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Community Effects of Cash-for-Work Programmes in Jordan

Effects on Host Communities' Local Economic
Development, Gender Roles, and Social Cohesion

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Foreword

This report presents the findings of a DIE research project on the indirect effects of Cash-for-Work projects in Jordan. It is based on an extensive literature review and empirical research conducted in Jordan by the authors of this study in during February through April 2019.

Preliminary findings of the research project have been presented and discussed at several workshops and conferences: on 17 and 25 April 2019 in Amman, on 14 May 2019 in Luxemburg, on 27 May 2019 and 04 December 2019 in Bonn, Germany, on 06 November in Frankfurt on Main, on 31 October 2019 and 29 March 2020 in Cairo and on 07 April in Athens. We did our best to take all feedback to the preliminary findings into consideration when writing the final draft of this report between January and May 2020. We should stress that the results, even though preliminary, have received substantial attention in the Jordanian media; for example, in April 2019 the Jordan Times had a long article on the DIE research project.

In this report, all names of persons are spelled as the individuals wished. The names of towns and other geographical terms have been transliterated into English according to American Library Association and the Library of Congress (ALA-LC) guidelines, the city of Amman being the only exception because of the fact that its name is regularly cited in press and in academic papers in the same non-ALA-LC-conform way.

By agreement, we do not quote any of our interviewees by name, date or affiliation. We have promised them beforehand to treat all information given by them confidentially.

Most sincere thanks go to all persons in Jordan, Germany and elsewhere who have supported us in our research. In particular, we express our deep gratitude to all interlocutors for their co-operation and the warm and pleasant atmosphere we were received in. Our very special thanks are addressed to the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan, and in particular to Yasmin AlDamen for her excellent and diligent support and feed-back to our research. In addition, we are also most grateful to Julie Weltzien and her entire team of the GIZ project ‘Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan’, who have supported our empirical research tremendously and allowed us to use the data collected during the first round of their GOZ post-employment survey conducted between January and November 2019. Finally, we express our most sincere thanks to all our interpreters as well as our bus drivers – without them, our research would not have been possible.

Bonn, May 2020,

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List of abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt / German Foreign Office
AAH	Action against Hunger (international NGO, established originally in France as “Action contre la faim”)
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
AVSI	Association of Volunteers in International Service
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
C4WW	Cash for Work/Water (one of three GIZ CfW programmes)
CCT	Conditional cash transfer
CfW	Cash-for-Work
CT	cash transfer
DEval	Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit / German Institute for Development Evaluation
DIE	Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / German Development Institute
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EUR	Euro(s)
FFA	Food/cash-for-Assets (CfW programme of WFP)
FFT	Food/cash-for-Training (CfW programme of WFP)
GDP	gross domestic product
GI	Green Infrastructure (one of three GIZ CfW programmes)
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (German agency for technical co-operation)
ICDF	International Cooperation and Development Fund of Taiwan
ILO	International Labour Organization
IO	international organisation
JLMPS	Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey
JOD	Jordan Dinar
JOHUD	Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development
KfW	KfW Development Bank
LED	local economic development
LFPR	labour force participation rate
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOSD	Ministry of Social Development
MU	Maastricht University
n/a	no answer
NAF	National Aid Fund
NARC	National Agricultural Research Center
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development

NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (India)
NZF	National Zakat Fund
ODA	official development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute (London)
RSCN	Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VNG International	International Activities of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)
WFP	World Food Programme
WtPE	Waste to (positive) Energy (one of three GIZ CfW programmes)
WVI	World Vision International

Executive Summary

The report at hand addresses the indirect effects of Cash-for-Work (CfW) programmes in contexts of flight and migration. Thus, effects on the community level are relevant for us, meaning that not only participants in the programmes benefit from them but that there are also important effects for non-participants.

CfW programmes are able to provide a double or even triple dividend, if implemented well: they provide (1) employment and thus income to vulnerable people; (2) infrastructure, as this is where the labour force is put to use; and (3) skills development if explicitly included in the set-up of the programmes. While CfW programmes are quite well-researched in low- and middle-income countries, we know little about their functioning in circumstances of flight and war. The study at hand addresses this gap, analysing CfW programmes' impact on host communities' social cohesion, gender roles and local economic development. As Jordan has welcomed between 600,000 and 1.2 million Syrian refugees since 2011, the social fabric of host communities has changed a lot and pressures onto the local labour and housing markets are high, in an already difficult economic situation for most Jordanians.

Analytical Framework

To best grasp CfW programmes' indirect effects on communities we combine the concepts of social cohesion and local economic development while applying a gender-sensitive approach.

Within the concept of social cohesion, we focus on two main components: horizontal trust (between societal groups) and social identity, which can be understood as sense of belonging to a community.¹ Social cohesion is relevant for the analysis of CfW because the fact that Jordanians and Syrians are working together in the programmes has an impact on community life, and thus certain aspects of social cohesion.

Gender is the second component of our analysis assuming that CfW programmes entail important elements empowering women socially but especially economically, which in the Jordanian context is all the more important since women are affected disproportionately by flight and displacement.

Local economic development as the third dependent variable follows the assumption that CfW programmes employ people and build infrastructure which will lead to more money in the community, via a multiplier effect.

1 This follows the definition of the "Social cohesion in Africa" projects at DIE.

Background and country context in Jordan

Due to its geographical location in the Middle East, Jordan's history is characterised by the accommodation of large numbers of refugees at different points in time. Refugees and migrant workers have shaped Jordanian history and are an important factor of Jordan's economic and societal life until today. As of 2018, Jordan hosts around 671,000 Syrian refugees that are registered with UNHCR (UNHCR 2018).

At the same time, the huge number of refugees and migrants poses significant challenges to social cohesion and local economies as Jordan struggles to offer services and employment to the growing population. This is in a context where a difficult economic situation and continuously high unemployment makes several parts of society struggle to make ends meet and threatens to strain relations between different societal groups (e.g. tribes; Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians) and state legitimacy.

Cash-for-Work and other social transfer programmes in Jordan

Jordan spends 12 per cent of GDP on public pension, health and social transfer schemes but these schemes mostly cover only formal sector employees, thereby excluding the poor. Furthermore, most of them cover only Jordanians; Syrian refugees have only access to the public health and education system.

Foreign donors have therefore set up parallel social transfer programmes that target explicitly Syrian refugees. Some of them are unconditional cash benefit and voucher schemes but since 2016 a whole range of CfW programmes has been established by quite different agencies, in most cases with funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development / Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). All employ Jordanians along with Syrians and females along with men because they are meant to (i) support Syrian refugees as well as vulnerable Jordanians, (ii) strengthen social cohesion between Syrians and Jordanians, (iii) reduce competition on the labour market and (iv) promote the integration of women into economic life.

Jordanian CfW programmes' total budget for the last five years was about 300 million Euros and they employed at least 70,000 workers during this time – typically for a period of 40-90 working days – in the rehabilitation and cleaning of infrastructure, the collection and recycling of waste, the rehabilitation of eco-systems (and municipal parks and the intensification of agriculture).

Research Methodology

We spoke to 380 interviewees in 295 semi-structured interviews with experts (national and local experts, mostly representatives of donor and implementing agencies) and community members (CfW participants, non-participants and shop keepers). We gained field access to ten CfW sites in Jordan mainly through international donor agencies and their local implementing partners and snowballed through them and through community associations and shop keepers. We selected smaller communities with large-scale CfW programmes and an appropriate level of awareness about the programmes.

Findings

While our findings confirm that CfW programmes offer positive direct effects for the participants of the programmes, the impact of the programmes on community level is small but noticeable. Regarding social cohesion, we found that the participation in CfW programmes strengthens the sense of belonging, especially of Syrians. The same holds true for horizontal trust. However, the relations between Syrians and Jordanians and thus their trust towards the respective other group have already been good before the introduction of the programmes so that their effect is rather marginal here. Still, since economic pressures remain high, heightened trust through CfW could help in preventing potential future tensions.

For gender, CfW programmes contributed to a change in the perception of female labour force participation in several studied communities. A significant example is the reduction of a shame culture around female employment in the waste sector. Furthermore, in comparison to other jobs, women see CfW programmes as a ‘safe environment’ and continue to look for employment opportunities after the programme ends.

In terms of LED, as participants indeed spend their income mostly locally, increased business activities are traceable to some extent. Yet, there is hardly any investment effect as people in need satisfy their basic needs first of all. These include housing (rent, electricity and water), food, household equipment and debt repayment.

Concerning project design, participants and non-participants understandably asked for a higher number of working days and skills training components. Our interviews show that practitioners continue to disagree whether CfW can or should lead to sustainable employment. Therefore, our study identified the clear need to develop stronger exit-strategies for CfW programmes, securing hand-over not only of created infrastructure and associated maintenance but ideally also of the programmes themselves to local authorities.

Policy recommendations

CfW programmes are recommendable also in conflict settings, as they have the potential to positively influence social cohesion and to empower women, who are disproportionately affected by flight and displacement. Project design choices need to take into account the existing relations between different societal groups and between genders. The duration of a given CfW programme in a specific host community and specific project design choices (like participatory set-ups, procurement regulations) decide to what extent indirect effects can be achieved.

While CfW programme seldom achieve a triple dividend, tailor-made project designs to fit a specific community context have the potential to do so. In other settings, aiming for a double dividend seems to be more realistic: For CfW programmes creating grey infrastructure we recommend a ‘classical’ focus on creation of infrastructure and employment. CfW programmes creating ‘green infrastructure’ should emphasise employment creation and skills training; here, in particular, participatory events can further social cohesion and possibly edge a CfW programme toward creating useful infrastructure, too.

Different considerations for CfW-built green and grey infrastructure should also inform choices about the number of working days in different CfW programmes. There is a trade-off between number of working days and people reached. So, for programmes not focusing on skills development short-term employment for many workers is recommendable, while other programmes may ‘deviate’ from classical CfW designs in favour of solutions oriented towards longer-term developmental choices. However, investment effects are not to be expected under the current CfW programmes; and negative psychological effects need to be countered by not fostering unrealistic expectations among CfW participants.

Implementation of CfW programmes by foreign donors, like in the Jordanian case, is the preferred option if state authorities do not want to take on full social responsibility for non-citizens but insist that independent implementers should step in. In this case, local authorities forgo potential legitimacy gains through successfully run programmes.

1 Introduction

The instrument of Cash-for-Work (CfW) has gained immense interest over recent years because evidence has increased that it can deliver a range of positive effects. Many low- and middle-income countries have built up CfW programmes because of their double effects: the provision of employment, and thus income and social protection, to vulnerable households and the building of dearly needed infrastructure in underdeveloped regions. More recently, international donors have started to apply CfW also in contexts of civil war, post-conflict reconstruction and forced migration.¹ Here, the hope is that CfW can also contribute to social cohesion and local economic development. Especially in Jordan, which hosts hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in addition to a large number of refugees² from other countries, many donors utilise CfW programmes to improve refugees' livelihoods and to step up host communities' resilience. The topic is urgent and delicate, as Jordan's public infrastructure is under immense strain and the country has been fighting massive un- and underemployment since long, well before the influx of Syrian refugees. On the first glance, the tool of CfW seems ideal to achieve the international communities' goals in the wake of the so-called Jordan Compact, which was agreed at the London conference in 2016.

However, while there is growing evidence on the many positive effects of CfW in general, very little is known so far on whether these effects materialise in conflict and post-conflict situations as well. In particular, hardly any study has looked at more indirect effects, especially on the 'meso-level', i.e. the level of local communities. To the extent that research or monitoring & evaluation projects have looked into CfW programmes, most have done so at a micro level, asking to what degree individual recipients' situations have improved.

In contrast, the study at hand focuses on CfW programmes' indirect effects in host communities. In particular, it investigates how the social and economic situation of Syrian refugees and Jordanian local population (both either CfW participants or non-participants) changes, in absolute terms and relative to each other. The guiding research question is to what degree and how social cohesion and economic opportunities – in particular for women – changed within host communities due to CfW programmes. Further, the study aims to identify ways in which CfW can be adapted to serve contexts of flight and migration better. Thereby, it addresses both, researchers and policy makers with an interest in Jordan and in CfW in general.

The study at hand looks at analytical frameworks to empirically examine social cohesion, gender, local economic development, and the analytical state of the art in regard to CfW (Chapter 2) before turning to the Jordanian case. It informs how Jordan's societally and economically difficult situation has been aggravated by the arrival of Syrian refugees (Chapter 3) and which

1 Forced migration is understood as migration that includes an element of coercion and thus a threat to life and livelihood (IOM 2011).

2 Following Article 1 of the "Convention relating to the status of refugees", a refugee is a person, who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country", cf. UN 1951.

social transfer programmes, amongst them CfW, have been set up in response (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 details the research design implemented during the field research phase and Chapter 6 presents the findings. The report closes with policy recommendations for the Jordan context and for the implementation of CfW in conflict-afflicted contexts in general (Chapter 7).

2 Analytical Framework

In order to understand the effects of CfW on social cohesion, gender and local economic development, all four terms have to be well defined and operationalised. The first three sections of this chapter, therefore, provide frameworks for the analysis of our three dependent variables (social cohesion, gender, local economic development), while Section 2.4 gives an overview of the concept of CfW, existing CfW programmes and the existing evidence of their direct and indirect effects.

2.1 Social cohesion

The term ‘social cohesion’ is increasingly used in social science literature but still lacks consensus on its exact meaning. In the following, we (i) present a working definition for our purposes, (ii) give an overview of ways to measure the phenomenon and (iii) list some possible factors and impacts of social cohesion.

2.1.1 Definition

Social cohesion is a vague and contested concept (UNDP 2016). While originally associated with general aspects of solidarity within a community or society, today the concept is often linked to heterogeneous societies that are experiencing tensions between various societal groups, such as between refugees and their host communities.

Based on an in-depth literature review of existing research of the concept, the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) conceives social cohesion as “the glue that holds society together”:

“Social cohesion refers to both the vertical and the horizontal relations among members of society and the state as characterised by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good.”³

This definition is henceforth used in this report.

3 This definition is currently used as a working definition by the research project ‘Social cohesion in Africa’ of the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). So far, it has been published only once in Burchi et al. (2020).

2.1.2 Measurement

DIE research, using publicly available, often public opinion, data and conducting surveys, evaluates three different parameters to measure the level of social cohesion across different dimensions within a community: trust, inclusive identity (sense of belonging), and co-operation for the common good.

Trust (horizontal and vertical): Literature on social cohesion considers two types of trust as being important for social cohesion: First, generalised trust or ‘outgroup’ trust that captures the ability of people across social groups to trust each other. In this study, we call this type *horizontal trust*. Secondly, political trust that measures underlying trust in the “formal, legal organisations of government and state, as distinct from the current incumbents nested within those organisations”.⁴ We call this type of trust *vertical trust*.

Inclusive identity (sense of belonging): The concept of an inclusive social identity is analytically distinct from the concept of personal identity. Personal identities are inherently subjective, whereas social identities are grounded in a shared understanding among individuals regarding specific social groups. Individuals can hold multiple social identities at the same time, and are subjectively ascribing emotional significance and priority to them. The more individuals in a given society agree over the meaning and content of their common social identity, the more cohesive said society is. In the context of this research, we call this variable *sense of belonging* since this term better captures whether or not a person’s social identity is related to his/her local community.

Co-operation for the common good: DIE understands co-operation for the common good as an individual’s voluntary consent “to take into account interests higher than his own”.⁵ The concept also includes the willingness of an individual or a group to pay a cost or make a concession in order for the larger community to receive a benefit. Therefore, the concept goes beyond the related notion of social capital that measures the willingness to cooperate for individual and mutual benefits.

The above-described attributes can be evaluated across three dimensions: Between state and individual (vertical), between groups (intergroup, horizontal) and between individuals (interpersonal, horizontal). Indicators are almost always measured by assessing public opinion data.

2.1.3 Factors and impacts

Few studies have produced robust results on what indicators impact a community’s social cohesion. Exceptions include political trust, the legitimacy of government and social protection,

4 Definition from the documentation of an internal workshop at DIE on 9-10 July 2018 on “Social Cohesion in Africa: Concept and Measurement”.

5 Definition from the documentation of an internal workshop at DIE on 9-10 July 2018 on “Social Cohesion in Africa: Concept and Measurement”.

which all seem to have a positive impact on social cohesion (Burchi et al. 2020). In addition, Wietzke (2014) finds that formal employment correlates with social behaviours that are typically associated with higher degrees of social cohesion. Ariely (2014) provides evidence that, in contrast, some forms of diversity (e.g. ethnic and linguistic fractionalisation) have a negative impact on general trust and solidarity and, hence, social cohesion. Similarly, Langer et al. (2017) show that in countries where group identities are strongly prioritised over national identities, national social cohesion is more likely to be threatened – and that societies with low levels of social cohesion tend to face more violent conflicts (ibid.).

Furthermore, various researchers suggest that, like for other marginalised groups, for women full integration into a socially cohesive society comes with more burdens and challenges than for male members of society (Segalo, 2015). Anzaldúa assumes that this is due to the fact that in societies in which people (of different gender, race, religion etc.) co-exist, their lives are so interwoven that it becomes difficult to distinguish between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ despite their differing lived experiences. For instance, while women in most societies are perceived as ‘insiders’ and legally allowed to participate in the community (e.g. by entering the labour force and being household heads), they are faced with higher burdens to do so (Anzaldúa, 1999).

Increasingly, researchers, policy makers and the general public around the world associate the notion of social cohesion with positive and negative changes to society as a result of immigration and refugee movements. However, there are very few studies on the impact of the presence of migrants and refugees onto a host society, especially in low- and middle-income countries (Langer et al., 2017). In addition, limited data sets and the risk of politicisation make it difficult to measure the impact of refugees on social cohesion (Ariely, 2014; Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017).

2.2 Gender

Gender is the second dependent variable of our analysis. We want to investigate the experiences and specific needs of females and males in the context of CfW programmes and try to find out to what degree CfW programmes can empower females in the context of crisis and migration. This is particularly important in the Jordanian context because flight and displacement often affect females disproportionately.

In the following, we (i) define the term ‘gender’, (ii) discuss why a gendered perspective is particularly important in the context of flight and migration and (iii) explain why the empowerment of females is also important for social cohesion and local economic development.

2.2.1 Definition

For our purposes, we adopt Carol Cohn’s definition whereby gender is “*a structural power relation [...], a social system which shapes individual identities and lives*” (Cohn 2013, p. 3).

Gender thus constitutes an “organizing principle” (Boyd, 2003, p. 2) and refers to the social construct of being male or female and consequences emanating from this categorisation (Cohn, 2013, p. 3). The term gender differs thus from the term sex, which refers to the biological attributes of men and women (UN DESA, 2004). Gender norms shape roles, expectations, identity constructions and behaviours associated with masculinity and femininity (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). Since gender is grounded in social interactions, it varies across regions, societies and time. Existing gender norms can empower or constrain rights and opportunities. For example, in patriarchal societies, the mobility and agency of females tend to be restricted.

We understand gender as fluid and non-binary, including identities that go beyond feminine and masculine. In addition, women and men are no monolithic categories. For reasons of practicability, this study still refers predominantly to the categories of male and female. But we do our best to take the diversity of experiences of both, females and males, into account.

We highlight in particular the experience of females. Of course, a gendered analysis of conflict should as well look at the set of attributes, behaviours, and roles associated with boys and men. However, as females often – and in Jordan in particular – face more social constraints than men do, the participation of females in social, economic and political life is particularly important for development (see for instance Cuberes and Teignier, 2012, or Sen, 1999).

2.2.2 The context of conflict and forced migration

A gendered lens on conflict and forced migration uncovers the unequal burden that females are carrying, hampering their access to resources, their participation or policy changes in favour of the diverse interests of females.

In conflicts, females are both a potential force to reduce security threats through their inclusion in social and political affairs, and a population at high risk (Bunch 2008). While males are the majority on the battlefield, they leave their wives behind. Some of them will turn into widows and hence be suddenly solely responsible for securing their and their children’s livelihood. And some may become victims of sexual abuse (Jacobsen, 2013). In addition, they are often affected by forced displacement. After conflicts, conditions

“tend to exacerbate women’s already unequal economic and social status relative to men [...]. Often, dire economic conditions after conflict foster corruption and criminality, while marginalised groups of women experience extreme income inequality, working in the informal economy and the most precarious employment positions in the labour market” (True, 2013, 3).

A return to violence can always occur in volatile post-conflict contexts and in fact, domestic violence raises after conflicts end (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013).

Women and girls make up around 50 per cent of any refugee, internally displaced or stateless population (UNHCR 2019). Gender affects all aspects of the migration and refugee experience. It influences the access to resources as well as treatment within economic, social and legal

structures. Female migrants and refugees are more vulnerable to physical, sexual and verbal violence carried out by members of host communities, public officials or by other refugees and migrants. Those who are unaccompanied, pregnant, heads of households, disabled or elderly are especially vulnerable. This perspective does not negate that male migrants and refugees are exposed to vulnerabilities, too. However, female migrants face double discrimination, as women and as migrants. They are generally less mobile when they need to take care of children or live in socio-cultural settings in which they fully depend on their husbands. In addition, more and more crises are protracted, prolonging displaced peoples' plight and forcing them into a state of long-term emergency, often depending on international aid assistance (Giles 2013).

2.2.3 The role of female empowerment

Many females are already powerful – or, in the context of flight and migration, resilient – and thus do not need to be empowered. Therefore, we understand the empowerment of females rather as a structural measure to support their own struggles and to open up new opportunities to fulfil their economic and social potential. Categories to define the empowerment of females include

“[...] women's sense of self-worth and social identity; their willingness and ability to question their subordinate status and identity; their capacity to exercise strategic control over their own lives and to renegotiate their relationships with others who matter to them; and their ability to participate on equal terms with men in reshaping the societies in which they live in ways that contribute to a more just and democratic distribution of power and possibilities” (Kabeer, 2008, p. 27).

Empowering females can be crucial for social cohesion and local economic development. A social structure that is marked by traditional division of labour between males and females (productive vs. reproductive) and spaces (public vs. private) may hamper the sense of belonging of females and their horizontal trust to other groups (Pateman, 1988). Likewise, an economy in which half of the population is mostly restricted to unpaid housework cannot strive as much as more dynamic and flexible societies. Therefore, the UN Peacebuilding Commission in its “Declaration on Women's Economic Empowerment for Peacebuilding” calls upon member states to “take measures to promote sustainable livelihoods for households led by women [...] in post-conflict societies, including through financial support and access to productive resources and sustainable income-generating activities” and stresses the “importance of assisting post-conflict countries in creating favourable conditions that can generate decent jobs for women” (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2013).

Section 2.4.2 below will show in what way CfW programmes can help to empower women both socially and economically.

2.3 Local economic development (LED)

The term ‘local economic development’ (LED) refers to a concept that shows the complexity and the interplay of the various dimensions of economic processes on a local level. We will use it to understand the economic benefits of CfW for communities (as opposed to economic benefits for individual participants).

In the following, we (i) provide a working definition for the term, (ii) elaborate on possible drivers of LED, and (iii) explain the so-called ‘multiplier effect’, which transforms a singular payment into a repeated benefit.

2.3.1 Definition and measurement

The concept of LED describes the sustainability of economic development processes on a local level. Just as economic development in general is more than just economic growth, we consider LED to be a multidimensional process, as well. In particular, equity, the inclusion of vulnerable groups and the reduction of multidimensional poverty (see Box 1) are taken into consideration. Local communities’ social, environmental, and political aspects of development are as much foci of analysis as are local labour, commodity and capital markets. This understanding is well reflected by the International Labour Organization’s (ILO, 2018) definition of LED as “promoting participation and local dialogue, connecting people and their resources for better employment and a higher quality of life for both men and women.”

Following this definition, LED entails the two goals quality of life and employment. While measuring employment is rather straightforward – and commonly done in national statistics collecting unemployment or labour market participation figures – quality of life is much more abstract and difficult to measure. People’s subjective perceptions about their material living conditions, their capabilities to access health or education services, as well as their social interactions, the respect of their basic rights, environmental pollution also play a role. In the local context, ways in which material living conditions are affected and leveraged by multiplier effects deserve particular attention (see below).

Box 1: The conceptual framework of multidimensional poverty

This study understands poverty as multiple deprivation of basic capabilities. Capabilities are “the substantive freedoms [a person] enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value” (Drèze and Sen, 2013, 43). They are determined not only by income and wealth, but also by education, health, social inclusion, political rights and many more. The capabilities of any person depend therefore not only on the person’s place of living and working but also of age, gender and social origin (class, family reputation, caste, ethnicity).

Thus, we argue, in accordance to Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC 2001) that poverty results from deprivation of one or more of the following subsets of capabilities:

- *Economic capabilities* refer to the ability to generate income, consume and have assets.
- *Human capabilities* include health, education, nutrition as well as access to clean water and shelter.
- *Political capabilities* comprise the respect of human rights, opportunities of political participation and to have some impact on public policies and political priorities.
- *Socio-cultural capabilities* are the ability to take part as a valued member of a society.
- *Protective capabilities* are resilience, i.e. the ability of people to resist economic and external shocks.

2.3.2 Drivers

In addition to traditional drivers of economic development, such as institutions, physical and human capital and technology, social or political capacities, locality factors and local business cycles are also important drivers of LED. The combination of those drivers and their resulting augmenting/multiplying effects also play an important role. For example, strong social or political capacities can compensate limited resources. However, weak community or political capacity, which could be due to corruption, disorganisation, or cronyism, can hamper LED so that an endowment with natural resources might not necessarily translate into good capacities. Thus, infrastructure, natural resource availability, geographical location, labour markets, capital investment, entrepreneurial climate, transport, communication, industrial composition, technology, size, export market, international economic situation, and national and state government spending can all be considered drivers of LED (Blakely and Leigh, 2017).

As CfW programmes are expected to achieve a double dividend by offering employment and creating infrastructure, this study highlights labour markets and infrastructure as key drivers of LED.

Labour markets: Labour markets are an essential element of LED. The skill level of the workforce in a region is an important factor for attracting industries. Thus, the ability to upgrade the skill level of the workforce through training, education and development is crucial for a region to remain competitive and respond to changing labour demand (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and To-maney, 2006). Various models highlight the importance of job creation and retention for LED. One example is the export-base/primary-jobs model that focuses on the effects of creating ‘primary’ jobs producing goods and services for export outside the respective local economy. The generation of income from the sale of these products increases purchasing power and demand for other products, which can be secondary or tertiary, and also offer new employment opportunities (Greenwood, Holt and Power 2010, see also below).

Infrastructure: Functioning infrastructure is essential for any kind of economic activity. In the context of LED, infrastructure subsectors such as energy, water and sanitation, telecommunications and transportation are particularly important. However, access to physical infrastructure alone does not foster gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth or social returns on a macro level. Studies find that a high level of poverty and bad governance weaken the effect of infrastructure on economic growth, while a competitive environment and well-made and clear regulations are associated with higher payoffs (Estache and Garsous, 2012).

2.3.3 Multiplier effects

In general, a multiplier effect can translate even minor inputs into considerable outputs. This effect stems from different processes, the most famous being the circulation of money within a closed economy: Here, every expenditure raises the income of not only the recipient but of many more people because the recipient of the payment again spends the additional income for her/his own purchases, and then the same money is spent over and over again to other people. As long as nobody in the local community saves part of her/his income or spends anything outside, the same first payment is recycled infinite times. If people save on average half of their income or spend half of it outside the community, in each round, half of the additional income from the last round generates new income. John Maynard Keynes has labelled this phenomenon the ‘multiplier effect’ (Keynes 1936, 117). And the multiplier m can be computed as follows:

$$m = \prod_{1}^{\infty} (1 - s - i) = \frac{1}{s + i} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} = 1 & \text{for } s + i = 1 \\ \rightarrow \infty & \text{for } s + i = 0 \end{array} \right.$$

Where s is the average share of the income that people save and i is the average share of the income that people spend outside the community.

A variant of this elementary multiplier effect comes about when employment is created: Somebody invests into a factory (e.g. a bread factory) and creates employment for several people in the region, who achieve higher income and can then buy the products of the investor (e.g. the bread).

Another variant is the so-called capacity effect, which results from a one-time investment into assets that enable or ease or cheapen production. Thereby, owners of production facilities enjoy increasing sales figures or falling production costs. The local community also benefits because the additional income or saved spending can be used for other items, generating the original variant of the multiplier effect.

For the analysis of LED, the multiplier effect is particularly important because it boosts the effects of one-time expenditures. This holds not least for the wages paid out by CfW programmes (Barrientos 2008). However, of course, the size of the effect depends totally on the assumption that the additional income is indeed spent locally. For example, if businesses are

not owned by locals, or labour is imported from outside the region, or local capital flows out of the region, the local community will benefit less from economic activity (Soifer, 2014).

In addition, is very little empirical evidence so far for the existence of the multiplier effect. Barrientos (2008) stresses that most empirical research focused on the impact of social transfers at the household level and thus found multiplier effects mainly on the level of assets and consumption of the beneficiaries. Only few studies have investigated the effects of social transfers on the local economy, partly also because few social transfer programmes have explicit economic growth objectives. One exception is a case study on Cambodia, which finds that social transfers have more positive impact on economic development if implemented along with productivity-enhancing local policies (Robinson and Levy, 2014).

2.4 Cash-for-Work programmes

CfW programmes provide employment and income to people without either. They can thus be seen as an instrument of passive labour market policies as they offer low-wage employment for people who face difficulties finding a job on the primary labour market. But they can also be seen as social transfer schemes providing benefits only on the condition that recipients work for the construction or rehabilitation of public goods such as physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, water systems, drains), environmental goods (e.g. municipal parks, river beds, forests) or services enhancing human capital (e.g. public health, education). This dual labelling is not astonishing as there is a huge overlap anyhow in the instruments used by social protection and labour market policies.

The fact that the receipt of transfers is conditional has a dual function. One is targeting, i.e. to make sure that only people in need will benefit from the programme – often referred to as ‘self-targeting’ or ‘self-selection’ mechanism. People who have a job or sufficient assets would not apply for a short-term job in the building of infrastructure. The other function is to achieve a double-dividend: (i) to provide income to jobless people and thereby alleviate poverty in the short term and (ii) to build useful infrastructure that improves the social and economic capabilities of people in the region and thereby addresses root causes of poverty in the long term.

CfW programmes have been set up since long in both, developing and developed countries⁶ and are implemented in a growing number of cases⁷ but, more recently, the instrument is also used in the context of conflict and migration. Here, the hope is to achieve even a higher-order goal, namely to prevent social unrest and thereby enhance political stability. CfW is thus strongly associated with the goals of social cohesion and socio-economic development (Reeg, 2017).

Synonymous or related terms for CfW programmes used by both academics and practitioners are (i) employment guarantee schemes, (ii) employment-intensive programmes, (iii) labour-intensive employment schemes and (iv) public work programmes (Gehrke and Hartwig, 2018, p. 112; Zepeda and Alarcón, 2010, p. 5; Keddeman, 1998, p. 2). Main foci and connotation of these terms differ slightly; for instance, employment guarantee schemes imply a fall-back mechanism over a longer term.

In the following, we (i) provide a definition for CfW programmes and (ii) present some evidence of their direct and indirect effects.

2.4.1 Definition

CfW programmes are characterised by the fact that they provide jobs to “poor households and individuals at relatively low wages”, mostly for the creation of infrastructure (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 112). Their aim is to reduce poverty and vulnerability and simultaneously create public goods, the so-called double dividend. Thereby, they provide social protection to eligible households.

The programmes fall into the broad category of conditional cash transfer schemes as they (i) are non-contributory and (ii) transfer benefits to people who are poor and without a job rather than people who have made a contribution previously or have experienced a specific kind of shock (illness, drought or death of the main provider of a family) and (iii) paid only under a specific condition. In the case of CfW schemes, the condition is labour while in other schemes –conditional cash transfers (CCT) in the narrower sense – it is, for instance and most commonly, that all minors in the household are enrolled in school and regularly go to medical check-ups. Both

6 Measures similar to CfW has been used in the antiquity by the Egyptians and Romans already who have employed farmers outside the harvest season to build streets and bridges and provide rural populations with additional income. More recently, the French government has set up ‘ateliers nationaux’ during the February revolution of 1848. Likewise, CfW was a key component of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal Policies launched during the Great Depression in the 1930s. The US Civil Works Administration created rapidly millions of temporary manual-labour jobs in the construction of roads, bridges and buildings. In developing countries, CfW saw a boom during the 1950s and 1960s and later again as instrument that was meant to cushion the adverse social effects of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and primarily employed by the so-called social funds (Stewart & van der Geest 1993).

7 For instance, CfW programmes were introduced in more than 94 low- and middle-income countries in 2015 alone (Reeg, 2017)

kinds of programmes aim at reducing poverty both, in the short run (through cash transfers) and in the long run (through investments into public goods respectively individual human capital).

CfW constitutes a form of social protection because their immediate costs typically exceed their short-term benefits, both in terms of created infrastructure and regarding higher spending power: First, the wages/ transfers paid to workers are by far higher than the value these add to public goods through their work as there are generally cheaper ways to build or restore public infrastructure. Second, there are also cheaper alternatives to CfW if the only aim is to transfer purchasing power to the population. Making the pay-out of social transfers conditional on beneficiaries' involvement in the construction of public goods is costly. The identification of useful infrastructure investments involves considerable expenditures just like its fine-tuning and implementation – not least because often the building materials are quite expensive. One way to reduce these costs is to purchase as many production inputs locally and thereby contribute to LED again.

In any case, CfW pay off only if they make a tangible contribution to both of their two goals, i.e. if they create considerable numbers of jobs for vulnerable households and also create public goods that are useful and capacity-widening in both the short and the long run.

CfW programmes can be set up by governments, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social funds, or private contractors (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018; Gehrke, 2015; Corser, 2018).

CfW programmes are implemented in quite different settings: (i) as short-term relief in contexts of conflict and crisis, (ii) as a stabiliser with a medium-term focus during economic recessions, and (iii) as employment guarantee schemes with a long-term timeframe (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 113; Roelen et al. 2018, p. 6-7). All three settings may or may not include training or skills development components.

2.4.2 Effects

In this report, we distinguish mainly between direct and indirect effects of CfW programmes. Effects are considered indirect if they are not the immediate results of CfW programmes but, for example, due to changes in the behaviour of the immediate recipients (such as the multiplier effect mentioned above or changes in social cohesion). Some evidence exists on the direct effects of CfW programmes in stable contexts but much less so on their indirect effects – especially in the context of conflict and migration.

Direct effects

Empirical evidence suggests that CfW can have positive effects on employment, income poverty reduction, resilience (social protection), infrastructure, and skills development. However, the significance of these effects depends to a large degree on the design of the respective CfW programme.

Employment: By definition, CfW has short-term employment effects, also in crisis contexts, as Reeg demonstrated for Yemen and Sierra Leone, where CfW acts as a safety net (Reeg, 2017). However, there is no clear evidence for general labour market effects. Gehrke and Hartwig (2018) find that the effect on employment can be either positive or negative as most CfW programmes pay wages substantially above market-levels with the effect that private employers feel obliged to raise their wages as well or replace workers by machines.⁸ Other authors confirm this finding by evidence from India (Bhargava, 2014), Yemen (Imbert & Papp, 2015) and several other countries (Reeg, 2017).

Income poverty reduction: Studies show that CfW programmes reduce income poverty (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018; Reeg, 2017) – at least among their beneficiaries and at least by the amount of transferred wages, yet the effect ends with the closing of the CfW schemes (Reeg, 2017).

Social protection (resilience of CfW participants): Many CfW schemes have a substantial impact on the social protection of their immediate beneficiaries (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018). Even programmes in conflict-affected countries such as Sierra Leone and Yemen have been able to reduce the vulnerability of participants to risks (Reeg, 2017, p. 5).

Infrastructure: Almost by definition, CfW programmes have an impact on the creation of public goods (most often infrastructure). But there are large differences with respect to the quality and sustainability of the built infrastructure. Here, the fact that works are undertaken by un-skilled CfW participants and not capital-intensive with the help of the latest technology can take its toll (Gehrke & Hartwig 2018). In addition, there is a wide variety of experiences with respect to which groups of people benefit most from CfW-created infrastructure (ibid.): urban or rural populations (e.g. streets in towns or villages); locals people or a greater number of less-affected people (e.g. village streets or long-distance overland roads); rich or poor people, e.g. landowners or landless field workers (e.g. irrigation versus drinking water supply systems).

Skills development: CfW programmes have an effect on the skills of participants only if the respective programme has a training component. However, the existence of a training component can distort the self-targeting mechanism: Not only the very poor may want to participate but also people who are mainly interested in the training. Gehrke and Hartwig thus advise to deliver trainings and CfW in distinct sub-projects (Gehrke & Hartwig 2018, p. 115). In addition, more extensive training should only be offered if it provides skills that are also needed elsewhere on the labour market (Estache, Ianchovichina, Bacon, & Salamon, 2013, p. 71). Ultimately, whether these skills can be transferred into higher income after the end of the programme depends on many factors (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, pp. 118-119).

8 In their study, they looked at 15 CfW programmes worldwide (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018).

Indirect effects

Less evidence exists on the more indirect effects of CfW programmes: on LED, the social protection of non-participants, investment, social cohesion and political stability, gender roles, education and health.

LED: CfW programmes can help to bridge gaps in essential infrastructure and thereby boost investment, production and trade. This may have a positive long-term impact on employment and poverty reduction but the empirical evidence for such effects is not yet entirely clear (Gehrke, 2015, pp. 1-2). In addition, different kinds of infrastructure have varying potential to boost LED, and the quality and maintenance of the produced infrastructure is also decisive for the size of the overall effect (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018).

In addition, CfW programmes can have positive impacts on income, growth and poverty reduction beyond the group of their participants through the *multiplier effect* but again, empirical evidence is sporadic. There is evidence that CfW participants spend most of their income on consumption but few studies confirm that they purchase mainly locally (Keddeman 1998). Tesitore (2013) found evidence for a small short-lived multiplier effect in Somalia. For Ethiopia, Filipski et al. (2017) demonstrate that CfW programmes had even nationwide impacts, though small ones.

Another assumption is that the participants of CfW programmes invest part of their wages in order to establish an income source from which they can draw when the CfW programme ends. However, there is few evidence for this assumption – possibly because the wages of most CfW programmes are too low and little predictable (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018). Only if programmes run for longer periods and with no restrictions on participation there is potential for productive investments (ibid.). For instance, one of the few positive examples is a CfW scheme in Sierra Leone, i.e. a post-conflict country, where Rosas and Sabarwal (2016) found that CfW participants are more likely establish new businesses.

Social protection: Gehrke provides evidence that CfW programmes can provide social protection beyond the group of participants. She shows that many poor households in India changed their investment behaviour when the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was set up, which guarantees all vulnerable rural households in India a minimum of up to 100 days of paid employment per year. Knowing that they can resort to NREGS in case of need makes even non-participants protected and ready to invest into assets with less stable rates of return (Gehrke 2017). In any case, CfW programmes seem to have the highest impact on aggregate income poverty levels if they are located in rural areas with underdeveloped labour markets (Zepeda & Alarcón, 2010, p. 5).

Social cohesion and political stability: It is also assumed that CfW programmes contribute to social cohesion and political stability. The argument goes that the programmes reduce poverty and create important infrastructure thereby improving people's well-being, social inclusion and satisfaction. As a result, social unrest is less likely, and citizens are more likely to accept the

existing political order (Burchi et al. 2020). Another assumption is that in crisis contexts, the existence of CfW programmes raises the opportunity costs of being part of an armed group (Reeg 2017). However, there is only limited evidence for these assumptions so far. Even Babajanian (2012), who published a whole study on the interplay between social protection and social cohesion, provides only very indirect indications for the assumed effects of CfW on social cohesion. Reeg (2017) stresses that such an effect depends on the (perceived) equality in access to CfW. At the same time, there is more ample evidence on the effects of other social transfer programmes on social cohesion. Evans, Holtemeyer and Kosec (2019), for example, show that the launch of a pilot conditional cash-transfer scheme in Tanzania increased the vertical trust in local governments. In addition, they reveal that the effect depends to some degree on people be aware of the fact that their local government was in fact involved in the design and establishment of the conditional cash transfer scheme and was larger where community members participated in the design process.⁹ Adato (2000) in contrast, shows that provides evidence that conditional cash transfers in Mexico have positive effects on community social relationships.

Gender roles: CfW programmes have a potential to empower females both economically and socially. They can provide women with access to labour markets in contexts where female labour force participation rates are low. Furthermore, they can enable women to participate in the rehabilitation of public goods, move and act in public as well as, through their income, possibly gain more influence over household decisions. However, most CfW programmes are implemented as short-term measures to ease sudden financial shocks rather than to alleviate poverty and foster social protection in the long term and hence are unlikely to empower women. In many countries, women tend to enter the labour market only if they have to because of financial stress rather than because they wish to gain equal rights. These women face chronicle cycles of impoverishment and it is hard to determine whether they have made an active choice to join the labour market or have been forced into it by the underlying circumstances (Kabeer, 2011). Even if CfW programmes have a positive impact on women's economic empowerment they may not change the social roles of females and males as research on the Indian NREGS shows (Sudarshan, 2011).

Whether women actually participate in CfW programmes depends on several factors. The willingness of women tends to rise (i) the more equal males and females are paid in the programmes, (ii) the closer CfW activities are to women's houses, (iii) the more similar the activities are to what women already do outside the household (e.g. if the activities are in agriculture) and (iv) if there are day-care facilities for the children of women next to the CfW sites (Kabeer, 2011). In contrast, if there are not, women may participate but with the unintended negative effect that older daughters are taken out of school in order to look after their younger siblings instead of the mother (Dammert et al., 2017; Sudarshan, 2011).

Education and health: Finally, CfW programmes can have positive effects on education and health as well – despite the possibility of school dropouts if children of – especially female –

9 Bastagli et al. (2018), Camacho (2014) and Hunter and Serghyama (2014) provide similar results.

CfW participants need to replace their parents on farms and in households (Dammert, de Hoop, Mvukiyehe & Rosati, 2017, p. 11). Gehrke (2015) argues, for example, that sanitation-related infrastructure can reduce the spread of diseases, which may lead to higher quality of labour supply in the end. Also, investment in school infrastructure can lead to higher school attendance rates and thus higher education levels.

Institutional sustainability: Concerning institutional sustainability, it is important to analyse how CfW fits into the local social protection framework, and whether international aid organisations can build on these structures in order to implement CfW programmes (Gehrke & Hartwig, 2018, p. 121; Zepeda and Alarcón, 2010, p. 3).

3 Background and country context of Jordan

We now turn to the case of Jordan, which is a very illustrative example of a country being strongly affected by flight and migration. In fact, refugees and migrant workers have shaped its history since independence in 1946 and they are an important factor of Jordan's economic and societal life until today. At the same time, they pose significant challenges to social cohesion and development as Jordan is a middle-income country struggling anyhow to offer social services and employment even to its own growing population.

This chapter describes the socio-economic situation of Jordan (Section 3.1) and the situation of refugees in Jordan (Section 3.2). Then it reports on social cohesion in Jordan (Section 3.3), the gender situation (Section 3.4) and local economic development (Section 3.5).

3.1 The socio-economic situation of Jordan

Jordan is an upper middle-income economy, which has achieved a comparatively high level of human development even though (i) it started from a very low level of human development in 1946, (ii) is almost land-locked, (iii) is surrounded mainly by unstable neighbouring countries, (iv) has hardly any natural resources and (v) had to integrate huge numbers of migrants throughout its history. This achievement can be attributed to a forward looking and balanced foreign policy and considerable financial support by both Western and Gulf countries throughout the decades (World Bank, 2016a).

The huge majority for the population is urban, with a high concentration in and around the capital city Amman and the north of Jordan. Between 2010 and 2016, the population grew from 6.7 million to 9.8 million (Department of Statistics Jordan, 2016; Krafft, Assaad & Keo, 2018). One factor for this increase was the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Syria, who constitute a considerable additional burden for the development of the country, which suffers already from limited water resources, bottle-necks in infrastructure and lack of employment (see in more detail below).

Yet, the presence of large numbers of refugees is by far not the only challenge for Jordan's social and economic development. The country still struggles for a coherent national, social, and political identity since its creation by European powers in the first half of the 20th century. Its society and politics are deeply influenced by strong rival tribes and an authoritarian monarchy. Both co-operate to uphold their say in society and polity, thereby limiting the potential of democratisation. This stalemate nurtures growing discontent in the population and provokes sporadic protests, which culminated in weekly demonstrations in front of the prime minister's office in Amman between June and December 2018 and a march of people from the South all across Jordan to the Royal Court in February 2019, where they staged a sit-down strike.

While in June 2018, people demonstrated mainly against a tax reform (which was then postponed and later brought back onto the table in a slightly different form), at the end of 2018 discontent was growing especially among the youth, who saw no promising perspective any more in their country. They felt that nothing had really changed since their protests almost seven years earlier during the so-called Arab Spring 2011 (Ramadan, 2018).

3.2 Refugees in Jordan


Due to its geographical location in the Middle East and its relative political stability, Jordan's history is characterised by the reception of large numbers of refugees throughout the decades. This trend started even before the country became independent but accelerated thereafter:

- In 1948/49, some 500,000 Palestinians fled from lands that became part of Israel and added to a local population, which counted just about 400,000 people itself.
- In 1967, some 380,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which had both been occupied by Israel during the Six Day War.
- Between 1975 and 1990 about one million Lebanese and Palestinians came from Lebanon to escape the Lebanese Civil War. (Most Lebanese returned though during the 1990s.)
- In 1982, a small group of Syrians came to escape from the massacre of Hama.
- In 1991, some 350,000 Jordanian and Palestinian migrant workers returned from the Gulf countries: first from Kuwait because of the country's occupation by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and then from Saudi-Arabia and other countries, which expelled people with Jordanian passports to sanction the fact that Jordan had remained neutral in the war between the Gulf states and Iraq.
- During the 1990s, some 250,000 Iraqis fled to Jordan to escape from persecution, violence and the bad economic situation in their own country.
- And during the 2000s, another 750,000 Iraqis followed to escape from the civil war that started after the US American occupation of their country. (However, most Iraqis have in the meantime returned to their country.)

- At the same time, a considerable number of Egyptians came as labour migrants. (Many have returned to Egypt again but some 600,000 Egyptians are still residing in Jordan.)
- After the uprisings in several Arab countries in 2011, about 20,000 people came from Libya, about 30,000 from Yemen, some from Egypt and Somalia and up to 1.3 million from Syria (De Bel-Air 2016).

Today, Palestinians represent the largest group of non-natives in Jordan even though it is difficult to estimate their total share on the population: all Palestinians who came until 1949 or resided in the West Bank until 1967 were conceded Jordanian passports, thus they and their descendants are counted as Jordanians in national statistics. Guesses of their number range between 1.6 and 4.5 million (25-70%), which would mean that only between 2 and 5 million (30-75%) of the population of Jordan originate in fact from its current territory. Exact data exist only on the number (634,182) of Palestinians who came to Jordan from the Gaza Strip or Israel after 1949 and their descendants because they were not given a Jordanian passport but only an identity card (Department of Statistics Jordan 2015, see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Jordanian population by country of origin



Apart from the Palestinians, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Jordan by 2019 registered about 654,000 Syrians, 67,000 Iraqis, 15,000 Yemenis, 6,000 Sudanese and 2,500 people from 25 other countries (UNHCR, 2020). On top, many more unregistered refugees are living in Jordan. These include, among others, an estimated 17,000 Syrian Palestinians, who could not register because the government of Jordan forbid Palestinians from Syria to seek refuge in Jordan (Grawert, 2019, p. 37). Some estimates tax the actual number of Syrians living in Jordan to more than 1.2 million (see Figure 1), while other sources argue that their number cannot be much higher than 500,000 (Krafft et al., 2019).

Finally, Jordan also hosts a considerable number of migrant workers, some 600,000 alone from Egypt (Schubert & Haase, 2018, p. 102; see also Figure 1).

As only about 20 per cent of refugees live in camps, their presence has a strong impact on economic and social life in their host communities. The refugees need water, food, shelter, clothes, education for their children as well as medical treatment (Hagen-Zanker & Mallett, 2016; Schubert & Haase, 2018).

Despite the fact that the Jordanian-Syrian border was recently opened again, it is unlikely that many Syrian refugees will return to Syria in the coming years. In general, Syrian refugees only returned infrequently as there are still persistent concerns regarding the security situation in their country and due to a new Syrian property law that effectively expropriates many refugees of their previously owned premises (Human Rights Watch 2018). A study on the mobility of Syrian refugees finds that in addition to the security situation, low provision of education, health and basic services in Syria deter refugees from returning (World Bank, 2019a).

In order to gain official recognition and enjoy some social benefits (e.g. food services and free treatment in Jordan's public health system, see Section 4.1), Syrian refugees need to register with an office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and then with the Jordan Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which gives them a magnetic 'MoI service card' or 'security card' (*biṭāqa amniyya*). Until March 2019, 654,266 Syrians had registered with UNRWA (out of which 299,168 at working age) (UNHCR 2020) but only about 405,000 with the MoI (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs, & Holmes, 2018).

On average, the Syrians have just 285 JOD for spending per household and month, and 69 per cent of their spending is for housing – just 11 per cent for health, respectively food, 9 per cent for education and 8 per cent for transportation. As a result, 17 per cent of the adolescents suffer from hunger, while 35.5 report chronic illness (Jones et al., 2019).

Syrian children are entitled to go to school but 20 per cent of them are still not yet enrolled – for different reasons. 41 per cent of students have experienced corporal punishment and discrimination (Jones et al., 2019).

3.3 Social cohesion in Jordan

Despite the presence of large numbers of refugees, social cohesion in Jordan is not weak, though put under pressure. The country benefits from the fact that traditional social norms are still strong, that there is some degree of national identity and that the dominant group identity is with the tribes (especially in rural regions and among original Jordanians), which stretch across state borders far into neighbouring countries.

This section provides an assessment of social cohesion in Jordan (3.3.1), information on national campaigns that were launched to strengthen it (3.3.2) and some preliminary evidence on the impact of refugee and migrant presence on social cohesion in Jordan (3.3.3).

3.3.1 Political and national identity in Jordan

Jordan still struggles for a national political identity due to its origins as a former British colony – after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Jordan's borders were effectively drawn by European powers –, its political system headed by the traditional monarchy and the broader political and social landscape in the Arab world.

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, three different visions of political community – Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*), state-centric nationalism (*wataniyya*), and the Islamic *ummah* (global community of Muslims) – have struggled for cultural loyalty within the Arab world, thus, challenging Jordan's national identity and social cohesion within the country as well (Lucas, 2008). In addition, and perhaps even more important, the tribes claim to be the natural and foremost focus of identity instead of the modern nation state (at least for the original Jordanians but also, perhaps to a lower degree, for many original Palestinians).

The tribes indeed have a strong say on political decisions. While the country is, by law, a constitutional monarchy, in fact parliamentary autonomy has been minimal, and the king holds a significant share of the power. Despite elections being held every three years, the process of democratisation in Jordan has frequently been described as a façade. The parallel existence of two systems of political authority – traditional authority of the monarchy and the state-authority of institutions – has created a situation of incompatibility that also leaves the question of national identity to open debate (Lucas, 2008). But even the king's legitimacy derives from traditional claims of kinship, religion, and Bedouin identification (Al Oudat & Alshboul, 2010; Melián Rodríguez 2018). As a result, even the king is not free to take decisions on major issues but always has to take the opinion of the main tribes of the country into consideration.

At the same time, social cohesion is strong within local communities. Several studies provide evidence for Jordanians having a strong feeling of belonging to their respective local communities and much trust in their neighbours – even if these have recently arrived from outside the community or even Jordan. Key drivers of mutual trust seem to be age, common interests and geographic proximity rather than nationality or religion (e.g. Kuhnt et al. 2017).

3.3.2 Government initiatives to promote national identity and social cohesion

Since the early 2000s, the Government of Jordan has increasingly emphasised the need to build social cohesion and national identity within the country through a variety of campaigns and national plans. In 2002, King Abdallah II launched a national campaign under the slogan ‘Jordan First’. It aimed at propagating the principles of rule of law, accountability, pluralism and equality as a means to modernise the Jordanian society and unify it behind a common national goal (Al Oudat & Alshboul, 2010). Nevertheless, state institutions substantially control political and civic associations, and Jordanian law still prohibits critical statements concerning the king, government institutions, and Islam (Human Rights Watch 2019).

Since the start of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Government of Jordan has also focused more strongly on building social cohesion and resilience within local communities. The three national plans formulated since 2015 to mitigate the refugee crisis – the Regional Refugee Resilience Plan, the Jordan Response Plan and the three-year National Resilience Plan – all include various social cohesion initiatives, particularly in the labour sector, such as the creation of employment opportunities, vocational training offers, apprenticeships and job-placements (Reach & British Embassy, 2014).

Unfortunately, only little research has been conducted on the effects of these efforts on social cohesion within Jordanian host communities (Kuhnt, Rischke, David, & Lechtenfeld, 2017).

3.3.3 Impact of refugee presence

In major host communities, social cohesion seems to have suffered from the presence of refugees, though only modestly. REACH found 160 communities in Jordan’s northern governorates (‘Ajlūn, Al-Balqā’, Jerash, Irbid, Al-Mafraq and Al-Zarqā’) to have experienced a weakening of social cohesion as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis (Reach & British Embassy, 2014). Likewise, Kuhnt et al. (2017) argue that the level of social cohesion in Jordanian communities (measured by mutual trust, sense of belonging and participation in community events) has slightly decreased on average during recent years – in particular between Jordanians and non-Jordanians (Kuhnt et al., 2017).

This trend is mainly due to the fact that the presence of refugees in Jordan is exerting additional pressure on already strained infrastructure, social services and the labour market (see Section 3.5 below). A joint report by UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP (2014, pp. 8, 10) stresses that several times tensions erupted between different population groups in Northern Jordan mainly because of increasing stress on resources such as water, housing and jobs. Reportedly, the situation in Al-Mafraq deteriorated most significantly. Here, rents skyrocketed and wages fell considerably because large numbers of Syrians in town were ready to accept any shelter and any job to survive (Grawert, 2019, p. 20; Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 3). Likewise, increasing demand for water has reduced the available amount of water per inhabitant, which has led to tensions in some municipalities (REACH 2015). Many schools have adopted double-shifts to accommodate also

Syrian children but classrooms are still over-crowded and the quality of education has worsened (Kuhnt et al. 2017).

Still, these trends did not put an end to the deep solidarity lived between Jordanians and Syrians. Betts et al. (2017), for example, acknowledge that tensions and conflicts over scarce resources increased when Syrians arrived in large numbers in the Al-Mafraq area. But they mention also that the solidarity between Jordanians and Syrians has endured because of longstanding kinship ties between the Jordanian host communities in Al-Mafraq and the communities of origin of many Syrian refugees.

Interestingly, many reports highlight the North of Jordan as the place where social cohesion was particularly under threat because most Syrians found refuge there, while we had the impression that social cohesion between Jordanians and Syrians in the North of Jordan is astonishingly strong (see Section 5.1). In addition, we heard often that there were much stronger tensions in the South of Jordan. Observers explained this by the fact that people in the North of Jordan and Southern Syrian belong to the same tribes, while there are quite different tribes in the South of Jordan. Because of this, the initial solidarity might erode faster in the South and Centre of Jordan than in the North. Grawert (2019) shows for two ‘Palestinian’ quarters of Amman that the solidarity with Syrians was initially high (perhaps because of the common experience of flight) but has been eroding over time because of conflicts over resources.

Apparently, social cohesion in schools has decreased in particular, with worrying consequences for refugee children. UNICEF finds that Syrian refugee children and youth are increasingly isolated and face mounting problems in access to education (Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 5). Other sources confirm that 1,600 Syrian children dropped out of the Jordanian school system in 2016 alone (Matteo Valenza, 2016; Grawert, 2019). Kuhnt et al. (2017) also note that tensions between young men are a growing concern, with Jordanian schools being among the places where social tensions erupt most frequently and openly.

3.3.4 The impact of external aid

In some communities, foreign aid has also contributed to weakening social cohesion. For instance, some foreign donors spurred competition over scarce resources by providing housing subsidies to Syrian refugees: these subsidies turned out to be goldmines for Jordanian homeowners and severe disadvantages for Jordanian tenants bidding for the same apartments as Syrians (Grawert, 2019, p. 23).

A study by REACH indicates that many of the surveyed respondents have the impression that bi- and multilateral donor agencies do not allocate their support to the most vulnerable affected by the refugee crisis and accuse them for corruption. This sentiment was found to be considerably higher among Jordanian than Syrian respondents, and higher among females than males.

The study concludes that external support frequently is a major source of tensions and frustration in host communities and leads to decreasing trust in local public authorities (Reach & British Embassy, 2014).

3.4 The gender situation in Jordan

In many domains, Jordan has made progress towards gender equality (e.g. education, health, legal provisions). However, in terms of economic and social empowerment, little or nothing has been achieved recently because of the prevalence of traditional role models of females and males.

This section sheds light on the multiple experiences that different groups of females are facing in Jordan (3.4.1) and what role the Syria crisis and the arrival of huge numbers of refugees play in this regard (3.4.2).

3.4.1 The situation of Jordanian women

On paper, women enjoy almost the same legal rights as men in Jordan, but in practice, they still face multiple gender-specific constraints. Patriarchal norms and traditional gender roles persist. Despite reform efforts, many legal loopholes remain that allow unequal treatment of men and women (ARDD, 2019). Another example are decisions over household expenses, even when women contribute to the households' income (Shteiki, 2015), or practices through which women become heavily indebted in the name of their husbands, as it is easier for females to gain access to credits (ARDD, 2019). Furthermore, young women often face family pressure to marry early.

With regards to education and health, Jordan has made substantial progress toward gender equality. Gross school enrolment rates of females exceed those of males since several years on the primary (more than 100 per cent for both) and secondary (66 against 64 per cent) and tertiary education level (34 against 30 per cent). Likewise, life expectancy for females is higher than for males by a factor that is similar to that of high-income countries (76 versus 73 years at birth) (World Bank 2019b).

With regards to economic inclusion, however, Jordanian women are at a clear disadvantage in comparison to men. They are still underrepresented in most business sectors and, in 2016, their labour force participation rate (LFPR) was just 17% – and even falling from 23% in 1990 – compared to 63% for men (Krafft, Assaad & Keo, 2018).

The huge gap is mainly due social norms prescribing women a place in the household rather than in gainful employment. Many women (Syrians just like Jordanians) would be willing to engage in paid employment. According to a study by REACH and UN Women, they share “a sentiment that they would be better off if they were able to work and provide for their families

themselves, rather than be dependent on aid in Jordan”. Also, many are already involved in small informal (non-registered) activities (e.g. tailoring, cleaning houses, tutoring, cooking for neighbours and family members). And still, most women interviewed for the same study do not see a chance to enter the formal labour market even though they would prefer a more stable and formal engagement in the labour market (*ibid.*). This is particularly true for women with low levels of education and training, but even well-educated women tend to withdraw from the labour market when they marry because cultural norms prevent them from taking up work (World Bank, 2016a).

Also the working conditions in Jordan provide disincentives for women to engage in formal sector jobs: (i) There is a lack of well-paid jobs in Jordan in general but, in addition, cultural stereotypes ban women from physically demanding jobs and some employers prefer hiring men; (ii) Jordan’s legal provisions for maternity protection at the workplace and for maternity leave are insufficient and too little reliable; (iii) there are only few reasonable and affordable child care facilities; and (iv) there is a real risk of harassment and discrimination at the workplace and in over-crowded public means of transportation to workplaces (Staton, 2018).

3.4.2 The situation of female Syrian refugees

Yet, the situation seems to be still worse for Syrian women than for Jordanian women. They constitute the majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan – probably because many of their husbands have either died in the war in Syria, are still fighting there (Krafft & Sieverding, 2018; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014), or have embarked on the dangerous flight to seek asylum in Europe. As a result, 22 per cent of the Syrian households in Jordan are headed by women (Tiltne, Zhang, & Pedersen, 2019). This fact may also be one of the reasons why Syrian women are particularly often victims of violence. One third of refugee women in Jordan report having experienced sexual violence at least once in their life-time and over half of them have experienced emotional abuse, with husbands being the most common perpetrators (GBVIMS, 2017). The real share is probably much higher because a strong stigma persists and a large majority of women prefers to stay silent about the subject (ARDD, 2019; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014).

Early-marriage is another issue – mainly for Syrian women in Jordan who marry at a much younger age than they used to do before the war in Syria (Tiltne, Zhang, & Pedersen, 2019).¹⁰ Apparently, many parents try to marry off their daughters as early as possible as a way of sustaining their own livelihood (UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014, p. 8).

10 While only 3% of 15-year-old Syrian women were married before the war, their number has risen to 14%. Also, men appear to marry earlier: in Jordan, 23% of them are already married at the age of 20 (Tiltne, Zhang, & Pedersen, 2019, p. 8).

3.5 Local economic development in Jordan

In parts of Jordan, the presence of refugees challenges LED, as a result of increased pressure on infrastructure, social services and the labour market.

This section presents challenges for LED resulting from bottle-necks in infrastructure (3.5.1) and the labour market (3.5.2) but also from the ‘Jordan Compact’ (3.5.3), which is an initiative of the international donor community seeking to enable and regulate the access of Syrian refugees to the Jordanian labour market.

3.5.1 Infrastructure challenges

Jordan faces numerous infrastructure challenges, especially in the domains of water, energy, transportation and schools. As about 80 per cent of Syrian refugees live in host communities, their presence has severely added to the infrastructure problems. However, the need to solve these problems also offers the opportunity to create jobs to absorb parts of the unemployed and underemployed population – a fact that international aid agencies duly considered in the design of CfW programmes.

Amongst both Jordanians and Syrians, three sectors – water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), solid waste management, and livelihoods (i.e. housing and employment) – are considered to be most affected by the presence of refugees. Jordanian nationals complain mainly about an increase in water shortages, waste management problems and a shortage of affordable housing (ESCWA, 2018). Syrian households, in contrast, cited rising costs of living and competition on the labour market as their most important concerns (Lockhart and Barker, 2018, p. 1), which is due to regulatory barriers preventing Syrians from entering the formal labour market (Reach & British Embassy, 2014).

Water and sanitation: Water is the most pressing infrastructure challenge in Jordan: 93 per cent of the population in Jordan have access to safely managed drinking water services (World Bank, 2018) but it has become increasingly difficult for the authorities to maintain this standard. Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries world-wide, and its groundwater reserves are depleting quickly. In addition, the water sector faces challenges with respect to maintaining the water network, extending wastewater treatment capacities (World Bank, 2019a) and distributing existing water resources across the country: while the government was able to raise the water supply in order to care for a quickly rising population these efforts resulted in increasing energy costs due to the high energy intensity of the water sector (World Bank, 2016a). Challenges with regard to sanitation services have also increased, especially in the North of Jordan where the connection rate to a sewage system had previously already been lower than in other parts of Jordan (World Bank, 2019a).

Energy: The provision of energy is another major issue. Access to energy is almost universal (97% of all Jordanian houses are connected to the electric grid, see World Bank, 2018) but the

country is highly dependent on energy imports (mainly natural gas imported from Egypt). In recent years, Jordan has suffered severely from interruptions in the supply of gas supply and volatile world market prices of energy (World Bank, 2016a).

Transportation: Due to its geographic location and its trade and service-oriented economy, transport in Jordan is an essential determinant for the functioning of the economy. Currently, most roads are in a good state but there is lack of funding for their future maintenance. Even more serious is the lack of public transportation for people and goods – a problem that also negatively impacts on labour market participation and further education and training (World Bank, 2016a).

Education: Jordanian schools are severely overcrowded and often operate in double shifts. This was already the case before the influx of Syrian refugees but has intensified since then. A large share of the refugees are children at school age.

Most of these problems are, first of all, an issue on the local level. On the one hand, municipalities carry a large share of the responsibility for infrastructure provision, especially road construction and maintenance, solid waste management, street lightning and cleaning and the management of public spaces and establishments. The provision of water, energy, schools and health services is organised at the national or governorate level but much of the construction remains in the hand of municipalities as well (World Bank, 2016a). In addition, municipalities are often key actors in the hosting and caring for refugees (Betts et al., 2017).¹¹ On the other hand, gaps in infrastructure normally affect most of all people in the same community rather than in other parts of the country (problems with energy provision being a major exception). Local communities have therefore a strong interest in bridging these gaps themselves.

3.5.2 Labour market challenges

The Jordanian labour market has always been strained. The repeated inflow of large numbers of refugees throughout the past 70 years is only one factor. Crucially there are high natural population growth, attempts to curtail the over-bloated public sector, labour market segmentation, qualification mismatches and low productivity growth.

Lack of employment remains a major, if not the main problem of Jordan. The official unemployment rate has remained at around 14% for the total population since 2000 and youth unemployment stands at even more than 30%. However, the unemployment rate itself is only of secondary importance: Jordan has no unemployment benefits, so only those who have sufficient financial reserves or secure financial support from friends or relatives can allow themselves to be completely unemployed. Much more important is the fact that another 37% are only part-time at work but could stay longer (quantitative underemployment) and 19% are full-time at

11 In the Jordanian context, Betts et al. (2017) find that tribal affiliation was the most important explanation for sub-national variation in the way refugees were received.

work but could do much more during working hours (qualitative underemployment, World Bank 2019b, see Figure 2).

The problem pertains despite a comparatively low offer on the labour market. The population of Jordan increased by almost 50% during the last six years, and its working age population grew by even 60% (World Bank, 2019b). Half of the increase is due to immigration, the other half to natural demographics. However, only a relatively small share of the population is actually on the labour market: Jordan has one of the lowest LFPRs in the world among both, men and women. (Krafft, Assaad, & Keo, 2018). It has been fluctuating at around 40 per cent since 1993, meaning that almost two thirds of the working age population do not participate in the labour market (World Bank, 2016a). This is mainly due to the fact that the LFPR among females has even decreased to 17% in 2016, while the LFPR of males remained almost stable at slightly above 67% (World Bank 2019b).

The main cause of underemployment is on the demand side: Jordan's private sector is not creating enough jobs. Many entrepreneurs argue that they face too many problems in terms of bureaucratic hurdles, corruption, access to land and credit as well as taxes (Al-Nashif & Tzanatos 2013).

Other entrepreneurs, in contrast, state that they would invest more and thereby create more employment if they could find the kind of workers that they would need. Especially trendsetting industries such as the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector lacks adequately trained staff. This is due to weaknesses in vocational training and higher education, but also to the lack of interest of many Jordanians in the respective occupations and the unwillingness of many employers to themselves invest into the training of their own workforce. Furthermore, especially small business owners are often unable or unwilling to check the qualifications of job applicants but instead rely on the recommendations of friends (Assaad, Krafft & Salehi-Isfahani, 2014), keeping productivity low and precluding further investments.

At the same time, numerous jobs have been created recently but not been filled with Jordanians. Instead, company owners employed migrant workers from Egypt, China or the Philippines or refugees from Syria, Iraq and Yemen claiming that many Jordanians request higher wages and refuse certain kinds of work (e.g. in construction, in agriculture or in private households). Many foreigners, in contrast, are even prepared to work without working contracts, social insurance and workplace protection (World Bank, 2016a). Some authors (source?) suggest that many Jordanians are gambling: they accept unemployment for a while because they still hope to get one day a well-paid job in the public administration or in the Gulf, in Europe or North America.

As a result, the Jordanian labour market is still segmented in several ways, and it is difficult to move from one segment to another:


Internal vs. external: The most important segmentation is that between Jordanians working at home and those who have found a job abroad. The latter account for as much as 15% of the total working population of Jordanian citizenship: around 8% work in the Gulf, 4% in North

America and 2% in Europe. On average, their incomes exceed by far the incomes of those Jordanians who work in the own country (source?).

Public vs. private sector: In addition, well over 21% of Jordan's total working population enjoy an employment in the public sector (army, security services, administration, judiciary, higher education, state-owned enterprises). This large number of jobs constitutes an important part of the social contract in Jordan. The total number of public sector jobs has declined in recent years, but the state still uses the allocation of employment to reward certain groups of the population for their loyalty. As a result, most public officials are from originally Jordanian rather than Palestinian families, and the army employs almost exclusively members of the most reliable tribes. Salaries in the public sector tend to be lower than in the private sector but for many Jordanians this is overcompensated by job security, pension entitlements, health insurance and regular working hours. (World Bank, 2016a).

Migrants vs. Jordanians: As a result of the huge number of refugees and migrant workers, the Jordanian labour market is roughly comprised of three different groups – Jordanians, refugees, and migrant workers (Razzaz, 2017). Around 28.8% of the labour force are non-Jordanians according to the Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) 2016. Egyptian and other Arab migrants constitute the big majority of non-Jordanian workers, followed by Syrians. Further, the majority of male workers is Arab, while most of the female foreign workers are Asians, who come as migrant domestic workers. Many of the foreign workers are either low skilled or have higher education profiles and compete with their Jordanian peers for jobs that require higher education (World Bank, 2016a).

Figure 2: Employment status of workers aged 15-54 by nationality 2016



Formal vs. informal sector: Within the private sector, there is additional segregation between formal and informal jobs. Two thirds of all workers in the private sector are informally employed (self-employed or employed without employment contract) (World Bank, 2016a). However, while half of all Jordanian nationals have a formal job in the public or private sector, the huge majority of the Syrians and other nationalities are in the informal sector (see Figure 2). This shows that Syrians are likely to compete over jobs with other migrants rather than with Jordanians (Krafft, Fallah, et al., 2018).

3.5.3 Syrians in the Jordanian labour market and the Jordan Compact

Syrians face significant barriers to entering the Jordanian labour market. Like other non-Jordanians, they must apply for a work permit from the Ministry of Labour. In addition, they are not allowed to work in so-called ‘closed occupations’ (which have been proclaimed several years ago as an instrument to promote the “Jordanisation” of the labour market), even if there are no qualified Jordanian to fill vacant jobs in these sectors (World Bank, 2019a). And finally, they are subject to a minimum wage of just 150 JOD per month (190 Euros), which is below the minimum wage rate for Jordanians (220 JOD per month) (ILO, 2017).

Therefore, the Jordan Compact was established in 2016 between Jordan and the international community. It is meant to help Syrians generate their own income and thereby shift the engagement of donors “from short-term humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation” for Jordanians and Syrians alike (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, & Mansour-Ille, 2018, p. 2). As part of the compact, the Government of Jordan promised to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrians and to provide formal jobs in specific economic sectors.¹²

So far, however, the government has mainly formalised existing jobs rather than creating new ones. Furthermore, most of these jobs are in the special economic zones (SEZs) and hence far from the places where most refugees live. The Syrians depend therefore on the poor public transportation system to get to the jobs (Staton, 2018), often precluding Syrian women from available jobs in the textiles sector because childcare duties stand against long commutes (Lerner & Turner 2018). In addition, employers in SEZ seem not very interested in employing Syrians as they are content with other migrant workers (mostly Asian workers living on site, *ibid.*) and, often, Syrians do not know the SEZs (Tiltnes, Zhang, & Pedersen, 2019, p. 13).

As a result, only a third of all Syrians at working age have applied for a work permit, so far (Tiltnes, Zhang, & Pedersen, 2019, p. 13). Most try to get a job on the informal labour market, where they compete with other migrants but also with low-skilled Jordanians of Palestinian origin (Grawert 2019). One reason is that the works permits are associated with too few benefits (*ibid.*) and with high costs for social security contributions (World Bank 2019). In addition,

12 The main reason for both, the earlier closure of the Jordanian labour market and the current sector restrictions, are concerns by the Government of Jordan that – like Palestinian refugees before them – Syrians may permanently settle in Jordan (Grawert, 2019, pp. 40-41).

many Syrians still do not know that they can get a work permit: half of the interviewees of a survey conducted in 2019 had not been aware of this possibility (Jones et al., 2019).

In particular, only very few Syrian women have applied for a work permit. Until mid-2019, 156,761 work permits have been issued but only 7875 were for women (UNHCR 2020). One possible factor is that the sectors that are open for Syrians are not considered suitable for females among Syrian refugees.

4 CfW and other social transfer programmes in Jordan

Jordan has a quite elaborate public social protection system, which includes both, contributory social insurance and non-contributory social transfer schemes, but these schemes cover only Jordanian citizens and long-term residents. Foreign donors have therefore set up, in parallel, social transfer programmes targeting Syrian refugees (in part along with vulnerable Jordanians), which are entirely financed by multilateral and bilateral foreign donors and run by international or national non-government organisations or sub-ordinate public institutions (co-ordinating only loosely with Jordan's ministries). The bulk of these latter programmes are CfW schemes, which are again predominantly funded by German development co-operation.

This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.1 gives an overview of social transfer schemes provided by the Government of Jordan for Jordanian citizens. Section 4.2 highlights that there is already a tradition of international donors taking care of refugees in Jordan since Palestinians migrated to Jordan as a result of the war against Israel in 1948. Section 4.3 presents the social transfer schemes that foreign donors have set up, at least in part, to support Syrian refugees.

4.1 Social transfer programmes provided by Jordanian institutions

The government of Jordan has established numerous social protection schemes but many of them target the urban middle class rather than the poor.

Public spending for social protection and health is high compared to other low- and middle-income countries. In 2012, it accounted for 12% of GDP (Loewe & Jawad, 2018, p. 10). However, the bulk of spending was on health systems for public sector employees and on public pension schemes, which cover only 60% of the population. In addition, the membership conditions and benefit levels are different for three groups of people: (i) members of the armed forces, (ii) civil servants and (iii) private sector employees. Informal sector employees, in particular, are completely excluded, although they comprise the poorest parts of society (Loewe et al., 2001; Loewe, 2019).

At the same time, less than 10% of all public social protection spending in Jordan (i.e. less than 1% of GDP) is on social transfer programmes, including unconditional social assistance, CfW,

fee waiver and in-kind programmes – even though they are particularly important for low-income earners. All of them together cover in fact 85% of the bottom income quintile of the population but this is mainly due to the health treatment fee waivers that the Royal Court gives on request to households in difficult socio-economic situations. Cash transfers alone reach out to only about 20% of the bottom income quintile. And the benefits are too low to close the poverty gap (Loewe, 2019).

Another problem is the lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the different schemes. It results in partial overlaps of provisions and non-harmonisation of targeting rules. Considerable financial means are lost because of these deficiencies and heavy administrative burdens in general (Loewe et al., 2001).

Social transfers are provided by three different institutions:

- *The National Aid Fund (NAF)* administers several social assistance programmes, which, however, target only Jordanian citizens. It is supervised by the Ministry of Social Development with the objective to provide support to poor and vulnerable population groups. The main activity of NAF is the provision of monthly cash transfers to people in need. The transfers are in the range of 40-180 JOD (50-223 EUR) per household, depending on its size and composition. For the selection of beneficiaries, the NAF combines a proxy-means-test with socio-categorical targeting (Zureiqat & Abu Shama 2015): In theory, only households with an income below the national abject poverty line of 336 JOD per individual and year (Department of Statistics Jordan 2016) are eligible to receive the benefit (ILO, 2019) – and only if there is no male at working age (15-64 years) without work-disability in the household (Röth, Nimeh & Hagen-Zanker 2017; Loewe et al. 2001, 30). Any income received by one of the family members decreases the benefit received by 25 per cent (ILO, 2019). In addition, NAF considers income-producing property, arable land, or possession of a car (unless used by a disabled member of the family) to be disqualifying factors. In practice, however, with few exceptions, only persons without any income qualify for the programme (ILO, 2019).

In the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, NAF's budget increased by 3 million JOD annually so that it can now support an additional 20,000 Jordanian families. In 2013, the Ministry of Social Development made an estimate that it would need another 9.96 million EUR to meet the needs of the growing numbers of vulnerable Jordanians in the context of the influx of Syrians. According to NAF, the fund seeks to increase the number of households benefitting from its regular assistance from 75,000 (in 2015) to 98,000 (in 2019) and the number of people receiving emergency assistance from 5,000 (in 2017) to 7,000 (in 2019) (Röth, Nimeh & Hagen-Zanker, 2017; Jordan Times, 1 May 2018).

- *The National Zakat Fund (NZF)* operates a different social transfer scheme on behalf of the Ministry of *Awqāf* (religious endowments), Islamic Affairs and Holy Places. The scheme provides cash assistance to orphans and very poor households who do not receive social assistance from NAF (Loewe et al., 2001). In 2015, the NZF extended one-time

emergency assistance to more than 30,000 families and regular assistance to 43,000 orphans and 30,000 poor families, mostly through its 210 local *zakāt* (Islamic religious tax) committees. However, the benefits are very low, ranging from 15 to 30 JOD per household and person (Mechado, Bilo & Helmy, 2018). In contrast to NAF, non-Jordanians are theoretically eligible for support if they are very poor. In practice, however, the only known case of NZF having ever provided support to Syrians was a one-time transfer of JOD 200,000 in 2014 to the Za'atārī Camp, which was meant to finance food support for Syrian refugee families (Zureiqat & Abu Shama 2015, 32).

- The *Ministry of Social Development* started, in 2015, to open community centres serving “as a shelter for men, women and children who are victims of human trafficking, covering their basic needs and providing counselling and rehabilitation services.” (Jordan Times, 4 November 2015). The Ministry also provides legal counselling services in co-operation with civil society organisations.
- The *Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development* (JOHUD) works through a network of 50 community development centres, mainly in rural areas. It is a foundation and considers itself as an NGO. However, it has been established by the state authorities and gets its core funding from the central government budget. Therefore, it makes sense to list it next to state institutions executing similar activities. These include awareness campaigns, vocational training and skills development, child and family health care, the promotion of productive activities of women, and micro-enterprise development as well as education and cultural programmes. JOHUD addresses women in particular (Loewe et al., 2001, pp. 38-39).

The Ministry of Education is responsible for Jordan’s public primary and secondary education system. It is free of charge for all Jordanians, and, in 2012, the Government of Jordan has extended the free access to Syrian refugees with the financial support of the international donor community (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs & Holmes, 2018). However, in most schools, Syrian children are in separate classes and their lessons take place in the afternoon, when the Jordanian children have already left their class-rooms. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that the schools cannot accommodate all Syrian and Jordanian children in a single shift.

The Ministry of Health runs Jordan’s public health system. It does not provide free health care but the user fees are highly subsidised, covering presumably just about 10% of actual costs. Very poor Jordanians can apply for a ‘green card’ issued by the Royal Court, which entitles them to health care totally free of charge (Loewe et al. 2001). Since recently, Syrian refugees can get similar waivers provided that they have registered with the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) in order to get a magnetic ‘MoI service card’ or ‘security card’ (*biṭāqa amniyya*) (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs & Holmes, 2018). Until the end of 2019, the Jordanian health system has dealt with about 328,000 medical consultations of refugees under this programme (UNRWA 2020).

Both, Jordan’s public education and its public health system, are chronically overstrained and of low quality so even many lower-income families instead pay for private schools and private health care.

4.2 Social transfer programmes of foreign donors for Palestinian refugees

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) runs the oldest social protection scheme for refugees in the MENA region. It acts as a quasi-public institution that offers free primary health care and basic education to registered Palestinian refugees living in official refugee camps in Jordan or in other MENA countries. In addition, its Special Hardship Assistance Programme provides regular food assistance to needy Palestinian refugee families as well as occasional cash assistance for shelter rehabilitation (Loewe, 2019; Röth, Nimeh & Hagen-Zanker, 2017b). Since 2018, however, UNRWA faces increasing problems in the provision of support because the United States, formerly a major source of funding, has drastically reduced its financial support (UNRWA, 2018).

4.3 Social transfer programmes of foreign donors for Syrian refugees and Jordanians

Both, bi- and multilateral donors have early started initiatives to support Syrians who had sought refuge in Jordan from the civil war in their country. On the one hand, they wanted to rescue the Syrian refugees from the worst forms of poverty. On the other hand, they also wanted to prevent Jordan's destabilisation and Syrians' continued flight towards Europe. Their favourite choice was to set up CfW programmes because these provide employment and income to the beneficiaries, can employ Jordanians together with Syrians and thereby are expected to benefit host communities, too. We can assume that CfW programmes are currently the core of well over 40,000 Syrian refugee families' livelihood strategies (Röth, Nimeh & Hagen-Zanker, 2017). In addition, foreign donors are also running unconditional cash transfer, voucher, winterisation, education, vocational training, employment and empowerment schemes for Syrian refugees (Röth, Nimeh & Hagen-Zanker, 2017).

Until 2016, international aid agencies mostly provided unconditional short-term assistance in the form of ad hoc and one-time payments (ibid.). Since then, their initiatives have shifted towards a more long-term commitment.

Most Syrian households in Jordan are currently benefitting from regular cash assistance provided by UNHCR and UNICEF for an unlimited time. However, UNHCR provides just between 65 and 360 EUR per month and household depending on the household size (i.e. 30-160% of the official minimum wage for Jordanian workers), while UNICEF grants a monthly cash benefit of 25 EUR for each child (ibid.). For more than a half of the Syrians, these grants are their only source of income (Jones et al., 2019).

Several other donors have set up additional, but smaller cash transfer programmes (ibid.):

- The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) administers an emergency cash benefit programme with a fixed benefit of 115 JOD per household.
- Oxfam runs a transfer programme supporting Syrian refugees with non-food purchases.

Table 1: Overview of donor-funded CfW programmes in Jordan


Name	Funding	Budget (million Euro)	Implementation	Start	Number of participants	Typical duration of employment (working days)	Geographical focus
Cash for Work/Water (C4WW)	BMZ through GIZ	24	Ministries, DRC, NRC, ACTED, AAH, WVI, Uni- versity of Hamburg	2017	24898 in all 3 projects together until May 2019	about 50 outside and about 35 in- side camps	All parts of Jordan
Waste to (positive) En- ergy (WtPE)	BMZ through GIZ	60	Municipalities, DRC; ACTED; AAH, Oxfam, Caritas Switzerland	2015	(overall share of women: 23%) In 2018, some 80 per cent were in WtPE and 10 per cent each in the two other programmes		Mainly in the North of Jordan (several communities and the two camps)
Green Infra- structure (GI)	BMZ through GIZ	12	Municipalities, DRC, NARC, VNG International, AVSI, RSCN	2017	GI alone had 2200		Mainly in the North of Jordan
Labour-inten- sive Mainte- nance at Pub- lic Schools	BMZ through KfW	10	UNOPS in coordi- nation with the Ministry of Educa- tion	2018	about 4,000 until the end of 2021	40 (un- skilled) to 120 (fore- men)	All parts of Jordan (Amman, Irbid, Mafraq, Balqa, Aljoun and Ma'an)
Employment Intensive In- vestment Programme (EIIP)	BMZ through KfW	45	ILO through ministries and municipalities	2016	14,200 until end of 2021	40 (un- skilled), 120 (foremen)	Mainly in the North of Jordan
	NORAD (Norway)	4	ILO through ministries	2016	3,200 in 2 years	30	Centre and South of Jordan
Food for Training (FFT)	World Food Programme (WFP)	n/a	Najma	2012	10,000 in 5 years	4x15	Mainly in the North of Jordan
Food for Assets (FFA)	World Food Programme (WFP)	n/a	Najma	2017 (re- placed FFT)	2,650 in 2 years	6x15	Mainly in the North of Jordan
CfW in Refu- gee Camps	UNHCR & UNICEF	n/a		n/a	6,000 per month	flexible*	Camps (Za'tari, Al-Azraq)
CfW	ICDF *	n/a	VDP	n/a	n/a*	n/a*	Centre of Jordan
Support to the Education Sector **	BMZ through KfW	6	UNICEF through NGOs and private contractors		Up to 1,350 per year	10x20	All of Jordan
Teacher salaries **	BMZ through KfW	60	Ministry of Educa- tion	2016	Up to 7,200 per year	10x20	All of Jordan

Source: own design based on data provided by GIZ, ILO, WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF.

See also Annex 3.

* ICDF is the acronym for the International Cooperation and Development Fund of Taiwan.

** The last two programmes are not covered by this report because (i) all of their immediate beneficiaries (employees) are Jordanians, (ii) they generate much higher wages than the other programmes for less vulnerable households, and (iii) they do not create infrastructure in any meaning of the word (but immaterial human capital).

Figure 3: Donor-funded CfW activities in Jordan by sector

- The World Food Programme (WFP) grants unconditional food vouchers to 95,000 beneficiaries in refugee camps and 430,000 in host communities with co-funding from the German Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA). In addition, it extends school meals in co-operation with the Jordanian Ministry of Finance (interview with WFP representative).
- UNHCR coordinates a large-scale winterisation scheme, to which NRC and Save the Children contribute. It distributes blankets, heating equipment and clothes and extends cash transfers during cold months.
- CARE International runs a cash-for-education-and-protection programme, which supports roughly 3,000 households with co-funding from AA. The programme targets mainly out-of-school-children and their families with the goal to prevent early marriage. Beneficiaries receive a monthly cash transfer of 90 EUR per household for an initial 10 months provided that all children attend school regularly and do not marry before the age of 16.

It is important to note that even though these programmes were introduced in response to the influx of Syrian refugees, Jordanian residents benefit from most of them, too. This is due to the fact that the Government of Jordan requires 30-50% of the beneficiaries to be vulnerable Jordanians (Röth, Nimeh, & Hagen-Zanker, 2017).

CfW programmes became a favourite instrument of international development co-operation in Jordan after the Jordan Compact in 2016. Especially the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development/ *Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung* (BMZ) has become very active in the use of CfW schemes as a central element of its *Beschäftigungsoffensive Nahost* (‘Partnership for Prospects’, BMZ 2018). Explicitly, this initiative is meant to ease the financial stress of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians, strengthen social cohesion between them, reduce competition in the labour market and promote the integration of women into the labour market (ibid.). At the same time, WFP, UNHCR and UNCTAD receive funds from other bilateral donors as well. The total budget of CfW programmes in Jordan has been about 300 million EUR over the last couple of years (see Table 1).

Typical CfW activities in Jordan include the rehabilitation, development and cleaning of ‘grey’ and ‘green’ infrastructure (such as streets, dams, schools and health clinics, respectively water reservoirs, irrigation systems, municipal parks and ecosystems), the collection and recycling of waste, and support for the intensification of agriculture (see Figure 3 and Annex 3).

Some CfW programmes, such as e.g. the Food/ Cash-for-Training (FFT/CFT) programme of WFP, offer trainings in addition to employment as to improve participants’ capabilities for the labour market (interviews with AA, WFP and Najmah representatives).

Most programmes are implemented by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) and KfW Development Bank on behalf of BMZ. GIZ co-operates with Jordanian ministries, municipalities, the Jordan River Authority, the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN), the National Agricultural Research Center (NARC) and several international NGOs such as e.g. the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the NRC (GIZ 2018a). KfW projects, in contrast, are typically implemented by international organisations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in co-operation with Jordanian ministries and municipalities.¹³ Only the KfW project “teacher salaries” is directly implemented by the Ministry of Education. However, the rest of this report does not deal with this programme as they are no CfW programmes in the stricter sense because (i) all its immediate beneficiaries are Jordanians, (ii) it generates much higher wages than all other CfW programmes, and (iii) it does not create infrastructure (see Table 1). The bulk of CfW activities takes place in the North of Jordan (mainly Irbid and Al-Mafraq governorate), where most Syrians live – as well as the two large Syrian refugee camps (Za’atarī and Al-Azraq). Some activities, however, are located in the Centre and South of the country (see Table 1 and Table 8, Figure 5 and Annex 3).

Design features such as the number of participants and the duration of employment vary considerably between the projects (see Table 1). However, more recently, all donors have agreed

13 CfW projects of KfW and ILO in road and highway maintenance are implemented in co-operation with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, farmland improvement projects are implemented with the Ministry of Agriculture and community infrastructure projects are implemented with the municipalities. The school maintenance projects of KfW and UNOPS, in contrast, are implemented with the Ministry of Education (interview with KfW representatives).

on joint Standard-Operating-Procedures (SOPs) for CfW projects in Jordan. Their rationale is to harmonise future donor-funded CfW activities in Jordan with regards to the level of salaries, the share of people with disabilities to be employed in the programmes and many other issues. In addition, all KfW and GIZ projects have to follow the stipulations of the BMZ Methodology Note for the Partnership for Prospects Initiative, which indicates, for example, that all CfW beneficiaries have to be employed for at least two months. Typically, the GIZ projects employ participants for three months with about 20 working days per month. Thereafter, they are normally not employed in the same calendar year again because BMZ would not count them as *new* beneficiaries another time. In subsequent calendar years, however, they have a chance to be employed again (GIZ 2018a). The WFP projects, in contrast, offer employment with training for at least six months with 16 working days per month (interview with WFP and Najmah representatives). KfW projects employ unskilled workers for two to four months and skilled workers for up to eight months (interview with KfW representatives).

All programmes employ women and men. In some programmes, females do the same kind of work as male participants. In others, they do similar work (excluding the hardest kinds of physical work). In others yet again, women assume different tasks than men. For example, they cook for the male participants, who do more physical and more dangerous work in the construction or improvement of public infrastructure such as e.g. the cleaning of water dams. Women account for 23 per cent of all CfW participants in GIZ programmes (interview with GIZ representative) and for almost half of the participants of the WFP's Food/Cash-for-Assets (FFA) programme (WFP 2018). The KfW UNOPS project of public school maintenance does not involve hard physical work, and participants are working in closed rooms rather than in the street. Therefore, it aims to reach at least 20 per cent of female participation (interview with KfW representatives). The KfW ILO programme in contrast employs only 16 per cent females (NAMA & ILO 2019).

In a recent study on the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan, one person out of five had at least once participated in a CfW programme during the last 12 months (Tiltnes, Zhang & Pedersen, 2019, p. 107). Overall, more refugees living in camps have been employed in CfW programmes than Syrians living outside camps. This is, however, partly due to the fact that until recently, CfW participants in the camps were typically employed for only 2 weeks rather than three months with the effect that more people could be hired (interview with a GIZ representative). Apart from that, refugees with higher education are more likely to participate in CfW programmes according to the same study.

However, most donors expect their CfW programmes to benefit not only the participants but also the wider community through additional income circulating in the local economy, through the creation of public goods such as the building and repair of grey or green infrastructure (streets, schools, forestation, municipal parks etc.) and through the improvement of social cohesion and gender relations. The research that we conducted in spring 2019 was meant to verify to what degree these expectations are fulfilled.

5 Research methodology

The aim of our empirical research was to provide evidence for the Jordanian case on the indirect effects of CfW programmes on communities hosting refugees from another country. The research question was *“To what degree and how have social cohesion and economic opportunities – in particular for women – changed within host communities due to CfW programmes?”* From the answer to this question, we try to draw conclusions and suggestions for the ways in which future CfW projects can be best adapted to serve contexts of flight and migration.

In the following, we present our research methodology: We give an overview on the research hypotheses that we derived from conceptual and empirical literature to guide our research in Jordan (Section 5.1) and describe our research tools and sample selection (Section 5.2).

5.1 Research hypotheses

To guide our research, we formulated 15 research hypotheses based on the conceptual and empirical literature presented in Chapter 2 (see Figure 4).

As social cohesion and LED are our main dependent variables, we first present the hypotheses relating to social cohesion – sense of belonging, horizontal trust and vertical trust – (Sub-sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4). Second, we explain those relating to LED – quality of life, per capita income and employment opportunities (in Sub-sections 5.1.5 to 5.1.6).


Gender was the third dependent variable in our project design but we modelled it as a cross-cutting issue: We did not formulate separate research hypotheses for gender but analysed the effects of CfW on the elements of social cohesion and LED separately for females and males wherever this made sense (see in the sections below).

5.1.1 Hypotheses 1-3, related to the sense of belonging to a community

Three of our hypotheses refer to the effects of CfW programmes in Jordan on people’s sense of belonging to the community (see Table 2). Sense of belonging is a sub-category of social cohesion and our proxy to measure whether a person’s social identity is anchored in, respectively related to his/ her local community.

Hypothesis 1 focuses on the effects of the existence of CfW programmes as such: We assume that the sense of belonging of people living in Jordan (both of refugees and Jordanians) increases just when they get to know that there are CfW programmes in their neighbourhood providing jobs and income for both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians as well as useful public goods. We assume that this hypothesis is true if all people who know about CfW programmes – not just those participating in the programmes themselves – confirm an increase in their sense of belonging. Of course, the hypothesis has to be tested separately for females and males in order to take account of gender-specificities in the effect.

Figure 4: Overview on research hypotheses



Hypothesis 2 is similar to Hypothesis 1 in that it assumes that CfW programmes have a positive effect on people's sense of belonging. However, it is built on the assumption that the effect goes back to the participation of people in CfW activities rather than their sheer existence. Evidence confirming the hypothesis would be if only CfW participants attest an increase in their sense of belonging or if their sense of belonging increases substantially more than the sense of belonging of non-participants.

Hypothesis 3, finally, purports that the sense of belonging of Jordanians and non-Jordanians increases mainly because of the creation of public goods, i.e. that they are proud of their community and feel being part of it because of improvements in street infrastructure, school buildings, dams, municipal parks, nature reserves or other public goods.

Table 2: Hypotheses related to the sense of belonging to a community	
Thesis	Categories
1. The existence of CfW programmes as such increases people's sense of belonging to their respective community.*	Sense of belonging of participating Syrians and Jordanians
	Sense of belonging of eligible Syrians and Jordanians who have not yet participated
2. The participation of Jordanians and Syrian refugees in CfW programmes creates a sense of belonging in the respective other group.*	Sense of belonging of participating Syrians
	Sense of belonging of participating Jordanians
3. The creation of useful assets by Jordanians and Syrians creates a sense of belonging to the community for the participants.	Sense of belonging of Syrians
	Sense of belonging of Jordanians
* For Hypotheses 1 and 2, a gender-differentiated perspective is particularly relevant. Source: own design.	

5.1.2 Hypotheses 4-5, related to the horizontal trust between people from different social groups

Hypotheses 4 and 5 focus on the effects of CfW programmes on horizontal trust. Horizontal trust is the trust of people in people from a different social group of their respective local community.

Hypothesis 4 is that the existence of CfW programmes as such increases the horizontal trust between people from different social groups being eligible for participation in these programmes. In the specific case of Jordan, the assumption would thus be that the provision of decent income-opportunities to both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians has a positive effect on the horizontal trust of people from these two groups in each other and no effect or possibly even a negative effect on the horizontal trust of people from other groups (who are not eligible for participation in CfW programmes) in people from the two eligible groups. The main

information sources to test both hypotheses are ideally CfW-eligible and CfW-participating people, as well as people who are non-eligible, such as non-eligible Syrians, Palestinians without a Jordanian passport, refugees from Iraq, Yemen or Somalia, and other migrant workers.

Hypothesis 5 is similar to Hypothesis 4 in the assumption that CfW programmes have a positive impact on the horizontal trust between people being eligible for participation in CfW programmes and people from other social groups being also eligible for participation. In contrast to Hypothesis 4, however, the belief is that this effect is due, in the Jordanian case, to the joint work of Jordanians and Syrians in the CfW activities rather than to the existence of the CfW programmes as such. The hypothesis is based on the idea that people who work together for a number of weeks get to know each other quite well and are therefore able to build trust in each other that helps them to also better trust other members of other social groups.

Table 3: Hypotheses related to the horizontal trust between people from different social groups

Hypotheses	Categories
4. The existence of CfW programmes as such increases horizontal trust among CfW-eligible groups.	Horizontal trust of CfW eligible people
5. The participation of Jordanians and Syrian refugees in CfW programmes creates horizontal trust in the respective other group.	Horizontal trust of participating Syrians
	Horizontal trust of participating Jordanians
Source: own design	

5.1.3 Hypotheses 6-7, related to people's vertical trust

Hypotheses 6 and 7 deal with the effects of CfW programmes on people's vertical trust, i.e. their trust in government institutions such as municipalities.

Hypothesis 6 tests to what extent the existence of CfW programmes as such improves the trust of people who are eligible for CfW participation in those institutions that they believe to be responsible for the initiation or implementation of these programmes. In the Jordanian context that would mean that both Jordanians and Syrians perceive increased trust in the staff of their municipality if they believe that this very municipality has initiated or is implementing the CfW programmes – be this in fact the case or not. In the context of Hypothesis 6, we also want to find out whom CfW participants perceive as being responsible for the programmes.

Hypothesis 7 is also an assumption that CfW programmes raise vertical trust, however because of the public goods that they produce rather than because of their sheer existence. Here, the idea is that people's satisfaction in their municipality improves because they appreciate the public goods that CfW programmes create – provided that these people believe that their municipality has initiated or is implementing the respective CfW programmes.

Table 4: Hypotheses related to people's vertical trust

Hypotheses	Categories
6. The existence of CfW as such leads to higher vertical trust in perceived implementing agencies among eligible Syrians and eligible Jordanians.	Vertical trust of eligible Syrians
	Vertical trust of eligible Jordanians
7. The creation of useful assets has a positive effect on vertical trust.	Vertical trust of all community members
Source: own design	

5.1.4 Hypotheses 8-10, related to CfW programme design features' impact on sense of belonging, horizontal and vertical trust

Hypotheses 8, 9 and 10 (just like below Hypotheses 12 and 15) refer to the possibility that some features in the design of CfW programmes can constitute interfering variables, i.e. increase or reduce the possible positive impact of these programmes on communities. These features denote whether the targeting of CfW programmes (i.e. the selection of participants) is perceived as fair, whether community members can participate in the design of CfW programmes and how long participants are employed.

Hypothesis 8 assumes that people who perceive the targeting of CfW programmes as unfair perceive less increase in their sense of belonging and in their horizontal and vertical trust than people who have a positive opinion about the targeting. As pointed out in Section 4.3 on CfW programmes in Jordan people may perceive targeting unfair (i) if certain groups are not eligible to participate in the programmes, (ii) if the duration of participation varies between the programmes and (iii) if the selection process itself is perceived as unfair (with a negative impact especially on vertical trust. Hypothesis 8 can, thus, be seen as an assumption or an interfering variable that may alter or downsize the effects of CfW programmes on social cohesion as identified by Hypotheses 1-7. Interviews with both eligible and non-eligible community members will reveal to what extent the admission of CfW participants is perceived as fair.

Hypothesis 9 assumes that a lack of participation by community members in how CfW programmes function and what they try to achieve negatively impacts on their sense of belonging as well as horizontal and vertical trust. If people are not involved in decisions on CfW activities in their respective community this might cause (i) a sense of isolation or of being left out, thus decreasing their feeling of belonging to the community; (ii) a decreased horizontal trust as there is less meaningful interaction between different groups, or (iii) a decreased vertical trust in the implementing organizations: If project design features are not made transparent participants may feel that the implementing agency does not work efficiently or in the best interest of the beneficiaries. By interviewing local experts as well as eligible and non-eligible community members, we want to find out whether and to what extent community members were involved in any consultation process prior to the introduction of CfW programmes in their community.

Hypothesis 10 takes the varying number of working days between different CfW programmes into account (see Section 4.3), assuming that a higher number of working days raises the positive effects of CfW programmes on participants' sense of belonging, horizontal and vertical trust. Interviews with participants will provide information about possible effects on their sense of belonging and horizontal trust, while interviews with local experts and non-eligible community members will do so especially for possible effects on vertical trust.

Table 5: Hypotheses related to the impact of design features' impact on sense of belonging, horizontal and vertical trust

Hypotheses	Categories
8. Targeting practices of CfW programmes which are perceived as unfair lower the positive effect of CfW programmes on sense of belonging, and horizontal and vertical trust.	Impact of CfW targeting on vertical trust
9. The possibility to participate in project design increases the positive impacts of CfW programmes on sense of belonging, and horizontal and vertical trust.	Impact of participation in CfW design on sense of belonging
	Impact of participation in CfW design on horizontal trust
	Impact of participation in CfW design on vertical trust
10. The positive effects of CfW on sense of belonging, horizontal and vertical trust increase with the number of working days of participants.	Impact of number of CfW working days on sense of belonging
	Impact of number of CfW working days on horizontal trust
	Impact of number of CfW working days on vertical trust
Source: own design	

5.1.5 Hypotheses 11-14, related to per-capita income and other aspects of quality of life

Hypotheses 11-14 are the first set of hypotheses related to LED: They deal with the effects of CfW programmes on community members' quality of life as the core element of LED (Section 2.3.1). Originally, we planned to use both, subjective and objective indicators for changes in quality of life. However, after a pilot phase, we excluded Hypotheses 11 and 12, which had been looking primarily at people's perceptions of their quality of life, and continued only with Hypotheses 13 and 14, which focus on the effect of CfW on per-capita income as a more objective, though very partial indicator for quality of life.

Hypothesis 11 (eventually not used during our field survey) was the assumption that different types of public goods (created by CfW) lead to changes in different dimensions of quality of life. Green infrastructure and public open space may not lead to direct economic advantage, but can for example significantly improve health, social interactions, or food security. In contrast,

grey infrastructure may provide significant new income opportunities and thus lead to improved material living conditions.

Hypothesis 12 (also not used) considered the impact of a participatory CfW project design on local economic needs. We had expected different potential impacts. A lack of participation may further support local business elite's choices for specific sites and sectors. Marginalised groups may experience decreased economic outcomes due to crowding out effects. In contrast, an inclusive project design may facilitate stronger connections between different economic agents and in turn lead to economic benefits. To test this hypothesis interviews with eligible and non-eligible parts of the community as well as local experts are informative.

Hypotheses 13 and 14, in contrast, focus on economic well-being as one major aspect of quality of life. Both deal with the positive effects that CfW programmes can have on per-capita income in a direct or indirect way. Hypothesis 13 assumes that CfW programmes raise the average per-capital income in their vicinity because they extend additional wages to participating households. These wage payments have a direct and an indirect effect, the later going through the multiplier as well as investment and employment effects (see Section 2.3.3). The focus of our own research was on the indirect effect because we expected it to be more important for the whole community (while for participants, the direct effect is, of course, more important) and because the direct effect are already covered quite well by another study (Roxin et al. 2020). Hypothesis 14 finally looks at income effects generated by the creation and maintenance of public goods. In order to analyse both hypothesis, we interviewed CfW participants, business people (shop keepers, bakers, butchers, street vendors, taxi/bus drivers) and local experts.

Table 6: Hypotheses related to per-capita income and other aspects of quality of life	
Hypotheses	Categories
11. The creation and maintenance of useful assets increases the quality of life in the host communities.*	Perceived change of quality of life
12. Because of a lack of participation in project design, local economic needs are not sufficiently addressed and the quality of life stagnates.*	Perceived change of quality of life / utility of assets
	Increased economic deprivation among marginalised groups
	Deterioration of economic opportunities (crowding-out effect)
13. CfW programmes have positive direct (participants) and indirect (community level) effects on income.	Direct effects
	Investment effects
	Multiplier effects
14. The creation and maintenance of public goods increases direct (participants) and indirect (community level) income effects.	Direct effects
	Investment effects
	Multiplier effects
Source: own design	
* Hypotheses 11 and 12 were not pursued any more during the field research.	

5.1.6 Hypothesis 15, related to employment

Hypothesis 15 looks at changes in the employability of CfW participants. It is based on the assumption that participants may find it easier to find another employment when their contract with the CfW programme ends if they have acquired additional skills. This is particularly probable if the programme includes a training component. The design of CfW programmes is thus decisive for their effect on the likelihood of participants to find another employment.

The hypothesis invites a particular focus on analysing gender roles, because the high share of females employed in CfW programmes may represent a first point of access into employment for women in particular.

Table 7: Hypothesis related to employment	
Hypothesis	Categories
15. Skills acquired through participation in CfW lead to better employment opportunities after completion (both for Syrians and Jordanians).*	Direct employment effects Indirect labour market effects
*For Hypothesis 15, a gender-differentiated perspective is particularly relevant. Source: own design	

5.2 Research design

In order to test our hypotheses, we applied a predominantly qualitative research methodology for three reasons: First, we wanted to have enough flexibility and time to discuss specific issues in-depth with our interviewees instead of being obliged to ask them all questions of a standard guideline. Second, we wanted to capture also soft variables such as opinions and perceptions. Third, we wanted to be as open as possible for new aspects and issues, which have not yet been identified by the literature.

The two main sources of information our study are the existing literature and 380 qualitative semi-structured interviews that we conducted ourselves during February, March and April 2019. Most interviews took place in villages where CfW activities were being implemented, others in Amman or in Germany. In addition, we conducted two focus group interviews with Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, and carried out participant observations at two consultation events. All four events took place in Amman in February and provided valuable background information for later interviews in the field sites. Furthermore, we also used the results of a survey that GIZ's 'green infrastructure' programme conducted during the year 2019 among all of their CfW participants at the end of their engagement. In the remainder of this study, we will refer to it as the 'GIZ post-employment survey'.

This section gives an overview on our interview technique and data analysis (5.2.1), explains how we selected our research field sites and the people that we interviewed at these sites (5.2.2),


portrays in more detail the goals and structures of our interviews with CfW participants, non-participants, local experts and representatives of international donor agencies (5.2.3), describes the focus group discussions that we have organised and the participatory consultation events that we were able to attend (5.2.4) and portrays the GIZ employment survey (5.2.5).

Throughout, our aim was to adopt a gender-sensitive approach wherever possible. Furthermore, we also had in mind other migrant and refugee groups in the different localities but in the end, we focused mostly on Jordanians and Syrians, since, due to the geographical distribution of migrants and refugees in Jordan, it turned out that other migrant groups played only a minor role in the selected field sites of our research.

5.2.1 Interview technique and data analysis

Of our 380 interviews, we conducted 281 in villages where CfW activities were being implemented and the remaining ones in Amman or in Germany or via Skype. The latter interviews were held with experts for the general development of Jordan or the effects of CfW programmes in Jordan in general – most of them in English, some in German, only few in Arabic. These ‘experts on the national level’ included government officials, representatives of foreign donor organisations, academics and staff members of non-government organisations (NGOs). Interviews in the CfW sites, in contrast, were predominantly conducted in Arabic with the support of young, very capable Jordanian interpreters. Out of these interviews, 77 were with CfW participants, 97 with shop-keepers, 73 with other non-participants and 34 with so-called ‘local experts’, i.e. people from the villages with a good overview of local development such as mayors, tribal leaders, NGO workers or school directors (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Sample of interviewees



All interviews were semi-structured by different interview guidelines: one for CfW participants and non-participants in the CfW sites, one for shop-keepers, one for the ‘local experts’ and one for representatives of donor organisations. All interview guidelines are included in full length in Annex 1. All guidelines were adapted to the respective interviewee and refined over the entire data-collection process. The interviews in the field sites were conducted in teams of three, consisting of two researchers and one interpreter.

We are aware that our findings might be distorted by our appearance and habitus as ‘outsiders’ to the local communities. However, we tried to mitigate this bias through the accompaniment of local interpreters – yet, on its part, the fact that we needed to rely on interpreters in some situations may have reinforced the insider-outsider problem. Most of the time we conducted interviews in mixed-gender teams, whenever necessary the team composition was adjusted to the specific needs of the interviewees.¹


The interviews took mostly between thirty and forty-five minutes. Given the fact that our dependent variables – social cohesion, gender and local economic development – are very sensitive issues in Jordan, we recorded the interviews only in suitable interview situations, but relied mostly on notes taken during the interviews.

We analysed the data gathered through interviews with the help of the software programme Atlas.ti and applied strict rules of confidentiality. With few exceptions, we do not mention the names or other individual properties of our interviewees in this report because we have promised them to treat their information and opinion with confidentiality. When we quote from field interviews, we refer to them by interview number as recorded in the programme Atlas.TI as well as type and place of interview. All interviews are listed by their number in Annex D with information on the date and type of the interview (CfW participant, shop-keeper or other non-participant), the place, as well as the number, gender and nationality of interviewees. Only some of the ‘experts’ on the national or local level are mentioned by their name.

5.2.2 Access to and sampling of field sites and interviewees

We searched for field sites with a relatively high concentration of programmes in rather isolated communities in order to be able to trace back easily the effects to CfW programmes. We thus selected smaller communities with large-scale CfW programmes and an appropriate level of awareness about the programmes because we assumed that in such a setting, the effects were more apparent. The implementing agencies supported this process by providing us with access to a mapping of projects, which they had developed primarily to keep track of the high and continuously evolving number of CfW projects in order to ensure better coordination and to avoid concentration of programmes in certain localities (see Figure 6 and Annex 3).


1 Yet, we are aware that the gender composition of interviewer teams cannot fully override barriers to disclosure in regard to sexual and gender-based issues like sexual harassment.

Figure 6: Map of selected field sites

To control against a possible selection bias, we used different points of access to our interviewees. First, representatives of international donor agencies and their local implementing partners assisted us not only in gaining access to the field sites but also in contacting potential interviewees. Second, we approached interviewees through community-based organisations, such as women associations and charities. Third, we obtained access to shop keepers and other non-participants through randomly approaching people in the field sites as well as through snowball-sampling, asking previous interviewees to refer us to other community members.

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Table 8: Composition of interview sample			
	Females	Males	Total
CfW Participants			
Jordanians	19	19	38
Syrians	14	25	39
Other	0	0	0
Total	33	44	77
Shop keepers			
Jordanians	13	72	85
Syrians	1	8	9
Other	0	3	3
Total	14	83	97
Other non-participants			
Jordanians	24	23	47
Syrians	11	13	24
Other	0	2	2
Total	35	38	73
All interviewees without local experts			
Jordanians	56	114	170
Syrians	26	46	72
Other	0	5	5
Total	82	165	247
Local experts			
Jordanians	10	24	34
Syrians	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0
Total	10	24	34
All interviewees			
Jordanians	66	138	204
Syrians	26	46	72
Other	0	5	5
Total	92	189	281
Source: based on our field research.			

Figure 7: Distribution of field site interviews, CfW programmes and inhabitants by region

Source: own design

Table 9: CfW programmes included in research sample, by donor, implementing agency and programme

Donor	Implementing Agency / Project	Number of interviews
German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ)	GIZ / CfW Water	72
	GIZ / CfW Waste for Positive Energy	66
	GIZ / CfW Green Infrastructure	39
	KfW through ILO	28
	BMZ sub-total	205
Other	International Co-operation and Development Fund (Taiwan)	20
	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad)	19
Other sub-total	World Food Programme	37
Total		281

Source: based on our field research.

Table 10: Characteristics of field interview sites

Field site	Information about field sites	CfW programmes	
		Implementer	Type of work
Irbid High-way and Al-Mafraq	Interviews were conducted at different sections of the highway from Irbid to Amman, as well as in Al-Mafraq.	KfW/ILO with local contractors	Waste collection
Al-Azraq	Remote, small town in Al-Zarqā' Governorate, Eastern Jordan, located where the only permanent source of fresh water existed in approximately 12,000 square kilometres of desert, now dried out because of groundwater over-use. But there are still small wetlands, forming now a well-protected nature reserve under the administration of the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature. The city of Azraq has a Northern part (8,000 Druze, originally from the Syrian-Jordanian Hawran mountain range, and 3,500 Bedouins), and a Southern part (6,000 Chechens). Inhabitants complain about a loss of customers due to a new street bypassing the town, as well as border closures following the wars in Iraq and Syria. The Muwaffaq Salti Air Base is located next to Al-Azraq.	ICDF with AAH	Waste collection and awareness raising
		<i>GIZ (green infrastructure)*</i>	<i>rehabilitation measures in the nature reserve*</i>
Deyr 'Allā	A small town in the Jordan Valley in Al-Balqā' Governorate with a population of 7,321 in 2015. Largely dependent on agriculture.	GIZ (green infrastructure) with NARC	Agricultural work
		GIZ (waste to positive energy)	Waste collection
Faqu'a (Al-Qaşr)	A small town in Al-Karak Governorate. Largely dependent on agriculture. The population was 7,300 in 2015. According to local experts, it hosts some 150 Syrian families. The economic situation is dire, especially for young people: The youth unemployment rate is almost 50 per cent. Also, there is no ATM in Faqu'a, which inhibits LED through CfW programmes, as payments by aid agencies are provided via ATM machines.	ILO/Norway with Agricultural Directorate	Tree planting
		<i>GIZ (CfW Water) with DRC*</i>	<i>Water dam rehabilitation*</i>
Kafr Şawm	A small town in Irbid Governorate, less than 15 kilometres south of the Yarmouk river, which constitutes the natural border with Syria. The population was 11,349 in 2015, including roughly 2,500 Syrians. Most people depend on agriculture: the village is well known for growing olive trees (since 500 years) and pomegranates (since 300 years).	GIZ (CfW-Water) with World Vision	Cooking (women); water dam rehabilitation (men)
Kafr Asad (Ḥawfā)	A small town very close to Irbid, within Irbid Governorate. The population was 14,232 in 2015. There are roughly 2,500 Syrians living in the area, with 500 living in Kafr Asad itself. Local experts mentioned protests in front of the municipality in order to raise awareness about youth unemployment and rising prices.	WFP with Najmah	School rehabilitation
		<i>GIZ (waste to positive energy) with NRC*</i>	<i>waste collection*</i>
Tal al-Rummān	Village with 1,988 inhabitants in 2015 and a high level of unemployment. There are a few shops but most people work in agriculture. Few Syrians actually live in the village.	GIZ (CfW-Water) with NRC	Water dam
Umm al-Jimāl	Village with 4,524 inhabitants in 2015. People depend mainly on employment in agriculture and trade. Plans to invest into the tourism sector are currently being implemented in order to fight high levels of unemployment. Umm al-Jimāl is in the proximity of Za'atarī refugee camp, the largest camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan.	GIZ (waste to positive energy) with Oxfam	Waste sorting (men); collection of recycling material (women)

Source: own design based on information provided by local experts during our field research. The population numbers are from Department of Statistics Jordan (2016).

* Italics denote that we have met by chance some participants of a CfW programme active in the area, but did not visit the work place or talk to implementers in the villages.

Tables 8 and 9 provide additional information on the selected field sites, in terms of funding agency, CfW activity and other characteristics. As they show, we conducted research not only on programmes funded through the German BMZ and German Foreign Office – who finance most of the CfW programmes (see Table 1) – but also on programmes funded by the Taiwanese International Co-operation and Development Fund (ICDF) and the Norwegian Agency for Development (Norad). Besides presenting some background information about the selected field sites, Table 10: lists the type of work done by the respective CfW programme, reflecting that we took care to include CfW activities in different sectors (see also Annex 3 for more details).

We have thus been able to draw samples from all existing kinds of CfW programmes in Jordan– German ones and others, those implemented by financial co-operation as much as those being set up by technical co-operation – while other studies have mostly focused on the predominant German-funded schemes (e.g. mainly GIZ participants in GIZ schemes).

In terms of sampling, we aspired to speak with an approximately even numbers of Jordanians and Syrians, CfW participants and non-participants and males and females in the different field sites. Due to practical constraints, this was not always possible. For instance, some assumed non-participants turned out as participants of earlier CfW programmes; or some groups – for instance, female non-participants – were more difficult to access; respectively, shop keepers in rural Jordan are mostly male. Table 8 gives an overview of the gender ratio within our sample for the different interviewee groups. As most Syrians reside in Jordan’s northern region and thus, also many projects take place there, we focused on the North. Figure 7 compares the number of interviewees to the number of CfW programmes, total inhabitants and inhabitants of Syrian origin by region (North, Central and South). This demonstrates that our sampling is proportionate to both the number of CfW programmes per region as well as to the population of Syrian origin. Overall, for logistical reasons, accessing the North was easier for us and we also followed the recommendation of a donor agency to not conduct fieldwork in one specific Southern site for security reasons. For analysing social cohesion, it might have been interesting to study a higher number of southern communities in-depth.

5.2.3 Structure of interviews

Interviews with experts on the national level

We conducted 54 interviews with ‘general experts’, i.e. people with a broader understanding for CfW and development on a national level such as representatives of bi- and multilateral donor agencies, academics with a variety of research backgrounds and affiliations (universities, ministries, private research institutions), as well as representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Most interviews took place in February 2019, during the first phase of our field work, some during a preparation phase in June 2018. Where necessary, additional contacts were obtained through snowball-sampling.

For this group of interviewees, most questions were formulated in a broad and open manner and the interview guideline (see Annex 1) was adapted accordingly, so that interviewees could unfold their personal ideas and focus on their respective field of expertise. This approach also helped to broach sensitive topics and was combined with closed questions to stay focussed on relevant research topics and to probe previously expressed content.

Interviews with ‘general experts’ were particularly informative in three ways: (i) they helped us to assess the relevance of our study and the interest it might find within different audiences (i.e., the Jordanian and international scientific communities, Jordanian civil society actors and the donor community); (ii) they pointed out how sensitive the topics of social cohesion, gender and LED are in the context of CfW; and (iii) they gave us practical advice on how to conduct interviews with refugees and local community members.

Interviews with local experts

We interviewed 34 local experts, such as municipality members, local authorities, NGO members and representatives of agencies implementing CfW programmes.

The interviews were based on the guideline for expert interviews (see Annex 1) and, since social cohesion, gender and LED are sensitive topics, we adjusted or skipped questions whenever an interviewee was not ready to talk about a particular issue in an open manner. By using visualisation tools like cards, we increased interviewees’ readiness to share their opinion about sensitive topics.

Interviews with local experts were best suited to gather information about the communities in question, e.g. community life in general, particular challenges and opportunities for social cohesion, gender equality and LED in the respective community as well as participatory processes involving community members in the project design of a specific CfW programme.

Interviews with community members

We conducted interviews with 77 CfW participants, 73 non-participants and 97 shop keepers. In total, we interviewed 247 community members. At the community level, 75 per cent of our interviewees were Jordanians and 25 per cent were Syrian. Two thirds of our interviewees were male and one third was female. Furthermore, we tried to interview participants of CfW programmes designed by different implementing agencies (see “list of interviewees – D” for an overview, Page XYZ).

Since the experiences of Syrian and Jordanian CfW participants and non-participants differ, we adapted the interview guidelines (see Annex 1) accordingly. As we got into contact with most of the CfW participants via the implementing agencies, it was important to conduct the interviews in absence of the responsible field manager as to create an environment in which the participants are able to speak freely. In order to obtain better – i.e. less biased and more spontaneous – responses we proceeded in two steps: In a first step we posed questions in a broad and open manner, so interviewees could unfold their personal opinions and perceptions social

cohesion, gender roles and LED in their respective community. Whenever interesting topics and hints came up, we posed an additional follow-up question. Only in a second step, direct questions on the CfW programmes and their possible effects were asked. Since CfW participants who had been approached through an implementing agency knew their CfW participation was the reason why they had been asked for an interview they more often brought up the effects of the programmes themselves.

The interview guideline for the CfW participants and non-participants was designed to obtain detailed impressions on views and opinions held about the respective other group as well as on the effects of their CfW activities. The interview guideline for shop keepers aimed to obtain detailed information about the influence of CfW on local business activities.

5.2.4 Focus group interviews and participant observations

At the outset of the field research, we organised two focus group sessions in order to gain additional background information, especially about the topic of social cohesion. The first focus group consisted of six Syrians: three males and three females. All had come to Jordan between 2011 and 2014. The second focus group in contrast included only non-Syrian refugees who had arrived in Amman between 2012 and 2016: three from Sudan, and one each from Iraq, Ghana and Somalia. Focused and structured discussions with both, all-Syrian and non-Syrian focus groups, gave interesting insights about how these groups interact and how they see their relationship to each other.

We also witnessed two consultation events in East Amman. The aim of this participant observation was to get an impression about the procedure and rationale of participatory consultation in the context of CfW. One was held by Greater Amman Municipality with GIZ support in a quite central quarter of East Amman at the foot of Jabal an-Nasr. It consists of a very broad and very steep footway connecting two major roads and leading to a number of houses but closed to cars, which could go only part of the way. The organisers had invited all residents to one multi-family house, where all males gathered in the apartment of one family, while the females met in another apartment. Both groups were asked to discuss how the footway in front of their houses could be improved. Interestingly, they came up with quite distinct results. The ladies sympathised with GIZ's idea to convert part of the dusty way into a little park with trees providing shadow while at least one group of men suggested to make it better accessible for cars.

The other consultation event took place at a school in Marka, the most Eastern part of Amman, where most of the capital's manufacturing is located and most people are workers and quite poor. The school had been very nicely renovated and equipped with basic but pleasant furniture by a CfW project implemented by Najmah with funding from the WFP. Parents were invited to inaugurate the school and discuss what they could do to preserve the upgraded school building.

5.2.5 GIZ post-employment survey

The first phase of the GIZ post-employment survey, conducted between January and November 2019, covered 984 people who had completed their employment in GIZ's green infrastructure CfW projects during this time. Interviews were conducted throughout Jordan, roughly a quarter of the interviewees were females (253 interviewees) and almost half were Syrians (471 interviewees).¹

The questionnaire was comparatively short, easily answered within 15 minutes. It included questions on (i) the site of employment (municipality and partner organisation of GIZ), (ii) individual characteristics (nationality, gender, age, marital status, number of dependent family members, education, vocational qualification and previous employment), (iii) the use of income received from the CfW programme, (iv) satisfaction with the programme (working conditions, payment, employer, work place, safety at work, treatment by supervisors, working hours, work equipment, feedback mechanisms), (v) lessons learnt on the job and (vi) future plans (next employment, next schooling or training measure, plans to return to Syria or migrate elsewhere).

In the context of our research, the GIZ post-employment survey was particularly important for testing Hypothesis 15.

6 Findings

We now turn to the outcomes of our research. In this chapter, we discuss first the impact of CfW programmes on social cohesion (Section 6.1), gender roles (Section 6.2), and LED (Section 6.3). Then, we elaborate on additional indirect effects that we detected: in particular on behavioural and environmental issues. And finally, we report on the different opinions of our interviewees on the design of the CfW programmes (Section 6.5).

As explained in Section 5.2.1 already, we do not mention the names of our interviewees because we have promised them confidentiality about the contents of our talks. The source of direct quotes is identified by the interview number, the nature of the interviewee (e.g. CfW participant, shop keeper, other non-participant, local expert) and the location where the interview has taken place. Where relevant, we also specify the gender and nationality of the interviewee.

1 Most interviewees (43%) were from Southern governorates (132 from Al-‘Aqaba, 192 from At-Tawfila and 103 from Al-Karak); many (39%) from Northern governorates (50 from Irbid, 221 from ‘Ajlūn, 113 from Al-Mafraq) and the remaining 17% from central governorates of Greater Amman (51) and Al-Balqā’ (115). 596 interviewees (61%) were married, 344 (35%) singles, 26 (3%) divorced, 13 (1%) widowed and 5 (0.5%) separated. 60 (6%) of them held a university degree, 19 (2%) had a vocational training certificate, 185 (19%) had completed secondary education, 450 (46%) had completed only primary education and 227 (23%) had not even completed primary education (GIZ 2019).

6.1 Social cohesion

Our research results provide evidence that, overall, CfW programmes in Jordan have a moderate positive effect on social cohesion at the community level. In particular, they contribute to the sense of belonging of Syrians to their respective host communities and to the mutual horizontal trust between Jordanians and Syrians. This effect is, however, mainly due to the fact that Jordanians and Jordanians work together in the same activities (Hypotheses 2 and 5) and much less so to the existence of the CfW programmes as such (Hypotheses 1 and 4) or the creation of helpful and enjoyable public goods (Hypothesis 3). Probably, the main reason for the effect being only moderate is that the relations between Syrians and Jordanians are traditionally intense with the effect that their mutual trust had already been quite good even before the CfW programmes were launched in Jordan. At the same time, their effect on vertical trust is much more ambiguous (Hypotheses 6 and 7). Unexpectedly, we also found positive effects on community members' co-operation for the common good, when it comes to the area of environment (no predefined hypothesis).

In the following, we discuss separately the effects of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging of Jordanians and Syrians to their respective communities (6.1.1), horizontal trust between both groups (6.1.2) and vertical trust in local authorities (6.1.3) as well as some observations about co-operation for the common good (6.1.4).

6.1.1 Sense of belonging (Hypotheses 1-3)

According to our findings, CfW programmes in Jordan clearly strengthen the sense of belonging of Syrian participants to their host community – but only to some degree the sense of belonging of Jordanian participants or of people from either group not participating in the programmes. This is presumably due to the fact that even Syrians have a quite strong sense of belonging to their host communities anyhow.

Sense of belonging irrespective of CfW programmes

The vast majority of interviewees asked the question whether they felt well being part of their respective local community stated clearly that they felt comparatively well integrated– both, Jordanians and Syrians. Unfortunately, we could not ask all interviewees and some did not answer our question, but a total of 84 people (i.e. just a third of all interviewees) responded to this question, including 53 Syrians, 30 Jordanians and one Egyptian, respectively 47 males and 37 females. 66 of these respondents (79 per cent) said that their sense of belonging to the local community had always been quite good and 5 said it had been bad but clearly improved over time. 10 interviewees (12 per cent) reported that they had not been well integrated in the past at all but half of them feel much better integrated now.

These results are in line with a study by Roxin et al., who found that more than three quarters of both Jordanians and Syrians feel they fully belong to their respective community, while

16 per cent feel just some sense of belonging and only 5 per cent perceive just little or no feeling of belonging to their communities (Roxin et al., forthcoming).

Of course, some Syrians mentioned also that they still did not feel at home just like they did in their Syrian home places before their flight:

“Yes, I belong here. But there is nothing like home.” (22, non-participant, Hawfā)

“Obviously, people are very friendly here. People are very welcoming. We visit each other on our special occasions. It’s very natural for us to become one. But our heart is in Syria.” (73, non-participant, Al-Azraq).

“Not 100 per cent, but it is normal, maybe 90 per cent.” (46, non-participant, Kafr Assad).

One CfW participant in Kafr Assad explicitly made a lack of interaction responsible for her low sense of belonging: “I have no contacts to other people in the village because everybody is at work at day and sleeps at night. Therefore, I do not feel to be part of it. And all my relatives live in other villages” (60, participant, Kafr Asad).

Some female interviewees stressed, that life in Jordan was not always easy for their children. A Syrian CfW participant said, for example: “My girl had problems in the public school” (149, participant, Kafr Şawm) and added that her daughter had to change to a private school because she was discriminated against because she was no Muslim; she was hit by a teacher and that other pupils asked her why her mother was not veiled. Another non-participant mentioned: “My children sometimes get abused because we are Syrians. [...] In the schools, or when they go out of them. My older son has got a broken arm because he got into a fight.” (135, non-participant, Kafr Şawm).

Male interviewees, in contrast, never mentioned problems that other family members had faced. Instead, they highlighted how much they appreciated the high degree of security of life in Jordan, which had helped them to settle in the host country and to feel more at ease.

Virtually all interviewees, however, recounted that they had tried to migrate to communities where they knew someone, preferably relatives and preferably Syrians – but also if they knew at least somebody from the community. Likewise, many Syrians mentioned they felt connected to their place of residence in Jordan because it reminded them of the environment of their previous Syrian home.

Most Jordanians stated that they had a very strong sense of belonging to their respective home communities, anyhow. Some also highlighted that many people from their communities did their best to integrate everybody – Jordanians and Syrians:

“There are people going to the weddings, funerals, graduation parties, different occasions, so in the beginning they invite the new people that come to the community” (117, non-participants, Umm al-Jimāl).

“There is no discrimination [between Syrians and Jordanians]” (224, shop keeper, Al-Qaşr/ Faqū’a).

“We don’t think of ourselves as Syrians or Jordanians here, we are one and we all face the same challenges” (133, non-participant, Kafr Şawm).

Effects of the existence of CfW programmes as such (Hypothesis 1)

At the same time, a considerable number of interviewees said also that CfW programmes still had a positive impact on their feeling of belonging. 30 out of 84 respondents (i.e. more than a third) said that the CfW programmes have eased their integration into local communities: 5 because they had been not so well integrated in the past and 25 even though they had always been quite well integrated. 10 respondents declared that the CfW programmes did not have any tangible impact on their feeling of belonging because it had always been good. Just 9 said that their feeling of belonging was bad or at least not quite good and that it was still the same (Syrian women and men) and no respondent mentioned any negative impact of CfW programmes on their sense of belonging.

Almost all of those who confirmed a positive effect were CfW workers. This finding supports the assumption that in a context like the Jordanian, where the sense of belonging of locals and immigrants is quite strong already, only the experience of working with people from the respective other group can still make a tangible change. The main channel of the positive effect of CfW programmes on people’s sense of belonging thus seems to be participation in CfW programmes, supporting our Hypothesis 2 (see below).

Just four non-participants stated that the existence of CfW programmes as such had also had a positive effect on their sense of belonging. Evidence for our Hypothesis 1 is thus weak. One non-participant even mentioned the Arabic word for social cohesion, *at-tamāsuk al-ijtimā’i*, by himself, but it should be noted that he had been working for a while as a volunteer with NGOs and international organisations and therefore knew the buzz words that donors and researchers like to hear in an interview. Another non-participant stated in contrast: “Yes, the programmes improved the relations. They were even better for the Syrians, who became part of society” (153, non-participant, Kafr Şawm).

Effects of participation in CfW programmes (Hypothesis 2)

The effect on CfW participants themselves seems to be strongest. 28 per cent of them acknowledged that their sense of belonging had improved – whether or not their sense of belonging had already been good.

Interestingly, the respective share was almost the same among Jordanian and Syrian cash workers. The Syrians, however, mentioned more often how important their participation in CfW programmes had been to make them feel being part of their host community even at times when we had not directly asked for this effect. The conversation with one Syrian woman was as follows:

“Did participation in the project improve your feeling to be part of the community? – Yes, very much! I am proud that I have helped to improve schools in the guest country. And I am happy that some children will now enjoy more going to school and that they will feel well at school” (60, participant, Kafr Asad).

Jordanians mentioned the issue only when we explicitly asked for it. For instance, one of them answered to the question “Is there anything in particular that helped you to become a member of the community? - The relationships with my neighbours helped me, and the friendliness of the people there. Also the common work helped” (43, participant, Kafr Asad). Evidence for our Hypothesis 2 is thus quite strong.

At the same time, this positive effect of having a job is not specific to the format of CfW programmes. Several Jordanian participants highlighted that work was generally good to make people feel integrated and part of their respective local community. A Syrian non-participant also stressed that having a job is helpful anyhow – regardless of it being sponsored by a CfW programme or being done side-by-side with Jordanian nationals:

“At the beginning, I felt as an outsider. But in the meantime, I feel to be part of society. This is mainly because I have got a job. It helped me a lot.” (55, non-participant, Kafr Asad).

Effects of public goods creation of by CfW programmes (Hypothesis 3)

In the course of our research, we did not find any evidence for our Hypothesis 3, i.e. that the creation of assets such as clean roads, embellished municipal parks, upgraded school buildings or the like have any tangible effect on the feeling of belonging of Jordanian nationals or Syrian refugees. As we tried to disentangle three different channels of effects in our research (see Chapter 5) it seems that the co-operation of Syrians and Jordanians in joint activities by far outstripped the existence of CfW programmes as such and the creation of assets helpful and enjoyable for people living in the respective local communities.

6.1.2 Horizontal trust (Hypotheses 4-5)

Our findings provide also evidence for a positive effect of CfW programmes in Jordan on horizontal trust. Again, the effect is not very strong, mainly due to the fact that the horizontal trust between Syrians and Jordanians has always been relatively deep. And again, most of the change can be attributed to the co-operation of Jordanian and Syrian workers in the same activities.

Syrian-Jordanian horizontal trust irrespective of CfW programmes

The majority of our respondents – both Syrians and Jordanians – highlighted that there was quite substantial horizontal trust between both population groups. A third stated even that the horizontal trust had always been good. Yet, the share was below-average among Syrian males but clearly above-average among Jordanians as well as Syrian females. Just 14 per cent of all

respondents said that the horizontal trust was clearly bad, and another 14 per cent said that it had been clearly bad in the past but improved in the meantime.

This finding is in line with a survey conducted in November 2018 by NAMA, a research, polling and consultancy firm in Amman, on behalf of Konrad Adenauer Foundation. It asked 600 Syrian refugees to what extent they had felt welcomed in Jordan, and 67 per cent answered “to a great extent”, 31 per cent said “to medium extent” and only 1 per cent chose “to little extent”, respectively “not at all”. And 56 per cent said that if they could go to any country, they would choose Jordan – followed by Canada (19 per cent), the United States (4 per cent) and Germany (3 per cent). Likewise, 53 per cent did not believe that Jordan should have done more to support refugees. 67 per cent of the 1,305 interviewed Jordanians stated having positive or very positive feelings towards Syrians, only 3 per cent admitted having negative or very negative feelings (NAMA and KAS 2018).

Our findings are also in line with the results of a study conducted by DEval in 2018-19. It found that 80-90 per cent of all Syrians and Jordanians have a strong feeling of mutual belonging – astonishingly without major difference between CfW participants and non-participants (Roxin et al. 2020)

Several factors contribute to the fact that relationships between Syrians and Jordanians are quite harmonious. Syrians and Jordanians report four prominent factors: family or tribal relationships and the historic presence of Syrians in the region; mixed neighbourhoods or the relations between neighbours; cultural proximity; and actions of solidarity after the Syrian war, such as lending money or giving in-kind aid.

Undoubtedly, the main factor is that, in many villages, Jordanians and Syrians are from the same tribes and sometimes even relatives. The lands of the tribes living in the North of Jordan stretch far across the border into Syria such that at least the Syrians who have come from the area between Damascus and the border belong to the same tribes as the Jordanians hosting them in their Northern Jordanian villages. The inhabitants of Hawfā and Kafr Asad, for example, belong predominantly to the “Āl-Dbābnah” tribe, which has a similar number of members in Syria and Jordan. For this very reason, many marriages were concluded across the border even before the civil war in Syria broke out. Many Syrians migrated thus to their relatives. Even those who are from different tribes are quite similar to their Jordanian hosts in terms of culture, language and customs. A CfW participant from Deyr ‘Allā therefore said:

“The people of Deyr ‘Allā are good, they are a tribal community and have the same traditions, and they are more welcoming than people in the city. The tribes are very committed to care for their neighbours. (...) the relations have always been good. People invite each other and there is lots of communication between the different groups.” (7, participant, Deyr ‘Allā).

And a Syrian non-participant declared:

"Oh, they are even getting married etc. It is really strong relations that have been formed since Syrians came here. At the beginning, it was a little more difficult but now it is going fine. As I said earlier, we are the same people." (177, non-participant, Al-Mafraq).

A lady from Umm al-Jimāl confirmed that she had been received quite warm-heartedly by her Jordanian neighbours but expressed also that the hard economic situation in Jordan puts a lot of pressure on the ties between Jordanians and Syrians:

"My neighbours keep lending me money but I have to pay it back eventually. I need to give it back so we have that mutual respect maintained, so we can be honest and true. I am doing my best to work and rather not to ask money from anyone, unless I am in terrible need. Until today, I have not paid the electricity bill." (101, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

In terms of cultural proximity, both groups tend to invite all kinds of people to celebrations such as weddings, funerals and village festivals with the effect that Jordanians and Syrians meet each other quite frequently. Likewise, children tend to play with each other in the streets.

Furthermore, we did not find evidence for substantial local tensions between Syrians and Jordanians prevailing in any part of the country. Some interviewed experts mentioned that there had been clashes in the past in Al-Mafraq, Adh-Dibban and other places. Some of them have also become mentioned in publications (cf., for example, Reach & British Embassy, 2014). In our research sites, however, not one single interviewee admitted that substantial conflicts had ever come up in the past. One explanation for this finding could be our selection of research sites: all of them are comparatively rural and most of them (a least Kafr Asad, Umm al-Jimāl, Deyr 'Allā, Faqū'a and Kafr Sawm) have strong historical ties with Syrians. However, it is well possible that none of our interviewees wanted to admit that clashes have ever occurred, in particular vis-à-vis foreigners for moral and strategic reason. As a trend, interviewees tend to avoid speaking in negative terms about their home place to foreigners. But they resist even more so when researchers come from a core donor country because they are afraid that negative tones might impact on future external financial support. The presence of a translator of Jordanian nationality may have triggered strategic answers, too.

However, we also heard Jordanians and Syrians talking in negative terms about each other. Five out of 48 Jordanian respondents (10%) clearly said that their relations with Syrians were bad, while four (8%) said that the relations were just mediocre. And 14 out of 91 Syrian respondents (15%) stated that their relations with Jordanian locals were bad, while 18 (20%) that the relations were mediocre.

Syrians complained mainly about the accusations made by Jordanians. Syrian women in particular said that many Jordanians were saying that Syrians were taking away their jobs, their houses and their water and that Syrians were getting better support and training from foreign donors than the Jordanians themselves.

Also, some Syrians reported of cases of discrimination:

“There were some problems here, but these are individuals and you cannot transfer their behaviour to the behaviour of the community. It is small things, like for example when children play in the street, they will throw a football or kick stones, but not intentionally. However, we do get into disputes with people about such behaviour. (54, participant, Hawfā).

A Syrian shop-keeper stated that “[The relations with Jordanians are] perfect, we have the same religion and the same family, families visit each other here, and we are being treated very well. Also, there are many mixed marriages now between Syrians and Jordanians” (90, Syrian shop keeper, Al-Azraq). However, when we reiterated on the question and asked him about his experience of arrival to Al-Azraq, he admitted:

“In the beginning, it was very hard. Also, for example, I couldn’t open a shop. Even this shop now is registered under the name of a Jordanian and I work here.”

A Syrian lady, working as the only woman in a team of street cleaners in Kafr Sawm, stated:

“The first two weeks, people commented about the fact that I was working but they stopped. (...) Syrians are sometimes blamed to earn more money. Personally, once, I experienced an incident: a lady came to say that we Syrians should leave, because we were taking away the development opportunities from Jordanians” (277, participant, Kafr Sawm).

A Syrian non-participant from Faqū’a confirmed this view. When asked whether there is anything she dislikes about the village, she responded:

“Sometimes, when you have incidents happening [...], they blame “us, the Syrians” for it. Also we (“as Syrians”) also get blamed a lot for the increases in the rents, the electricity prices, anything” (212, non-participant, Faqū’a).

Several Jordanian interviewees expressed, in fact, these very accusations. A Jordanian woman said, for example: “The Syrians have taken the jobs that should belong to Jordanians – especially in agriculture.” But she admitted also: “We have to accept that they are here. And we have to accept that the CfW programmes employs Syrians as well because without the Syrians, we would never have got the programmes here in Jordan. (14, participant, Deyr ‘Allā).

Four non-participants interviewed in a group discussion in Umm al-Jimāl pointed to the same issues. One person said: “Some of them [the Syrians] are good, some of them are bad. They put their self-interest first. The point is that they are always selfish.” Another person added that “we are all unemployed and the situation is really bad. The two of us here have graduated two or three years ago”. They specifically point to the decrease in job opportunities “since the Syrians have come” and mention farming as one sector that is particularly affected (107, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

“Everywhere you go, there are Syrians. We have relations with Syrians, they are neighbours, rent the houses next door. Syrians can work for 4-5 JOD per day. I can’t. Syrians have increased the rent. Many of them have left the [Za’atarī] camp and settled here. It is more cost-effective for employers to pay the Syrians, so they will choose them. This made unemployment go up.” (107, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

Some Jordanians clearly associate the Syrian crisis with an increase in prices, especially rents, as well as increased competition over jobs. For instance, in a group discussion with CfW participants living in a Palestinian refugee camp, people testify that Syrians work for lower wages, an increase in rent from 50 JOD to 120 JOD, and a priority shift of international aid from poor Palestinians to Syrians (182, participants, highway).

In the same way, a Jordanian male argued: “We are all humans and all have needs, but the refugees took opportunities and replaced Jordanian labor. The Syrians can live here and have their live, but there are more disadvantages than advantages. Everyone lives their life here, but they took job opportunities from Jordanians.” (65, non-participant, Tall ar-Rumman).

Finally, many Jordanians also stated that the Syrians were better off because they were receiving aid and support from international organisations (77, participant, Al-Azraq; 145, shop keeper, Kafr Şawm; 145, shop keeper, Kafr Şawm; 104, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl; 276, non-participants, Kafr Şawm).

Of course, these accusations are a risk for the Jordanian-Syrian relations. So far, most Jordanians differentiate between the competition for jobs and living-room on the one hand, and their personal relations with individual Syrian neighbours:

“The Syrians get money without any effort. They pay rent without bargaining so the rent is going up. They would pay twice the rent if they could get the house. Now, house owners ask for 150 JOD and there are no more empty houses left. I mean, as a house owner, of course I would give the house to a Syrian. The house owners are clearly the biggest beneficiaries from the Syrian crisis. This situation can also lead to tensions – as a house owner, if I prefer to rent out my place to a Syrian instead of a close relative, this creates tensions.” - Interviewer: “So, are there tensions?” – “No, we are one family. We can separate between work and life. Work is one thing, but our relations in general are very good. There is no difference between Egyptians, Yemenis, Syrians.” (209, shop keeper, Faqū’a).

But this may change. If ever the economic situation deteriorates further, the horizontal trust between Jordanians and Syrians could weaken on the personal level as well.

Again, our findings are in line with those of the NAMA study mentioned above. It found that almost two thirds of 1305 interviewed Jordanians believe that the presence of Syrian refugees has a negative effect on their life. In particular, 46 per cent stated that the Syrians’ presence affected negatively security in Jordanian, 53 per cent education, 64 per cent healthcare, 67 per cent water supply, 68 per cent the government budget, 87 per cent the labour market and 81 per

cent the economy as a whole. And even 9 per cent of the interviewed Syrians admitted that the presence of a large number of compatriots had a negative impact on security in Jordan, 21 per cent on education in Jordan, 33 per cent on healthcare, 38 per cent on water supply, 23 per cent on the government budget, 40 per cent on the labour market and 37 per cent on the overall economy. Likewise, 87 per cent of the Jordanians and 73 per cent of the Syrians blamed the immigration of Syrians for prices in Jordan to rise, and 92 per cent of Jordanians and 56 per cent of Syrians stated that the immigration has contributed to an increase in unemployment rates (NAMA and KAS 2018).

Several interviews unveiled that negative feelings between Syrians and Jordanians prevail mainly where the two groups do not get in touch with each other. A Syrian woman said that her relations with the Jordanians was quite bad at the beginning because she did not know any on the locals: “In the beginning, we did not know anyone; no one would come over to the Syrians, now there is interaction” (114, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

And a Syrian man said: “[Syrians and Jordanians] are even getting married now. The relations have become really strong since Syrians came here. At the beginning it was a little more difficult, but now it is going fine. (...) We are the same people” (177, non-participant, Al-Mafraq).

Likewise, several Syrian interviewees said that all of their good friends are Syrians and that their interaction with Jordanians is limited to work. Again, the economic situation strongly inhibits forging new relationships and strengthening existing ones: “The social relations have deteriorated because (...) they do not have the time anymore to establish relations, because they have to survive the current economic situation” (77, participant, Al-Azraq).

Unfortunately, we did not get more comprehensive evidence on the situation of other migrant groups such as Iraqis or Egyptians. The reason is that we went mainly to small villages with CfW activities while most Egyptians and Iraqis have settled in larger towns. However, we still made some observations, and based on these, it seems that Egyptians in particular are not well integrated and have only a weak sense of belonging. Only one of our few Egyptian interviewees knew the CfW programmes in Jordan. He stated that he was not jealous for not being eligible to participate but critical to what degree these programmes were in fact able to select the most vulnerable Syrians and Jordanians: “We are not bothered that we don’t get these opportunities. But we’re confused about the selection criteria” (140, non-participant, Al-Azraq).

Effects of the existence of CfW programmes as such (Hypothesis 4)

According to our research, the existence of CfW programmes has only limited effects on the horizontal trust between Jordanians and Syrians. 26 Jordanians and 34 Syrians said that their trust in the respective other group has clearly improved over time but only a quarter of these 60 people were not participating in CfW programmes. The main channel through which CfW impacts on social cohesion is therefore, once again, personal participation in CfW programmes. And most of the non-participants who also reported improvements in horizontal trust did so

because relatives, friends and neighbours had told them about their positive experience. Evidence for our Hypothesis 4 is thus quite weak.

Nevertheless, non-participants still welcome the programmes. Several interviewees highlighted that these programmes are good for both, Syrians and Jordanians, and that they like the idea that the two groups work together.

However, only two interviewees – both from Kafr Asad – confirmed explicitly our hypothesis that the existence of CfW as such has already positive effects on horizontal trust – even between non-participants:

„The programmes had a lot of impact on the social relationships between Syrians and Jordanians. First of all, when they came, there were not many connections between the groups. Now, it got better due to the programme. Before everyone was a bit ignorant of each other. Now the truth was revealed that the Syrians can also work for the community. Both Syrians and Jordanians have the same objective” (230:15, non-participant, Kafr Asad)

„As a result [of the CfW programmes], there are a lot of good relationships between people. There was a street cleaning project. The public would come out and give them tea. So even the people who did not participate were still happy” (229:7, non-participant, Kafr Asad).

Some interviewees, in contrast, were quite critical about the CfW programmes. Some complained that Jordanian participants in general were not selected on the grounds of their socio-economic needs but their *wasta* (Arabic for connections/ favouritism, see more on this issue below in Section 6.5.3). And some disliked that the programmes were employing an equal share of Syrians and Jordanians even though there much less Syrians living in their respective communities than Jordanians.

But none of them blamed the Syrians. For instance, when asked “What are the Jordanians thinking about the fact that the Syrians can also work in the CfW programmes?”, a shop keeper in Al-Azraq summarised the situation as follows:

“Some voices, of course, say that the jobs should be for Jordanians first. They feel that it is unjust that the Syrians get more money than themselves because the Syrians get also support from international organisations. This makes that the Syrians can afford to work at wages far below the levels at which Jordanians would work. This creates quite a bit of frustration in town because there are also very many Jordanian families in dire need. And the Syrians are getting much more help than even the poorest Jordanians get. So, many people in town say that all the support programmes are unfair” (91:11, shop keeper, Al-Azraq).

And a CfW participant from Kafr Sawm answered our question “Are non-participants jealous of your participation in the GIZ program?” as follows:

“Yes, of course many people wanted the work, Jordanians as well as Syrians, and are jealous of the good chance. Many people compete, because they are in need” (149:15, participant, Kafr Sawm).

Effects of participation in CfW programmes (Hypothesis 5)

CfW participants, however, confirmed across the board that CfW programmes tend to have a positive effect on horizontal trust because they bring people from different social groups together and make them work for the same goals. Three quarters of all interviewed CfW participants stated that the horizontal trust between Syrians and Jordanians is strong, just 8 per cent said that it is rather weak. Almost half said that CfW programmes had further strengthened horizontal trust. A fifth said that CfW programmes had not strengthened horizontal trust but with two single exceptions they argued that this was only the case because the horizontal trust between Syrians and Jordanians had always been so strong that it could not be further strengthened.

Our evidence for Hypothesis 5 is thus quite strong – in particular if we consider that many interviewees made their statements spontaneously, i.e. even before we had asked a question on the issue.

Participants mentioned different reasons for the positive effects of CfW programmes: Conversations during work to learn about each other’s interests and values, the need to collaborate to succeed in the work objectives, shared meals, or leisure activities after work (such as football, invitations to celebrations). In addition, the relations improved when participants exchanged skills. “People start to exchange experiences. For example, Syrians show locals how to plant” (194:10, participant, Faqū’a). In a cooking project in Kafr Sawm, participants exchanged recipes and cooking styles.

CfW is sometimes cited as the only means that brings Syrians and Jordanians actively together. “The project is the first way to interact with Syrians. Through the job I felt that I have the chance to choose to interact with Syrians” (27:8, participant, Kafr Asad). Several times, participants pointed out that prior to the programmes, they did not enjoy strong interactions with Syrians, despite the fact that they share many values, customs and traditions.

The joint activity made them connect and led to increased daily-life interaction, also beyond the programme, the relationships seem to stay. One participant from Deyr ‘Allā said that “the relationships between Syrians and Jordanians are very good. We are like brothers. Even when the programme finished” (2:2, participant, Deyr ‘Allā). Another recounted: “We are still in contact via Whats App. At the end of the project, we made a little celebration, and everybody contributed” (128:10, participant, Kafr Sawm).

These findings are again in line with the results of the DEval study mentioned above. It found that Syrians and Jordanians get to know each other in their working places much better than anywhere else. And according to that study, 56 per cent of all CfW participants perceive the

experience of working with people with the respective other group positively while just 2 per cent perceive it negatively (Roxin et al. 2020).

And the results of a workers survey conducted among the participants of the ILO's employment intensive infrastructure programme are also very similar. 93 per cent of its respondents stated that Jordanians and Syrians were able to work together as one team, just 8 per cent of the Jordanians and 4 per cent of the Syrians disagreed. Likewise, 90 per cent of all respondents said that Jordanians and Syrians trusted each other, and only 11 per cent of the Jordanians and 4 per cent of the Syrians disagreed. 91 per cent confirmed that they had built friendship with other workers including people with the respective other nationality, while only 8 per cent of the Jordanians and 7 per cent of the Syrians disagreed. And 83 per cent of all workers felt that participation in the CfW programme had contributed to a reduction in the tensions between Jordanians and Syrians in Jordan, while 15 per cent of the Jordanians and 13 per cent of the Syrians disagreed (NAMA & ILO 2019)

Our results do not significantly vary strongly between project sites. Interestingly, several participants in the ILO Highway project point out that their joint activity has helped them to learn from each other and has eased pre-existing tensions related to job competition.

The projects also connect women to men and fellow women. "I became close friends with my female co-workers and they became like sisters to me. This is due to the site engineer who is making us all feel the same" (25:3, participant, Kafr Asad). Finding new friends is a commonly cited outcome by the programme participants.

Another finding is that mixed nationality teams strengthen the effects. A number of times, interviewees pointed to the benefits of working in mixed groups. Interestingly, one member of a CfW-team mentions that the supervisor's decision whether or not to separate the groups by nationality has a strong impact: "It depends on the supervisor of the team, some supervisors mix the groups and other supervisors separate the groups, which also manifests hate between the groups. (...) It is better to work in a mixed group, it is good to integrate" (53:12, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

According to an expert, especially Syrians perceive that they have to carry out harder tasks than their Jordanian co-workers. This points to the fact that unequal treatment within mixed teams can weaken horizontal trust. Another participant points out that separating teams due to tensions exacerbates those tensions further and thus clearly favours a mixed approach:

"I love that I work in mixed groups of Syrians and Jordanians. In cities, there are many mixed groups. But not so in the village. Many other workers were sceptical in the beginning about co-operating with Syrians. But the project changed their mind. All of us increased our contacts with the Syrians, and we all became good friends." (59:6, Jordanian participant, Kafr Asad)

And a CfW participant from Deyr 'Allā said:

“I worked with Syrians and we built friendships. We were like brothers. When one of us was sick, we took care of him.” – Question: “How is the interaction in everyday life?” – Answer: They are part of the community. At first it was weird because of the new culture. But now it’s fine.” (271: 9, Jordanian male participant)

Getting to know each other is something rare in the context of the economic hardship of many interviewees, who say that it has become difficult to accept invitations for weddings, funerals, etc. as the cost for gifts are exceeding their household’s budgets. When asked “What are other works that should be done in the community?”, one interviewee answered:

“There should be more work that supports both Jordanians and Syrians, we should work with them together so we can better understand their situation. Sometimes you feel that Jordanians are like us, they don’t have income either.” (114:12, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

A non-participant from Kafr Sawm adds: “We don’t think of ourselves as Syrians or Jordanians here, we are one and we all face the same challenges.” (133:18, non-participant, Kafr Sawm).

6.1.3 Vertical trust (Hypotheses 6 and 7)

Our findings suggest that CfW programmes can have a positive impact on vertical trust even though they are limited with regards to this aspect of social cohesion. For two reasons, we had difficulties in getting meaningful answers on our questions related to vertical trust. First, we had the impression that many interviewees just said what they thought we wanted to hear. Therefore, we stopped asking very open questions after the first two weeks of research. Second, we found that many interviewees did know well which actors were effectively responsible for the CfW programmes. It was therefore difficult to say if their opinions about the local authorities had really been influenced by their experience with CfW programmes. Therefore, we started asking at least some of our interviewees who in their perception was responsible for the programmes (central government, municipality, NGOs or foreign donors) – in order to know whom they would blame for the good and for the bad of the programmes.

The answers of this small group of people gave a quite mixed picture. Three respondents (all males) thought that their respective municipality had set up the CfW programmes. Eight insisted that a foreign donor (GIZ, ILO or WFP) was responsible for it (including an equal number of females and males and of Jordanians and Syrians). And two said that they had no idea. And even the municipalities considered many CfW projects as GIZ or ILO rather than their own projects (5:1; 228:5).

We also asked some interviewees if the CfW programmes had strengthened their vertical trust in the local authorities, and 20 gave us clear answers. Exactly half of them confirmed, while the other half negated the question. Some even said explicitly that CfW programmes had only raised their trust in international donors.

Where local authorities are actively involved in the project design and appear to be open to the wishes of community members (e.g. when they organise participatory events, see Section 6.5.4) CfW programmes have a positive impact on the vertical trust in local authorities:

"The workers believe that the community centre is responsible for the programme [...] and] they attribute the programme and its benefits to the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, the workers are mainly grateful to the government, and of course they feel better connected to it because they have now an open door to it through the programme" (8, local expert, Deyr 'Allā).

Similarly, CfW participants in Kafr Asad see the municipality as being mainly responsible, indicating that trust in it increases with the creation of CfW job opportunities (17, 43, 46) and the local procurement of building materials (27). A Jordanian woman said:

"I feel that I can trust the local authorities more. They do immediately what we asked for, concerning the materials that were needed." (27:13, female participant, Kafr Asad)

Reversely, if community members attribute the CfW programmes to foreign agencies or implementers from outside their community, vertical trust is reinforced towards those actors, rather than towards Jordanian authorities:

„I hope that we work [more] together with the supporting organisations, to solve those problems together. It is better to talk to people directly in the communities than talking only to the centre or the government. We trust you [the foreign donors] more than we trust the government." (31:7, local expert, Kafr Asad).

And a different interviewee said: "The people here in Deyr 'Allā like GIZ very much. There are GIZ stickers on every fridge" (5:9, local expert, Deyr 'Allā)

Another factor that undermines vertical trust is that *wasṭa* (connections) has often an impact on decisions taken by the authorities – such as the selection of Jordanians for participation in CfW programmes or the purchase of building material and machines in local shops for the use in CfW activities. Many Jordanians and Syrians alike disapprove that local decision makers employ CfW participants on the basis of their *wasṭa* (connections):

"If you don't know anyone you can't find job opportunities. I feel that the municipalities would only announce the [CfW] opportunities, if they already have registered the people." (94: 10, female participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

"I am more angry at the municipality. There is wasṭa everywhere." (231:312; male non-participant, Kafr Asad)

Likewise, interviewees complain that decisions on local procurement are also often driven by *wasṭa* (connections):

„We need to ensure that all standards are implemented before handing it [i.e. the created infrastructure] over [to the municipality]. Otherwise, they will just employ the usual suspects – their cousins etc. – and do whatever they like” (111, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl).

These considerations show that in all settings, CfW programmes are creating new structures that run risk of damaging carefully built relations within municipalities. The projects become part of local politics.

6.2 Gender roles (especially Hypotheses 1, 2, 15)

All CfW programmes in Jordan aim at providing employment opportunities for both, women and men. As a result, they have effects on gender roles within communities. However, if female labour force participation rates have recently increased somewhat in parts of Jordan, the main reason is the protracted economic crisis, which forces many families to look into new options. CfW programmes play only a minor role because many Jordanians and Syrians have still reservations against women in paid employment.

In this section, we discuss how females are included in CfW programmes (6.2.1), how the work environment of CfW programmes is perceived by female workers (6.2.2) and in which way the participation of women in CfW programmes impacts on gender roles prevalent in the local communities (6.2.3).

6.2.1 The role of women in CfW programmes

CfW programmes include female participants in different ways. Some programmes let them do the same work as men in mixed teams. Others also let them do similar things as men but in separate teams. Some give different tasks to men and women – but let them work at the same sites. And others yet again let women and men do different things at different sites.

Many female interviewees reported that working in a mixed team had been a very good experience for them while others – in particular in more rural and conservative areas – preferred gender-segregation at work. One of them argued that “culturally it is not acceptable for men and women to work together” (194, CfW participant, Faqū’a). One female participant who had worked as the only woman in a male team stressed that this experience had been “weird” in the beginning, due to the fact that it was her first exposure to male strangers (277, Kafr Sawm). But she also highlighted that she never made any negative experience. Another female CfW participant stated even that male co-workers were necessary as a kind of guardianship that guaranteed the security of female workers, especially in contexts where CfW activities take place in public settings (182, highway).

Generally, the majority of female participants we interviewed perceive the type of activity they carry out as suitable for females. Our data indicate that female participants most often assume

‘lighter’ tasks than males. This applies also to CfW programmes in which males and females carry out similar activities, for example, where men accomplish physically more demanding tasks, such as carrying stones or handling heavy machinery. This division of labour into more and less physically demanding work seems to be appreciated by both female and male participants. Especially male interviewees are convinced that females should not carry out physically demanding tasks. But also a female CfW participant from Deyr ‘Allā stressed that “women do not have to do hard work. So there is no problem for women” (237). We found female CfW participants saying that in the beginning they were sceptical about doing so called ‘male-activities’, such as construction works: “At the beginning, I had myself doubts about doing construction work. But now, I am comfortable” (58, female participant, Kafr Asad).

Furthermore, males (both CfW participants and non-participants) seem to see the role of female CfW participants as a ‘contribution’ to the men’s work. As one male participant put forward, “it is a good idea for the females to help in the workload” (210, Faqū’a). That leaves the impression that men are the ones who are doing the actual work and women only have a minor, contributing role within the overall work process. Some female interviewees, in contrast, stressed that they could do the same kind of work as their male colleagues: “Women themselves know that they can do the same jobs as men” (93, participant, Al-Azraq).

However, most Jordanians and Syrians think that waste collection is not a suitable activity for females. This holds for non-participants and CfW participants of both genders, but particularly men: “Women are supposed to work in something better than this [waste collection]” (30, male non-participant, Kafr Asad). Especially men working in the field of waste collection themselves made very strong statements on this issue. One CfW participant said, for example, that “it is something embarrassing for ladies to do these jobs [waste collection]” (169, highway). Another participant stated that “it is not suitable for a woman. She cannot work in the street like this” (170, participant, highway). These findings align with the general practice of shaming people involved in waste collection and processing (see also Section 6.4.1). This phenomenon takes a dimension that female municipal authorities refuse to visit waste collection/ composting project sites, arguing: “I cannot come to the field because I am a woman, my husband won’t accept that” (78, local expert, Al-Azraq). However, we also found inspiring examples in practice, where female participants assume leading responsibilities in the waste sector, such as the position of a team lead at a compost dump-site. One participant expressed that she “never felt that some jobs are not good for women” (93, participant, Al-Azraq). This participant links her point of view with the way she was raised as well as with the university education she had received.

In contrast to this, CfW activities that are meant to contribute to the awareness about waste recycling are considered suitable for females – especially because they often entail visits to private households. Here, housewives are sometimes alone, and they are also responsible for dealing with household waste. A local expert from Al-Azraq pointed out that “they [the female CfW participants] go door to door and as it is mostly women at the door it is more comfortable for our society to have women going there” (78). For male-only teams it is culturally not appropriate to visit women who stay alone in their house.

Data shows that female participants seem to appreciate learning skills, such as refurbishment or agricultural techniques, within the CfW programmes that can be applied after completion of the CfW programmes. Thus, there are indications that confirm that skills acquired through the participation in CfW programmes indeed may contribute to better labour market chances (hypothesis 15, see also Section **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**6.3.4). Whether a type of activity is perceived as suitable for women is closely related to the environment and location of work, as the following section will show.

6.2.2 Suitability of the work environment in CfW programmes

Our research indicates that, to women in particular, the location of an employment opportunity is of great importance. Generally, our data show that it is considered acceptable for women to work inside houses. Especially male interviewees pointed out that any direct exposure of women to the public was inappropriate. One male interviewee said, for example: “I think females should do ‘internal’ works [jobs inside houses]. And external jobs are more suitable for men” (21, non-participant, Kafr Asad). Likewise, a male participant emphasised that all forms of employment that females can carry out from home were acceptable (167, highway). Local experts of both genders from different localities highlighted that this attitude was due to the preferences of women rather than the wishes of their husbands or other male family members. They said that most women did not want to leave their houses in order to become economically active but favoured home-based activities (4, Deyr ‘Allā; 78, Al-Azraq). Female and male interviewees linked this preference to the cultural norm that females are not supposed to get into contact with strangers. A female CfW participant said that “to go out and work” was her main challenge for participation in the CfW programmes (113, Umm al-Jimāl).

Many other female interviewees, in contrast, see CfW programmes as a ‘safe work environment’. They said that being employed in CfW programmes was much better for women than in most other work places because labour rights were respected and women were better protected. For instance, a female CfW participant stated:

“I tried working outside, but it did not work out. Here [in the CfW programme] it is better. Over here, the treatment is much better. It is taken care of us.” (1, Deyr ‘Allā).

Many mentioned in particular that they appreciated their CfW job being close to their homes. In addition, they lauded that this and the regulated working hours within the CfW programmes allowed them to take care of household chores as well as care work.

“It [the CfW programme] is suitable for me as a housewife because I can go back home to my children” (70, female participant, Al-Azraq).

6.2.3 Acceptability of female labour force participation

We found that CfW programmes contribute to raising the acceptability of female labour force participation but we cannot say how strong their effect is. One reason is that there are many other initiatives and development programmes targeting female labour force participation rates in order to improve gender equality and women empowerment. In any case, many of our interviewees, both participants and non-participants, stressed how important the creation of employment opportunities in CfW programmes was for a change in gender roles. For example, one female participant pointed out:

„It has become more acceptable. In the past, it has been more shameful. The opportunities specifically for women arose” (137, Kafr Sawm).

CfW has become a realistic point of entry into the labour market for females, and in many parts of Jordan, it is also the only one. Many female CfW participants said that this was their first paid employment ever. And all others, except one, had previously only worked in the informal sector such that the CfW employment was an entry into formal employment (though of course not yet to the regular labour market). Most female interviewees said that they enjoyed the work experience in the formal labour context of CfW. Many complained therefore about the short duration of CfW employment contracts and made clear that they would like to work longer in the CfW programmes. Several ones even declared that they were considering looking for a regular job on the formal labour market after the end of their CfW employment.

In contrast to this, an ILO representative pointed out that “[o]nce the CfW programme is finished they [the female CfW participants] step out; for them a short working period is attractive”, thus implying that CfW programmes are attractive to women particularly because of their limited duration (interview with ILO representative).

This ambiguity of findings supports the great importance of post-employment surveys, which should include questions focusing especially on opportunities for women to join the formal labour market after the end of their CfW contracts.

In any case, many interviewees highlighted that it is very difficult for women to find a regular employment – partly because Jordan suffers from a severe shortage of jobs in general and partly because many jobs are not given to women. A Jordanian woman declared: „There are very few jobs in town; and often, these few jobs are reserved for men” (93, participant, Al-Azraq). Another one pointed to lacking mobility: “There is no work for girls and women, we would love to work and to get out, but there is no possibility for us to get work” (113, participant, Umm al-Jimāl). Where they were implemented CfW programmes thus led to a significant increase in working opportunities for females, particularly in rural areas already characterised by an extreme shortage of employment opportunities. This shortage in turn may have spurred higher acceptability of female employment in CfW programmes by women themselves but also by their male relatives.

Conversely, the visible rise in female labour force participation induced by CfW programmes has apparently increased the acceptability of females in paid employment. A Syrian man phrased this acceptability as follows: “Yes [the programme encourages women to work], it removed the shame culture on working women” (148, non-participant, Kafr Sawm). Another one said: “The organisations [CfW programmes] have changed the attitudes that the woman is an active part of the society. [...] The project has transformed the whole community” (109, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

Furthermore, CfW programmes seem to have even a broader effect on gender equality. Some participants stated that the existence of CfW programmes as such increased the general recognition of females as a part of society because the programmes employ a relatively high share of women, let them do similar work as men and thereby demonstrate that women can make more or less the same contributions as men (e.g. 148, male non-participant, Kafr Sawm; 153, female non-participant, Kafr Sawm). One could say that CfW programmes raise not only the sense of belonging of migrant groups (Syrians) to local communities respectively society at large but also the sense of belonging of females, which supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. A Jordanian woman said, for instance:

“I felt change because they made us feel the importance of the women’s role in community. We became equal with men. We are doing the same work. In the past there were plenty of taboos, about women going out and working. But now this has changed. Men look at women as equals to them. I’m very happy about that. They improved our quality of lives. Now we [women] have an income. We can contribute to improve the household.”
(113, CfW participant, Umm al-Jimāl)

However, the CfW programmes are not able to change gender roles completely. Interviews with non-participants demonstrated that their effects on the wider community depend considerably on the awareness of non-participants about the existence of such programmes. Presumably, also the duration and the size of a CfW programme in a given location determines to what degree it can affect gender roles.

In our sample of interviewees, the vast majority females and males consider the labour force participation of women acceptable or even positive. Only three out of 23 male respondents and one out of 20 females said that women should not have a paid employment. However, an additional seven males and two females said that women should only work under specific circumstances: for example if the kind of work was adequate, if the sector of activities was acceptable for women and if the work environment was safe (see also Sections **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.** and 6.2.2). On the other hand, six males but only one female insisted that CfW programmes should employ more women. We also found evidence that the acceptance of female labour force participation depends somewhat on the age of a person. Younger people, both females and males, appeared to us more open to women in paid employment than older people. As one woman stated: “Especially old people have difficulties in accepting women in jobs like mine. But all the young people have no problems with this anymore” (93, participant, Al-Azraq).

The attitudes of CfW participants and non-participants did not differ substantially, neither did those of Jordanians and Syrians. But both groups stated that Syrians are more conservative, i.e. less likely to let a female work outside the house. As a Jordanian woman put it:

“It is very normal among Jordanians that girls work outside the house. Syrians, in contrast, think that women cannot work for pay and that they should stay at home. (...) When we sit together, I try to convince the other girls that it is normal for us to work. (...) I try to convince them that they have to be more educated and self-reliant.” (58, CfW participant, Kafr Asad)

Many Syrian women confirmed that in general women in Syria were only active in certain sectors of the labour market, such as education. But they also stated that it is more common for Syrian females to participate in the labour market in Jordan than it used to be the case back in Syria. One Syrian woman told us:

“Women work here more than they did in Aleppo. (...) I have told him [my husband] that you have to let me help you and work because if I do not help, we will probably break down” (136, non-participant, Kafr Sawm).

Thus, this behavioural change can most likely be explained by the difficult economic situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan. A Syrian woman said:

“This [increase in labour force participation among Syrian women] is also because life, paying rents, etc. is very expensive in Jordan and it used to be much cheaper in Syria” (149, participant, Kafr Sawm).

Financial hardship seems to be in any case the main reason for females joining the labour market. Many interviewees acknowledged that it was still “culturally inappropriate” (112, female non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl) for a family to allow a married woman to work for pay and only the last step it should take if it faced a financial crisis. A Syrian woman declared:

“Women should not be working outside their homes. It is the last option, really – only allowed if you do not have sons. Our neighbour is in this situation and therefore this is not a shame for him.” (112, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

Several interviewees pointed out that the protracted economic crisis has forced many families to break with the traditional model of the single male breadwinner family. They decided that in order to sustain a family, both men and women had to earn an income. A Jordanian man stressed: “I think the economic situation needs all members of a family to work. Also the females have to contribute to the family income” (21, non-participant, Kafr Asad).

This change is not irreversible. Once the economic situation improves, some Jordanian and Syrian women might reconsider their strategy and give up their jobs again. Some interviewees emphasised strongly that they were working only because of the difficult economic circum-

stances and would rather stay at home and fulfil their role as housewives: “I do not like it because it is forced by the economic situation. I would prefer to stay home and care for my children” (30, female non-participant, Kafr Asad). Longer-term acceptance of female labour force participation can only be achieved if coercion is not the only driving factor.

However, some women stated that they joined CfW programmes also because they enjoyed the work and the interaction with others at the work place. This supports again that participation CfW programmes can strengthen in particular female participants’ sense of belonging (Hypothesis 2). For many women, CfW programmes are particularly attractive because the joint activity allows them to talk with other members of the community with whom they have little contact in everyday life. A Jordanian woman told us: “I want to increase my communication with the people in the community” (123, participant, Kafr Sawm). Similarly, a Syrian woman said: “The programmes have many benefits. They are entertaining. And they are bringing people together to do more productive things” (279, non-participant, Kafr Sawm).

Finally, several women highlighted that their participation had also strengthened their self-confidence and thereby their standing within the community. A woman from Kafr Asad said: “It [CfW programmes] helped to shape my personality, I became more confident. I can now be an active member of the society” (27, participant, Kafr Asad).

6.3 Local economic development (LED)

CfW programmes in Jordan also contribute to LED. The direct effect (going through the wages paid to CfW participants) is very clear and significant. In addition, they also raise the wages of non-participants through the multiplier effect and local procurement but the size of this effect remains difficult to quantify – not least because of the difficult economic situation as another strong, yet CfW-independent impacting factor. The same holds for effects on LED that go through the creation of public goods. However, the effect of CfW programmes on the long-term employment prospects of CfW participants seems to be negligible.

In the following, we discuss how interviewees in our sample perceived LED in their respective community at the time of the interview (6.3.1), whether the wages paid by CfW programmes have an impact on average per-capita income in these communities (6.3.2), whether the public goods created by the programmes have an impact (6.3.3) and whether the programmes have long-term effects on the labour-market (going beyond their end, 6.3.4).

6.3.1 Perceptions of local economic development

Most of our interviewees, regardless of their nationality or employment status, conformed that the general economic situation in Jordan was very difficult. Both, Syrians and Jordanians, mentioned the lack of jobs and the prevalence of poverty as the main problems. Also many talked about decreasing wages due to higher competition on the labour market, rising rents, increasing

food prices, large numbers of students in school classes, transportation problems, shortages in water and electricity and long waiting hours in health care centres. Often Jordanians accused the Syrians for the problems like, for instance, this Jordanian woman:

“There was a great impact [of the arrival of Syrians in the region]. Job opportunities are rare for Jordanians, and [...] the Syrians accepted all jobs for a lower wage. Also, there was great impact on the electricity and water, and also in many other aspects” (65, shop keeper, Tal al-Rummān).

A local expert explicated:

“The schools are very crowded. Before, classrooms [...] took 30 students. Now, the class rooms need to fit 45 students. [...] Medical centres are prepared to treat 25 cases per day. Because of the [...] Syrian refugees, they have to accept now 40-60 people per day. This is a lot of pressure on the health services” (3, local expert, Kafr Asad).

Some Jordanians mentioned that the social relations within the communities were also suffering from the difficult economic situation. According to them, the lack of income did not allow people any longer to pay visits to each other, maintain their social relations or get married (77, participant, Al-Azraq; 44, Kafr Asad, shop keeper; 199, non-participant, Faqū’a; 76, participant, Al-Azraq).

Some Jordanians, however, acknowledged that the arrival of the Syrians has also had some positive economic effects on Jordan. Some shop keepers in the South of Jordan highlighted, for example, that the presence of the Syrians has led to an increase in business activities (201, shop keeper, Faqū’a; 202, shop keeper, Faqū’a). Some interviewees stressed that many programmes of international donors would not exist without the presence of thousands of Syrians in Jordan. Likewise, some streets and schools had been built to host the growing population. Furthermore, Syrians had brought some technical skills that were very helpful for the Jordanians as well (78, local expert, Azraq).

6.3.2 Direct and indirect effects of the wages paid by CfW programmes (Hypothesis 13)

CfW programmes raised the income of participant households by almost a quarter. These spent most of the additional income on basic needs and debt repay and invest only a very small share of it. In addition, they also raised the income of non-participant households through the multiplier effect and local procurement – but not the investment effect. However, we cannot say how ample these indirect effects are.

In the following, we discuss (i) how much the wages paid to CfW participants increased their income and what the participants did with the extra income and (ii) whether the broader community has been benefitting also (indirectly) from the wages through the multiplier or the investment effect.

Direct effects (income of CfW participants)

The most direct economic effect of CfW programmes is that the wages paid to participants increase their total household income during the time of their employment. According to Roxin et al. (2020), households in Jordan had an average total monthly income of 376 JOD when they applied in 2017 for a job in any of the GIZ programmes and a total monthly income of about 460 JOD during their participation in a programme. The GIZ programmes would thus raise the household income by about 85 JOD or 22 per cent on average. The increase appears somewhat low as CfW participants receive a wage of about 12 JOD per day (not including child-care, lunch and transportation) and typically work about twenty days per month. Their total income should thus rise by about 240 JOD. However, the difference might be due to extra costs that CfW participants have for example to travel to their work sites. According to Jones et al. (2019), Syrian households, which tend to be poorer than vulnerable Jordanian households, had an average income of 285 JOD per month in 2018 (excluding any CfW wage but including the unconditional cash grant provided by UNHCR and UNICEF, see Section 4.4). The abject national poverty line of Jordan is currently 28 JOD per person and month, which is, depending on household size, between 100 and 250 JOD per household (ILO, 2019).

Whatever the exact amount, in any case the rise in income of CfW participant households is only temporary. With the end of their employment, their income decreases again to the previous level (or even below it) unless some household member finds another job.

CfW participants spent the bulk of their wages on consumptive purposes. We asked 64 of 72 CfW participants about their spending patterns. Only a third mentioned investments into human capital (specifically the education of their children: 22 per cent) or small projects (10 per cent) as one of their top-spending priorities. In contrast, 43 per cent mentioned items related to housing (rent, electricity and water), 28 per cent food, 22 per cent household equipment and 20 per cent debt repayment. Other items were the support for children and other relatives, clothing, individual needs, health, transportation, weddings and holidays (see Table 11). Some experts also told us that the CfW participants did not necessarily buy more but sometimes higher-quality products.

Interestingly, the spending patterns of females and males differ significantly. We have information on the spending patterns of 26 female and 38 male CfW participants. And both groups spent in similar ways on household equipment, support for children or other relatives and investments. But while males spent more often significant parts of their CfW wages on housing (rent, electricity and water), food and debt repayment than females, females spent much more often on education and somewhat more often on health (see Table 12).

These differences can be due to different factors. One explanation is that males are more interested in hardware (housing, household equipment, food and the like), while females give the software a higher weight (especially education, but also health). Another, more probable, explanation is that within the families, men's wages are considered the main source of income and therefore used mainly for core items (housing, debt repayment, food etc.) while women's

wages are much more a windfall profit, which can be used for occasional needs such as health treatments and the costs of education.

Table 11: Spending patterns of CfW participants (N=64)			
Item	number	share of respondents (multiple answers possible)	share of answers given
Housing (rent, electricity, water)	30	47%	23%
Food	19	30%	15%
Household equipment	15	23%	12%
Education of children (school items, university etc.)	15	23%	12%
Debt repayment	14	22%	11%
Support children or other relatives	13	20%	10%
Investment into small projects	7	11%	5%
Health	6	9%	5%
Personal needs	5	8%	4%
Clothes	3	5%	2%
Transportation	2	3%	5%
Holidays	1	2%	0.5%
Sum	130		100%
Source: Data from our own survey.			

Table 12: Spending patterns of CfW participants – gender differences			
Women		Men	
<i>Items named</i>	<i>count</i>	<i>Items named</i>	<i>count</i>
Education	13	Housing (rent, electricity, water)	19
Housing (rent, electricity, water)	11	Food	13
Household equipment	7	Debt repayment	10
Support children or other relatives	7	Household equipment	8
Food	6	Support children or other relatives	6
Debt repayment	4	Health	2
Health	4	Investments	2
Investments	3	Education	2
Other	4	Other	6
Source: Data from our own survey.			

Some responses indicated that failures may have occurred in the targeting of vulnerable households. For example, a Jordanian man told us: “I used the salary from the first month to go to Turkey for holidays” (13, participant, Deyr ‘Allā). And another one said that he would use his wage to buy work gear (26, participant, Kafr Asad). However, only Jordanians made such statements. Some Syrians, in contrast, mentioned that they were sending money to their family back home in Syria (149, participant, Kafr Şawm; 73, participant, Al-Azraq).

By and large, our findings are supported by the Deval study mentioned above. It reports that 37 per cent of the CfW participants working in GIZ programmes see food as one of their most important household expenditure item, 28 per cent housing (rent, water, electricity, improvement of dwelling), 13 per cent debt repayment, 4 per cent education, 4 per cent health, 2 per cent clothes, 2 per cent transportation, 1 per cent social events, and 9 per cent other items (Roxin et al. 2020). Striking are the differences in spending for food and education, with higher shares in Deval’s (food) respectively our (education) sample. Differences in spending for housing are probably due to different classifications (spending for housing plus household equipment in our sample roughly corresponds to spending for housing plus other items in Deval’s study).

Likewise, our findings are quite similar to those of the GIZ post-employment survey conducted in 2019. Here again, the largest share of respondents stated that they used a substantial part of their CfW wage for paying the house rent (45 per cent), followed by debt repay (34 per cent), open bills (33 per cent), food (31 per cent), health (22 per cent), household items (20 per cent) and transportation (17 per cent). Just 8 per cent mentioned education (see Table 13).

Table 13: CfW-income spending and saving patterns (results of GIZ post-employment survey, 984 respondents)

Spending items	Number of answers	share (of respondents)	share (of answers given)	Saving items	number	share	share (of answers given)
Rent	443	45%	26%	Personal items	139	15%	13%
Debt repay	330	34%	19%	Health	126	13%	11%
Bills	318	33%	18%	Education	88	9%	8%
Food	304	31%	18%	Small business	28	3%	3%
Health	212	22%	12%	Other	38	4%	3%
Purchasing items	193	20%	11%	Could not save any money	684	73%	62%
Transportation	166	17%	10%				
Education	75	8%	4%	Sum:	1103	117%	100%
Leisure	46	5%	3%	<i>CfW wage did not even cover expenses</i>	253	23%	n.a.
Other	84	9%	5%				
Sum:	1728	224%	100%				

Source: Data from GIZ post-employment survey (GIZ 2019).

These findings confirm again that the income from CfW programmes can only just cover the most basic needs of participants. 23 per cent of those responding to the GIZ survey stated even that they were unable to live from their CfW wages. Just 27 per cent said that they were able to save at least a bit of their income. Most of them (15 per cent of all respondents) made savings for future personal wishes, while 13 per cent of all respondents made savings for possible future health care costs against 8 per cent who made savings for future spending on education. Just 3 per cent made savings for future business investments (see Table 13).

In addition, our findings are also roughly in line with a survey conducted among participants of KfW and ILO's CfW programme. 83 per cent of its respondents listed 'daily consumption' among the three main targets of use of their CfW wages, while 31 per cent listed debt repay. 14 per cent mentioned housing (rent, water, electricity), 8 per cent the education of their children, 7 per cent medical expenses and another 7 per cent the renovation of their houses. Just 3 per cent said that they could save or invest themselves some part of their wages. However, 0.7 per cent reported using part of the wage for the purchase of a car (NAMA & ILO 2019).

And our findings are also in line with the results of a study conducted by the Overseas Development Institute on the effect of UNHCR cash assistance extended to Syrian refugees in Jordan. According to this study, Syrian households spend 69 per cent of their total income on housing and just 11 per cent each on health and food. The UNHCR cash assistance allows them to raise their monthly spending on rent from 120 to 130 JOD, utilities from 20 to 35 JOD, health from 15 to 29 JOD, education from 9 to 25 JOD and transport from 10 to 20 JOD. On average, the Syrian households spend 285 JOD per month, which is equal to 5-6 USD per person and day on average in purchasing power parities (Jones et al., 2019).

Debt repayment was a recurrent issue in our interviews. 14 out of 72 CfW participants (nine Syrians and nine Jordanians) told us that they used their CfW wage for debt repayment. Because of this, we asked also other interviewees and found out that many people are in debts: to local shops, neighbours, relatives, friends or their landlord. Most debts are thus informal rather than formal credits through banks. And still, the CfW wages do not make much of a change for the debtors:

"How do you pay for these expenses? – I'm living on debts. – Do you think that with this new job you can pay them back? – No, I don't think that I can pay back the debt, I plan to spend the money on food, drinks, living expenses." (84, Syrian participant, Al-Azraq).

25 out of 97 interviewed shop keepers brought the topic up as well. Especially grocers complained that a large share of their clients were not always able to pay for what they were buying and some showed us the book in which they keep record of all the people owing money to them. One shop-keeper explained:

"Loans play a big role in the bad economic situation. All people take loans. I do not have a lot of customers recently. People cannot afford the loans they are taking." (9, shop keeper, Deyr 'Allā).

One interviewee blamed tensions among people in his community on the high level of outstanding debts: “Tensions would start between people who owe each other money. But these were just personal feuds. It did not happen at a larger scale, really.” (177, non-participant, Al-Mafraq).

However, the high number of credits given between individuals on a private, informal basis can also be seen as something positive. The phenomenon shows that there is a degree of horizontal trust between the members of the respective communities, which involves Syrians as much as Jordanians.

Multiplier effects

The indirect income effects of the CfW programmes are difficult to quantify. We can say that there must be a multiplier effect because all CfW households spend most of their additional income locally and because a substantial share of the procurement happens in the same region as well. Yet, we could not find evidence for its size. Furthermore, the investment effect of CfW programmes is negligible because CfW participants consume almost all of their wages.

In interviews with CfW participants, we found substantial evidence for our hypothesis that CfW programmes must unfold a meaningful multiplier effect on the whole local community. They spend more than three quarters of their additional income on items with a substantial part of the payments flowing to other households in the same area: 47 per cent of respondents spend on food, which is normally purchased in local shops (in contrast to, for example, clothes, see below). 24 per cent spending on renting the accommodation, and many landlords live next door to their tenants (even though, of course, many also live far away, rent out, for example, the house where they used to grow up before they migrated to Amman or another town). 13 per cent spend on debt repay and, as detailed above, the debts are mostly informal and the creditors neighbours, landlords or local shop owners. Other parts of the wages flow, of course out of the municipality: for example, the shares spent on health care, education, building material for the improvement of the dwelling, water, electricity and clothes (14 per cent altogether, see above).

Many CfW participants have also explicitly told us that they spend most of their additional income within the local community. The reason for this is simple: Most of the villages that we visited are so remote that it would be too expensive and too time-consuming to buy daily items in another place. Still, some households also said that they would rather go elsewhere if they wanted to buy something more expensive such as furniture or clothes because these items are much cheaper in urban areas.

If we could only assume that all households spend half of their additional income on average within their own community, we could say that the multiplier effect is just as large as the direct income effect of the CfW wages. This is because half of the wages is spent again in the community, thereby raising the income of the neighbours of CfW participants. And these spend again half the additional income locally. And so on: makes $\frac{1}{2}$ in the first round plus $\frac{1}{4}$ in the second round plus $\frac{1}{8}$ in the third round, and so on... resulting in a total of 1, i.e. the same as

the direct effect. Or in more general terms, if the households in the community spent $1/x$ of any additional income on average, the result of the infinite series would be:

$$\frac{1}{x} + \frac{1}{x^2} + \frac{1}{x^3} + \dots + \frac{1}{x^\infty} = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{x^n} = \frac{1}{x-1}$$

However, the multiplier effect is distributed over a much larger group of people: all households in the community rather than just those who participate in the CfW programmes. The direct effect of CfW wages per household is thus always larger than the multiplier effect as long as the share of households who participate in the CfW scheme remains limited and the share of additional income that households spend locally does not come close to 10 per cent.

In addition, we do not know the size of the multiplier effect for sure. To know better, we would need to have a much more detailed spending report of CfW participants and also non-participant households – or an explicit confirmation of non-participant households to have substantial benefit from the extended spending possibilities of participants households.


We tried our best in this regard by focusing on the perceptions of local shop keepers. Our assumption was that local shop keepers would be the first to benefit from the second round effect of wage payments executed by CfW programmes. If participants spend 41 per cent of their wages on food, there must be a second round benefit of CfW wages at least for local grocers. Therefore, we asked 61 shop keepers in the sites of our field research if they had realised from their sales that some people from the neighbourhood spend substantially more than in the past on purchases in the shop of the interviewee. In addition, we asked shop keepers if they knew about the CfW programmes being implemented not far from their shops and if they had realised that the participants in these programmes were spending more money in the shop since they started working for the programmes.

However, only six shop-keepers told us that their sales had increased significantly because many of their customers had got an employment in a CfW programme. 28 had realised that some of their customers spend at least a bit more money in their shop because they participated in a CfW programme – which did not have much impact, however, on the total sales of the shop keepers. 14 said that they knew at least one CfW programme but did not believe that any of their customers spent more money in their shop than before. And 13 stated that they had never heard about the CfW programmes (see Figure 8). Possibly, the multiplier effect is in most places too much distributed over a large number of households and therefore too small for each of them to be noticeable.

When we asked shop keepers whether CfW participants spend more money at their shops, one of them replied: “Yes, but not all. Some of them. They also came here before they worked in CfW, so there was no big change” (159; shop keeper, Kafr Şawm).

Figure 8: Perception of interviewed shop keepers about multiplier effects

Answers to the question: Have you realised from your sales that some people in your neighbourhood generate additional income from CfW programmes?



Source: data from our own field research

Another one said, however: “[I]n those three months [when the programme was running], I noticed an increase in sales. But when the programme ended, the increase also stopped”. And he could even quantify the increase in his sales: “It [the sales] increased from 350 to 400 JOD” (90, shop keeper, Al-Azraq). And yet another one estimated his income increase at 19 JOD (155, shop keeper, Kafr Şawm).

Two people from Kafr Şawm told us that a local chicken restaurant had increased its sales because of the CfW programmes: “One place [...] used to sell 50 chicken, now it can sell 70.” (133, non-participants, Kafr Şawm).

A shop-keeper in Al-Qaşr said:

“Do you think that these programmes have a positive impact? – Yes, not only on me, the whole souk [Arabic: market] benefitted from the programmes, people come here and spend their money and will buy more goods than before.” (214, shop keeper, Al-Qaşr).

And a shop keeper in Kafr Asad stated: Obviously [...] also other shops benefit. Because the money is always spent locally” (18:6, shop keeper, Kafr Asad).

Some local experts confirmed that CfW participants spend the bulk of their income locally. One of them said: “[The positive impact on the local economy] is noticeable, because people are spending their money in the community” (102:8, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl). And another one argued in a similar way: “Of course, the CfW programmes also help the neighbours because CfW workers spend their income in town. I know this because I can see this every day. I am from this community and I know all people her. And I can see how the CfW workers consume and spend their new income for food and clothes” (8:8, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā).

A CfW participant who was asked “Do you think that the CfW project has a wider effect on the community?” answered: “Yes, at the end of the month, everyone goes and spends the money, pays the loans and debts, and the money is spent.” (54: 22, CfW participant, Hawfa).

Most shop keepers said, however, that the existence of CfW programmes has only marginal impact on their sales. In addition, they stressed that everybody knew that the CfW activities were only temporary. A shop keeper whom we had asked if the CfW participants were coming to his shop said: “Yes, but they are saving the money. The little bit they buy here, it is not enough for us.” (74:13, shop keeper, Al-Azraq).

Some shop keepers highlighted that the CfW participants did not spend more money but at least repaid their debts:

“Do these people buy in your shop? – Most people pay their debt with it, so people are mainly repaying their debt” (144, shop keeper, Kafr Sawm).

“Did some of the participants buy here? – Yes, they paid their debts and some bought some new gas” (196, shop keeper, Faqū’a).

“In a nutshell, what do you think about the CfW programmes? – It is a good project in general. They provide cash and it helped a lot of people to pay back some of their debts” (209, shop keeper, Faqū’a).

Local procurement

Another relevant indirect effect of the Jordanian CfW programmes is local procurement but we were unable to quantify it. Only few interview partners were able to say where the CfW programmes would buy new machinery and building materials that was need for the projects. But some confirmed that the programme managers try to purchase as much as possible in the community in order to support it also through this channel: “We do promote local procurement wherever possible” (111:5, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl).

A donor representative explained: “We try to buy all materials and intermediate products locally, which in turn benefits the local economy. In Goueira, for example, women are trained to produce tent sheets in the traditional way, which are then set up in the parks as sun sails. Men are also trained to manufacture brick blocks themselves in a specific way” (285:5, donor representative, Amman).

Likewise, the programmes of WFP and World Vision buy, if ever possible, all ingredients that they need for the cooking in worksite kitchens from the local market: “The local market of Kafr Sawm saw development because they are providing us with the food for the programme” (263:1, Amman).

And the ILO projects also purchases all materials that they need for road construction and maintenance locally: “This should also have an effect [on local economic development]” (255:26, donor representative, Amman).

Other interviewees said it was not always easy to procure locally because the local products fall sometimes short in terms of quality and are sometimes more expensive than those available elsewhere.

And several shop keepers complained spontaneously that the CfW programmes had not bought their equipment in the local shop. For example, a shop keeper from Kafr Şawm brought up that the equipment of the kitchen, where food for the workers is cooked, could have been bought in his shop instead of Irbid (155, shop keeper, Kafr Şawm). And in Faqū’a, a shop keeper told us that his compressor was used on the tree planting side but his profit was very small:

“So, the DRC [Danish Refugee Council] made a contract with me. The compressor was needed for the stony soil. They used it for five days. I got 100JOD per day. 50JOD was for the Egyptians [operating the machines] plus 25JOD for diesel and transport” (196, shop keeper, Faqū’a).

Investment effects

The investment effects of the Jordanian CfW programmes are, however, most probably negligible. Some experts said that the CfW programmes had a positive impact on investment: “Also, there is impact on the local economic market and there is more investment in communities” (264, Oxfam). Likewise, a shop keeper stated: “I have heard that the people invest more because of the programmes. It has affected our markets” (227, shop keeper, Kafr Asad). Yet, as CfW wages are too low to be invested rather than consumed (see below), this is most likely a minor spin-off of the multiplier effect, for which we could however not find no conclusive evidence.

Only seven CfW participants told us that they wanted to invest part of their CfW wages. This is understandable because the wages are not very high and paid for three months only. In addition, many Jordanians and Syrians have debts to be repaid first while the others are also struggling with the costs of their everyday needs (162, participant, highway; 27, participant, Kafr Asad). Thus, none of the CfW participants has much financial flexibility for investments. And two out of the seven interviewees admitted also that the CfW wages will probably not suffice to finance their investment ideas.

If ever these investments will be made, they will be predominantly in subsistence farming with some minor additional earnings. Two interviewees had the idea to plant some crops in the garden and sell them later on the local market, two wanted to buy cattle, one planned for honeybee-keeping, one wanted to open a bakery and one wanted to open a household repair shop.

These findings are in line with the workers survey conducted in 2019 among the participants of the ILO employment infrastructure programme. Just 0.9 per cent of the interviewed households reported investing part of their CfW wage into private business. Another 0.5 per cent bought animals as an additional source of income and 1.4 per cent planned to save part of the wage (NAMA & ILO 2019).

6.3.3 Effects of the creation of public goods (*Hypothesis 14*)

Meanwhile, it remained unclear for us if the assets that CfW programmes in Jordan create have any secondary effects on LED as well (our Hypothesis 14). We could not find any evidence on this issue.

Most CfW projects are unlikely to have tangible income effects. For example, the collection and recycling of waste, embellishment of public parks, planting of trees and rehabilitation of nature reserves is definitely positive for the quality of life of people in the community but not important for any income-generating activity. Likewise, the renovation of schools and health clinics is very important for the well-being of students and patients but presumably without measurable income effect. And even the construction of rural roads in Jordan has probably no major economic importance because the Jordanian road network does not suffer from major gaps.

Other CfW projects, in contrast, can have a very substantial economic pay-off but its size is difficult to estimate. This holds for the rehabilitation of dams, water reservoirs and irrigation systems, support for the intensification of agriculture and measures of protection against soil erosion. Our methodology proved inadequate to produce any estimations.

And still, numerous interviewees stressed how much they appreciated the public goods that CfW programmes had created in their communities. When we asked a young Jordanian man “Has there been an effect on the community?”, he answered: “The infrastructure improved, they have computers in schools now, there have been developments, it has helped the community” (116, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl). And an older Jordanian woman said: “There was an improvement of the streets and also in electricity. Street lamps have been installed. Also communication technique, cables and so on improved” (23:1, non-participant, Hawfa).

6.3.4 Effects of the upgrading of skills (*Hypothesis 15*)

It is difficult to draw conclusions on the overall effects of CfW programmes on the labour market from our own research as we did not focus on the topic. Yet, we found indications for both negative and positive effects.

There are signs of distortionary effects. In some areas at least, CfW programmes crowd out private employment because the wages paid by the CfW programmes exceed the average level of wages for unskilled workers (interview with a donor representative). A government official said that when CfW programmes start, “workers leave their [previous] jobs in order to take part in more lucrative CfW programmes for 4-6 months” (248, Ministry of Labor). A donor representative seconded: “Syrians work for 1JOD per hour in private farms, which means that they do not earn more than 8 JOD per day. Offering them 12 or 14 JOD [in CfW projects] means thus that crowding-out is not unlikely to happen” (256, ILO).

On the long run, competition over Syrian workers can of course have positive effects. If the demand for workers by CfW programmes remains large, private employers may feel at some point in time that they have to adjust their wages in order to withstand the competition. But this scenario is not very likely because international donors are likely to reduce rather than increase their spending on CfW programmes in Jordan over the coming years and the offer of cheap workers on the Jordanian labour market will probably continue to increase rather than decrease.

A more positive effect of CfW programmes is the establishment of labour standards at least in an artificial segment of the Jordanian labour market. The CfW programmes carefully observe ILO norms. Some experts emphasise that CfW provides formal jobs, i.e. that they bring with them social security (102, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl; 259, Action Against Hunger) and an “aware[ness] of specific working standards” (259, Action Against Hunger). regarding income levels, safety at the work place, social protection for families, prospects for personal development, social integration and freedom to express concerns, to organise and participate in the decisions that affect work. This may, on the long term, have an impact on the attitudes of workers and employers in other parts of the labour market.

The most interesting question is however what the long term employment effect of CfW programmes is going to be: When they end, will more or less workers have a job then before? Of course, the answer depends on manifold aspects, but the main one is if CfW programmes have bettered or worsened the employability of their participants. And the dominant way to better the employability of CfW participants goes through skills upgrading, which is the focus of Hypothesis 15).

Several of our own interviews revealed that many CfW participants, non-participants and local experts think that most CfW projects in Jordan do not provide enough training and hence do not prepare participants well for the search of a follow-up employment.

The results of the workers survey conducted in 2019 among participants of the ILO’s labour intensive infrastructure programme suggest that all in all this programme had no positive impact

on the employability of its participants. It reveals that 57 per cent of the males and 43 per cent of the females had a job before they started working for the programme but only 32 per cent, respectively 13 per cent had a job right afterwards. These shares do not differ substantially between Jordanians and Syrians. However, while 47 per cent of the Syrians had been working in construction, agriculture or basic services before they got engaged in the CfW programme but only 1 per cent in commerce or manufacturing, the respective shares were 31 per cent against 6 per cent for Jordanians. The majority of those who had a job before their CfW participation had a wage between 7 and 14 JOD per day. And the majority of those who had got a job right after their CfW participation had wages that were somewhat lower (mostly between 5 and 12 JOD per day) (NAMA & ILO 2019).

Interestingly, 7 per cent of all female participants and 4 per cent of all males had even worked in a skilled worker's or employee's position before they got engaged by the ILO's CfW programme (NAMA & ILO 2019). This can be seen as a sign that the ILO programme crowds out existing employment, i.e. it attracts people from other good jobs but with only a limited chance to get the same kind of jobs again after the end of the CfW labour contract.

Even more so, most CfW participants who have got a new job after the end of their respective CfW project do not believe that their CfW employment has helped them obtain the new job. Just 11 per cent of all males and 4 per cent of all females believe that the CfW employment was helpful. And just 35 per cent of these say that this is because they have learned a new skill and 2 per cent because it has provided them with the seed capital to start their own project while 63 per cent that the CfW employment has only been helpful because it built *wasfā* (relations) with other employers or other workers (NAMA & ILO 2019).

Meanwhile, the GIZ post-employment survey produces a much more positive picture. Possibly, the difference is due to the fact that the ILO and the GIZ survey cover only the participants of the programmes run by the two respective organisations. And we have to consider that the GIZ survey includes the entirety of participants in the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme in 2019 while the ILO workers survey covered just a sample of those who were working in the organisation's Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme. Whereby, of course, any sampling produces biases. But in any case, we can say that the GIZ Green Infrastructure Programme does not crowd out workers in large numbers from residual occupations – in contrast to what the ILO workers survey says on the ILO CfW programme. 60 per cent of the participants of the GIZ GI programme have been without work before the programme started. And just 11 per cent had been in formal sector jobs (GIZ 2019).

At the same time, 74 per cent of the participants in the GIZ Green Infrastructure are longing for a new CfW job, while 31 per cent are searching for a different job and 12 per cent would like to participate in a more systematic training programme (whereby double counting was possible) (GIZ 2019).

6.4 Other indirect effects

During our field research, we realised that the CfW programmes in Jordan have some significant effects that we had not included in our research design but later found to be too important to be neglected. We therefore started collecting information on these effects but, of course, this research was much more inductive than the research on the dependent variables discussed in the preceding sections.

We present here our findings on just two additional effects: on the so-called shame-culture (reluctance of people to work in specific sectors considered inferior, 6.4.1) and on environmental awareness (6.4.2). We highlight these two effects, among others, in order to encourage future more intense research on them.

6.4.1 Effects on the so-called shame culture

The main issue that interviewees mentioned when we asked about ‘other impacts of CfW programmes’ was their effect on what many people in Jordan called ‘the shame culture’. The term refers to the observation that many people in Jordan – nationals and immigrants – have an accentuated aversion to working in specific economic sectors. In particular, people dislike sectors such as waste collection. But they also prefer, for example, trade and finance over construction and manufacturing.

18 interview partners raised the issue (two participants, five local experts, six non-participants, three shop keepers and two general experts) and stressed that CfW programmes have reduced the aversion of people towards the waste sector. In many sites, side-events of the CfW programmes such as lectures and awareness campaigns were mainly responsible for this change in attitudes:

“Shame culture was eradicated, the municipality terminated the idea that work in waste collection is shameful. – How did you achieve that? – Many lectures were held. We pointed out that they (waste collectors) are working for the municipality. The head of the municipality held speeches with important stakeholders. By combined efforts of municipalities and the local community itself.” (5, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā).

In addition, the staff of the CfW programmes visited private houses one by one in order to talk on the issue of working in the waste sector (29, GIZ, Kafr Asad).

What also played a role is that “large numbers of people [are] looking for jobs. They changed their perception about what is shameful” (70, participant, Al-Azraq).

A participant in Umm al-Jimāl sees it as “a growing trend that people participate in waste collection. Before people looked down on people collecting waste. Even shop keepers now tell us that they wished they had a job like ours, where we collect the waste.” (106:11).

And, of course, people have got just accustomed to working in the sector:

“In the beginning, there was this stigma about collecting waste. But now, it got ingrained in their own mentality. – What is the reason of this mind shift? – The way how they approach people. They came in a different way, they told us about the reasons of collecting waste. Many people shifted from working on farms because they pay more here. The people work here not only because of money. The people love working here. [...] They tell us that waste in nothing to be ashamed of. They made working with waste as something that is not shameful.” (94, participant, Umm al-Jimāl; similarly, 106, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

Of course, many workers just had to accept working in a sector without a good reputation because of economic pressure and the need to accept just any possibility to generate income:

“Before this, the idea was that you would work as an engineer. Working with waste would not even be on your radar. People do need the work, the situation is difficult and prices are rising. This helped to get rid of the shame” (106, participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

And still, among non-participants, the shame culture is sometimes still quite present: “What do you think about the programmes where Syrians and Jordanians work with each other? – These programmes are run by GIZ or foreigners. Jordanians would not want to work in such occupations” (50, shop keeper, Kafr Asad).

In general, the association of shame culture and waste is nothing to “be solved in one round of CfW”, but takes time instead. But it is worth doing “in a country that has a huge problem with waste” (expert interview, AAH).

6.4.2 Effects on environmental awareness

In addition, we found that the CfW programmes in Jordan contribute to environmental awareness. This is especially the case for projects in the waste area. Nine interviewees stressed that they appreciate that the streets in their community are clearer now because of the CfW projects: “Other than myself, others became aware of the environment. They started using the trashcans.” (20, participant, Kafr Asad).

And many interviewees said that an increasing number of people were aware of the necessity to recycle waste (i.e. 101, participant, Umm al-Jimāl). Apparently, this holds in particular for children: “You can see people working on the streets, children in school observe people cleaning and separating waste and thus also act on it and realise that putting waste in the environment is bad.” (102, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl; similar 70, participant, Al-Azraq).

Both, the environmental effect and the decrease of shame culture are related: “Now, the environment is considered and it is now okay to do cleaning” (28, participant, Kafr Asad).

“Many of the young men were actually affected, for example you would find someone in the group throwing a cigarette on the floor and then people would tell him to pick it up and throw it in the bin.” (54, participant, Kafr Asad).

6.5 Effects of CfW programmes’ design

With regards to the design of CfW programmes, mainly three issues were raised by our interviewees: the duration of employment, skills development during participation as well as the targeting mechanisms and application procedures. In addition, some CfW participants criticised that their wages were too low or paid too late, that their work equipment or safety provisions were insufficient, that it was difficult for them to commute to the sites of CfW projects or they complained, more generally, about the CfW setup (as opposed to other supporting mechanisms) and management choices (see Table 14).

Table 14: Feed-back of CfW participants on the design of the programmes (results of DIE survey)			
<i>Negative issues</i>	<i>count</i>	<i>Positive issues</i>	<i>count</i>
The duration of employment is too short	21		
The selection of participants is unfair	5	The selection of participants is fair	13
		The application procedures are good	8
CfW does not improve the skills of participants	2	CfW does improve the skills of participants	8
Sometimes, wage payments are delayed	4		
The safety provisions are insufficient.	4		
The work equipment is insufficient	1	The programmes offer good work equipment	1
Transportation to the sites is insufficient	1		
Wages are too low	1		
Donors should rather give loans for start-ups	1		
Donors should rather give one-time payments	1		
The works are not well planned.	1		
People from outside the villages should manage the programmes	1		
Source: Data from our own survey.			

The post-employment survey of the GIZ Green Infrastructure project produced a different picture but this is mainly because it did not enquire about the interviewees’ satisfaction with the duration of their CfW employment or the procedures of participant selection. Instead, it included questions on eleven other aspects of CfW employments (see Table 15). According to the answers, the participants of GIZ’s CfW Green Infrastructure Programme are quite satisfied with their employment. On average, 86 per cent declared to be satisfied or even very satisfied

with the different aspects, while only 11 per cent said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. The share of dissatisfied or very dissatisfied respondents was highest for the catering (28 per cent) and the payment (22 per cent) and much lower for the rest. Interestingly, respondents were satisfied or very satisfied in particular regarding ‘employer’, ‘supervision’, ‘safety at work’ and ‘work place’ with shares between 92 and 95 per cent (Table 15).

Table 15: Feed-back of CfW participants on the design of the programmes (results of the GIZ post-employment survey, N=984)				
	not satisfied at all	not satisfied	satisfied	very satisfied
Food and beverages	16%	12%	23%	45%
Payment	7%	15%	31%	45%
Transportation	6%	8%	31%	53%
Working hours	3%	9%	30%	57%
Work equipment	4%	5%	33%	56%
Feed-back mechanism	5%	5%	32%	56%
Training	4%	4%	30%	53%
Work place	3%	4%	33%	59%
Supervision	3%	4%	26%	66%
Safety at work	3%	3%	29%	64%
Employer	1%	2%	30%	65%
Average	5%	6%	30%	56%
Source: own design based on data from GIZ (2019).				

Yet, when the interviewed workers were asked in an open question how the GIZ programme could be improved, 13 per cent suggested to extend the length of the employment contracts, while only 4 per cent suggested higher wages and 2 per cent suggested to decrease working hours, respectively to increase training. The numbers of all other suggestions was very low (GIZ 2019).

The results of NAMA & ILO’s (2019) workers survey among 572 participants of the ILO’s employment intensive infrastructure programme are similar to those of the GIZ survey: 93 per cent of the interviewees stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the programme. Just 6 per cent said that they were not satisfied. Asked for the reasons of their dissatisfaction, 27 per cent said that the wages were too low, 24 per cent said that the working hours were too long, 8 per cent said that the training on the job was not sufficient and only 14 per cent said the duration of the employments was too short. In addition, 8 per cent said that Jordanians should have priority in getting employed, 17 per cent criticised issues related to payments (delays, deductions etc.) and 7 per cent said that the work environment was unpleasant (NAMA & ILO 2019). The following set of questions, however, also revealed that 22 per cent of the Jordanians and 33 per cent of the Syrians were not registered with social security, 59 per cent of all female

workers had no separate toilets and 39 per cent of the Jordanians and 27 per cent of the Syrians were not paid in time. 2 per cent of the Jordanians and 3 per cent of the Syrians (i.e. 12 workers in absolute terms) even stated that the representatives of the respective implementing agency (municipality, contractor, farmer etc.) had asked them to pay back part of their wages for transportation (5 workers), for better treatment (3), for social security (1) or for other reasons (3) (NAMA & ILO 2019).

While different programme designs of implementing agencies and insufficient information policies continue to cause uncertainty and sometimes frustration among participants, this has not often been referred to in the interviews and ameliorated as compared to accounts by Lenner (2017). While in earlier CfW phases, participants were selected and paid in different ways or given different information about the duration and conditions of their employment (ibid.), the coordination between different implementers through the CfW coordination group has helped to adapt standards and decrease feelings of being misinformed. Yet, apart from different strategies, shortcomings in coordination and communication also stem from the fact that many projects are based on very short-term funding and the prolongation of budgets is often uncertain (Lenner 2017) – a fact that has not changed since.

In the following, we discuss in more detail the four most discussed elements of CfW programmes' design: the duration of employment (6.5.1), skills development (6.5.2), the targeting of CfW programmes (6.5.3) and, much discussed by CfW implementers, the participation of community members in the design of the projects (6.5.4). In this context, we discuss also how much evidence we have for or against our Hypotheses 8-10 and 15 referring to the intervening effects of the CfW design features..

6.5.1 Duration of employment (*Hypothesis 10*)

The most frequent complaint by CfW participants was that the term of their employment was too short. And all kinds of interviewees stressed that the CfW programmes would have more substantial effects on the livelihoods of participants and on their vertical trust in the local government as well as foreign donors if the term of their employment was longer. This finding is evidence for Hypothesis 10.

Of course, it is not astonishing at all that the participants themselves would prefer longer term employments. 18 out of 72 participants mentioned the issue: "I hope they make the programme longer; this would help to improve my living conditions. Also then we would have the opportunity to learn more and this contributes to improve our living standard" (1, participant, Deyr 'Allā).

However, many non-participating community members also criticised the short duration of the jobs: "Most organisations hire only for three months. We want more stable opportunities" (96, shop keeper, Umm al-Jimāl). One shop assistant stopped his informally and precariously working son from applying because CfW is "too temporary" (156, shop keeper, Kafr Sawm).

The representatives of CfW implementing agencies also expressed their discontent with the frequent rotation of CfW participants. At the same time, they argued that they have two reasons for issuing short-term contracts only (e.g. interview with ILO representative). The main one is that foreign donors wish to report high participation figures, so the budget is used in a way that it allows for the creation of as many jobs as possible – even if this comes at the cost of short employment terms. The other – much less important – reason is that some participants prefer to get ultra-short employment contracts of two times ten days per month because they are afraid they might otherwise lose their National Aid Fund (NAF) benefits (interview with Oxfam representative). At the time of our fieldwork, the implementers were making efforts to conclude an agreement with the NAF that would concede CfW participants the possibility to just pause the receipt of NAF benefits during the time of their CfW employment. Indeed, as Lenner (2017) noted already, for implementers the lengthy process required to get work permits is very cumbersome, especially in relation to the short CfW contracts.

CfW participants with longer-term employment contracts (e.g. 6 months) seemed to be more satisfied with their jobs. For instance, a participant in Kafr Asad, who at the time of the interview had been working in a CfW programme for 6 months, could not think of any possible enhancements: “I feel it [the programme] does not need more improvement, it is already quite perfect” (26; similar 218, participant, Azraq). One shop keeper (120, Umm al-Jimāl) perceived this difference as tied to neediness: “The people who got long-term contracts really deserved them, they worked very well, others who just wanted to spend time and worked not as hard did not get the long-term contracts”. A participant in Kafr Sawm objected: “People are not motivated very well. Because it is so short it makes no difference whether they work well or badly” (149).

Overall, the short duration severely hampers the programmes’ sustainability. “When short term aid is not linked to sustainable development opportunities, it raises expectations that cannot be met by public authorities” (interview with JOHUD representative; similar statements by representatives of Caritas; MOL; GIZ; UNDP). Participants should be employed for a longer period so that wages will be used not only for consumption but for investment (interview with GIZ representative), children’s education (155, shop keeper, Kafr Sawm) or medical costs (168, participant, highway). However, as some interlocutors pointed out (e.g. interview with AAH representative), CfW creates by definition a limited-term employment, so significantly expanding the period of employment would create a different type of programme.

6.5.2 Skills development (*Hypothesis 15*)

Likewise, many interviewees stressed how much more CfW participants benefit from the programmes if these help also to upgrade the skills of the participants. Most CfW programmes in Jordan do not focus on this effect and only very few have an explicit training component. Still, it is evident that the participants of some programmes learn something new that may help them to get another job in the future. Our evidence for this effect is not ample but some statements of interviewees support to some degree our initial Hypothesis 15 saying that the skills acquired

during participation in CfW programmes improve the opportunities to find a new employment after the end of the CfW programmes. This question is all the more important in light of the complaints about the lack of sustainability of CfW.

As CfW programmes are, by definition, short-term interventions, most CfW programmes in Jordan have no explicit training component²; but still, the participants of some of the programmes have confirmed that they have earned some useful skills. Knowing that the GIZ, the ILO and DEval were conducting much more systematic and comprehensive surveys among CfW participants that all include questions on the skills development of the interviewees, we did not systematically ask for this topic in our own survey. And still, we have heard enough about the potential of skills upgrading in CfW programmes and its possible impact on the employability of CfW participants to conclude that training should be more systematically integrated into the design of new projects.

Many CfW participants emphasised the importance of acquiring new skills. They understand that they need better skills to improve their job opportunities and the prospects of acquiring new skills was also a major motivation for many participants to apply for participation (161, non-participant, Kafr Sawm; 276, non-participant, Kafr Sawm).³

Yet, several community members also highlighted the importance of skills development: “They [the CfW programmes] are good because they provide the Syrians with additional skills, which help them master difficult situations and get new jobs more easily so that the Syrians do not have to rely any more on society” (92, shop keeper, Al-Azraq).

In particular, they appreciated skills in farming (255, ILO) and domestic repairing (120, shop keeper, Umm al-Jimāl) but also – and perhaps surprisingly – in waste sorting, recycling and composting (114, local expert, Umm al-Jimāl; 85, local expert, Al-Azraq). Two CfW participants said:

“I learnt a lot. Now, I can deal with electricity, fix things in the house, paint and much more. Now I can do it alone without external help and repair my own house” (58, Jordanian female participant, Kafr Asad).

“I have already learned a lot about modern farming techniques. It is more efficient” (270, Syrian male participant, Deyr ‘Allā).

2 Some interviewees cite skills training as an aim of CfW while others do not on the grounds that “CfW programmes are meant to provide short-term economic opportunities for participants. They are thus responding to short-term needs but they are also willing to achieve longer term effects” (259, Action Against Hunger).

3 Strictly speaking, this may distort the self-selection of the most vulnerable persons into CfW. Yet, local implementers see the need to develop criteria to also select people into the programmes, who can use the newly developed skills afterwards.

Only few interviewees in our survey stated explicitly that they had not learnt any new skills. Some participants complained that the CfW programmes were much too short to provide participants with useful skills needed later for opening up new employment opportunities (Hypothesis 15): “We wish the time period was more than two months, so that we learn more [...], so that we can do our own projects with other people” (140, female participant, Kafr Sawm).

Likewise, 83 per cent of the workers covered by the GIZ post-employment survey stated that they were satisfied or even very satisfied with the training provided during their employment with the Green Infrastructure programme. Just 8 per cent said that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (see Table 15). Interestingly, the respondents did not mention technical skills in the first place when asked what main lesson they had learnt from their participation in a CfW programme. Instead, the largest share said that they had learnt to ‘co-operate in teams’ (56 per cent), followed by ‘friendship’ (41 per cent) and ‘commitment’ (36 per cent). Just 24 per cent stated that they had learnt ‘new technical skills’ and 18 per cent ‘time management’. Yet, the share of those who had learnt ‘new technical skills’ was much higher (36 per cent) among Jordanian women and lowest among Syrian men (18 per cent). 6 per cent maintained that they had not learnt anything (see Annex D).

In stark contrast to this, the findings of the second round of the ILO workers survey indicate that just a minority of the participants of the organisation’s employment intensive infrastructure programme has learnt new skills that would help them finding a new job after the end of their employment in the programme. Only about a fifth of the interviewed participants could find a follow-on employment and just 8 per cent of these say that their CfW participation had helped them finding that new job. Even in these few cases, the CfW participation was mostly helpful because of the *wasṭa* (connections) that the workers had built during their CfW employment (5 per cent) rather than the skills they had acquired (3 per cent) (NAMA & ILO 2019).

Many experts emphasised therefore that explicit training modules should be integrated into the design of future CfW programmes (189, local expert, Faqū’a; 248, MOL; 252, MOPIC; 259, AAH). Yet, there is a discussion about how the skills-sustainability nexus should be addressed: on the labour demand or on the labour supply level, i.e. either through supporting employers with employment-intensive business plans – an approach more supported by the ILO and KfW – or through certifying skills at the level of the participants – an approach mostly favoured by GIZ.

Within the first approach, concentrating on the labour demand side, contractors implementing CfW programmes, for instance companies responsible for road construction and local resourcing, learn “how to work in a labour-intensive way” (255, ILO; 256 ILO) while respecting working standards and certifying acquired skills. By focusing on labour-intensive employment, this approach would thus create additional jobs and provide a pool of possible contractors also for government-run programmes, even when the CfW programmes finish.

In contrast, within the second approach, experts argue for a better skilled labour supply, debating whether skills could be certified according to the national qualification framework. There

are two conditions for such a certification of skills developed: first, workers in fact acquire new skills (239, Oxfam) as opposed to fulfilling completely unskilled job placements (229, GIZ); second, skills training must be in line with the needs of the labour market, which are often not sufficiently mapped (245, Caritas). In relation to Syrian refugees, our interviewees call for skills for possible home-based businesses (252, MOPIC) or for eventual reconstruction in Syria (253, MOPIC).

6.5.3 Targeting (*Hypothesis 8*)

Several interviewees told us that they perceive the selection of workers for participation in CfW as unfair and intransparent, and these same interlocutors expressed also that this perception is one of the reasons why they have only weak vertical trust in the implementing agencies and in the local authorities. Other interviewees, in contrast, saw the selection of participants as fair and just and, in turn, felt much higher vertical trust in the implementing agencies and the local authorities that are responsible for the CfW programmes. Our findings support thus Hypothesis 8 saying that targeting that is perceived as unfair lowers the positive effect of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging, as well as horizontal and vertical trust.

We discuss here how (i) the dissemination of information on CfW programmes, (ii) the procedure of participant selection and (iii) the targeting results were perceived by our respondents.

Information on CfW programmes

Apparently, the dissemination of information on new CfW programmes is not a problem. All interviewees reported positive experience in finding out about CfW job opportunities and how to apply for them. They learnt about the programmes from advertisements on Facebook or other websites, printed flyers or advertisements in local supermarkets – but most often by word-of-mouth communication by friends or family members. A Syrian man said: “Everybody in Dayr ‘Allā is talking about it” (7, participant, Dayr ‘Allā). Another one told us: “[I found out about it] ‘*an Ṭarīq an-Nās* [via the people]” (181, participant, highway). Often, participants know someone who is working for the implementing organisation and therefore decide to apply.

Selection process

The procedure of participant selection seems to vary from one CfW programme to the other. In the beginning, some implementing agencies have selected applicants on the basis of a “first come, first serve” approach. Later, they started using information on the applicants provided by the National Aid Fund to check their neediness (31, local expert, Kafr Asad). Meanwhile, most programmes set local committees in each field site to decide on the acceptance of applicants on the basis of an elaborate list of criteria of vulnerability and, sometimes, qualification. In Al-Azraq, for example, the committee consists of representatives of the municipality, the implementer and local charity organisations (85, local expert, Al-Azraq). Likewise, in Kafr Asad, “there is a participatory committee from the municipality, with also a Syrian representative,

somebody from the local youth, a women representative. They select three out of them for the selection committee that will select the cash workers” (29, local expert, Kafr Asad).

Non-participants in Umm al-Jimāl stressed that they were glad about the fact that the foreign donors were overseeing the recruitment process because “if organisations ask people to apply through the municipality, *wasṭa* will become a problem. Then from the same household there are many people working, but sometimes in other households no one would find work” (116, non-participant, Umm al-Jimāl).

In Faqū’a, in contrast, the selection seems to be done by people from the place only. A Jordanian participant criticised this practice and requested that „outsiders should manage the programmes. It is not good when locals manage it. The money is lost due to corruption” (204, participant, Faqū’a). A local expert was similarly sceptical about the process:

“We had one single application day... [They] used some sort of questionnaire and gave grades to the answers [for example] if you have a family member with a disability. But [...] there was no fact-checking. And the decisions on who is allowed to participate was taken the very same day. Also, there was no equality in the areas, they did not include the place [of living of applicants] in the questionnaire. Then, they took a lot of people from Faqū’a [itself] and few people from the surroundings. The distribution was not fair” (189, local expert, Faqū’a).

A local implementer from Deyr ‘Allā admitted that “of course, some people perceive the selection process as unfair. They believe that some people need the jobs more than those who have been selected.” And he added: “We suggest applicants to the NRC. But they select. I am afraid that there are a lot of problems because we know so much better than them who is good for the programmes. So, we should choose. They know the candidates just on paper” (8, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā; similarly 31, local experts, Kafr Asad). Striking the right balance between local knowledge on individual applicants’ situation and locals exploiting their role through favouritism (*wasṭa*) is, however, daunting, as our data on targeting results show.

Targeting results

Opinions on the targeting results differ substantially among participants, non-participant community members and experts.

They are particularly positive where the nature of the CfW activities (e.g. road maintenance and waste collection) brings about self-targeting. A participant of the KfW/ILO employment intensive infrastructure programme said, for example: “Nobody would work so many hours if they were not in need. We walk two to three kilometres per day. People wouldn’t walk so far if they would not need the money” (168, participant, Irbid Highway). A Jordanian colleague stated: “If anything, the person who is in charge knows the people who are working; the person knows that the people are in need” (167, participant, Irbid Highway). Another, Syrian colleague seconded: “I don’t know how people get selected [but] it is obvious that people here are in need of work.” (181, participant, Irbid Highway). Likewise, participants of the GIZ’s waste to (positive) energy programme also had no doubts that the programme was employing only people

who needed the work. A local expert (29, Kafr Asad) stressed that only Jordanians in desperate need of any kind of income would ever apply for jobs as ‘shameful’ as those in the waste sector (see Section 6.4.1 on the so-called ‘shame culture’).

Still, we also heard positive comments from other projects, where self-targeting is less effective. For example, a Jordanian man from Faqū’a was quite satisfied: “They choose the right people, it is a good way, an appropriate selection” (210, participant, Faqū’a). Sometimes, however, such contentedness stemmed from rumours nurturing a wrong understanding of the selection procedures: “All Syrians were told that at some point, they would receive a job and therefore, everybody accepted the selection process as fair” (218, participant, Al-Azraq).

In all field sites, other interviewees were more critical, though, and participants, non-participant community members and local experts complained about favouritism on the basis of *wasṭa* (connections). A local expert from Kafr Asad stated:

“The names were chosen by wasṭa, the selection process was very unfair. I’m saying that it is not the fault of [the implementing agency]. When I register to sign my name with the baladiyya [municipality], to be employed by a CfW project, the baladiyya gives other names to it. If I work in the baladiyya, I can tell my friends to apply for the programme” (228).

Some people said that *wasṭa* was playing a role in the selection of both, Jordanians and Syrians: “The [...] project is running through *wasṭa*; I know people that have been working there for years. [...] Yes, both Syrians and Jordanians have *wasṭa* to be able to do that [i.e., doing more than one rotation]” (48, Syrian participant, Kafr Asad).

More often, however, we heard that targeting errors happened mainly in the selection of Jordanians because the Syrians were all vulnerable anyhow. For example, a Syrian man said: “The Syrians [...] were selected in a fair way but for the Jordanians it was mainly by *wasṭa* [i.e. connections] (147, participant, Kafr Sawm). Similarly, a Jordanian participant complained:

“I know that Syrians are in bad conditions, but [at least] they are treated equally, a Syrian individual gets the same treatment as other Syrians. For us [Jordanians], when we get support from the government it is by luck whether you get any assistance, and usually wasṭa and connection play a role” (211, Faqū’a).

At the same time, we found no indications that, as preliminary research by Lenner (2017) suggests, very vulnerable Syrian refugees get excluded from CfW programmes, because they lack the necessary official documents and thus cannot obtain the mandatory work permit. Neither implementers nor applicants report such problems to us, so the application procedure seems to have taken account of this in the meantime.

6.5.4 Participation in project design (*Hypothesis 9*)

The CfW programmes in Jordan let the members of local communities participate in the design of their different projects in different ways and to different degrees. Some programmes plan their activities in a completely top-down and centralised manner without any possibility of community participation while, on the other extreme, some programmes even hold open councils inviting all community members to participate in the discussion on the shape of future activities. Unfortunately, we could not analyse the different forms of citizen participation systematically but we have asked our interviewees about their opinions on them. The answers provide some support – at least in regards to vertical trust – for Hypothesis 9, which suggests that community participation in project design increases the positive impacts on social cohesion.

Both, CfW participants and non-participants confirmed to know which CfW programmes have given what kind of possibility to community members to participate in the planning of their local activities, and they appreciated all attempts being made by the programmes in this regard. For example, a Syrian male in Kafr Asad remembered well that “the municipality came and asked, ‘What is your opinion if we should get a German firm to open job opportunities?’ [...] They] informed some of us, and then the news spread around the village” (46, non-participant, Kafr Asad). A Syrian woman confirmed: “Many meetings were held where everything was explained. We have heard from Najmeh, have heard about another project in Irbid” (25, participant, Kafr Asad).

In the example of Al-Azraq, the co-operation between the implementing agency and the donor started early on: „We [a committee of representatives from the municipality, the implementing agency and local charity organisations] planned together. Our unit had developed a strategic plan that we presented to AAH [Action against Hunger]. We had learned from USAID [the United States Agency for International Development] how to strategise. That is why we succeeded in the collaboration” (85, local expert, Al-Azraq). The same committee was later also responsible for the organisation of participatory events and the recruitment of CfW participants (85, local expert, Al-Azraq).

In other places, such as Deyr ‘Allā and Kafr Sawm, all key decisions on CfW project design are taken by a small groups of representatives of the municipality, the responsible ministry and the donor agency (6, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā). Participatory events were held but could only discuss on options “to improve and develop the [existing] programmes” (5, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā). The director of the implementing agency of CfW programmes in Deyr ‘Allā explained:

“There is a way of communicating with the municipality. But only with a small group of people. I pick these people myself. They can speak up and then tell what kind of infrastructure they want. These seven representatives of the community meet and all of them talk about what they need. Thereby, these people provide the municipality with the information that it needs” (6, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā).

And in some places, the local authorities were heavily criticised for not providing more possibilities of citizens’ participation in project design. A local expert from Faqū’a said, for example:

“We wish to have more say in where the projects take place. It was not clear to me what power we have. It was not even clear who was the decision maker. We did not know whom to contact to ask for changes. Some decisions were taken on WhatsApp, I was not sure about the legal status of these decisions. Were we breaking the law, if we did not accept the decisions” (189, local expert, Deyr ‘Allā).

The range of experiences can be explained by the fact that specific CfW activities offer different starting points for participatory processes. CfW creating public spaces or other public goods that can be shaped according to people’s wishes are suited best for participatory events as people can connect to the infrastructure created (282, GIZ; focus group East Amman). Other CfW activities, like road maintenance or waste collection, offer hardly any design choices the public could be consulted on.

7 Policy recommendations

The findings of our research show that CfW programmes, if well designed, are able to reap a triple dividend – also, and perhaps in particular, in the context of flight and migration: They can (i) generate employment and income for refugees and other vulnerable groups, (ii) help fill gaps in infrastructure and (iii) extend the skills, the self-esteem and the motivation of their beneficiaries. And, as we have also found, CfW programmes contribute equally to social cohesion, local economic development and gender equality.

From this, we draw three conclusions:

- The international donor may consider the use of CfW programmes again when social cohesion and local economic development are threatened by crises such as flight and migration – and perhaps even in some conflict-affected countries.
- At the same time, national governments could also consider to set up CfW programmes themselves – possibly with co-funding from external donors – and thereby safeguard the coherence of social policies targeted to nationals and immigrants.
- For Jordan itself, we recommend that CfW programmes are continued but carefully transformed from a humanitarian aid to a development policy instrument. Possibly, the government of Jordan can play a more active role in this process in the future.

These three conclusions are discussed in more detail in the three following sub-chapters.

7.1 Are CfW programmes recommendable in contexts of migration and conflict?

We recommend the use of CfW programmes in contexts where social cohesion between different population groups is under strain and needs to be strengthened, as the programmes contain the potential to reconcile groups or to integrate people into a (host) society. This holds for situations of international and internal migration, rising tensions between resident population

groups and other contexts. However, of course, violent conflict should not be imminent because the effectiveness of CfW programmes requires a reliable administration, a minimum of safety and some trust for the unfolding of more indirect effects. In Jordan, the fact that Jordanians and Syrians already had strong ties before the war in Syria eased considerably the setting up of CfW programmes. Nonetheless, we recommend CfW programmes also in other countries with less favourable conditions. Here, CfW programmes have to be carefully designed, for instance in regard to employing mixed-teams, in order to make sure that they do not have adverse effects.

Cash transfer schemes are an alternative. Their over-head costs are lower because they do not require infrastructure gaps to be identified, work schemes to be designed, building material to be provided and work to be monitored by project managers and engineers. In addition, if a country has already got an effective cash transfer scheme – as Jordan does – it may find it easier to extend it to additional population groups rather than to set up parallel structures. The results may thus look more coherent, which may be the reason why DFID has stopped its engagement in CfW in Jordan and considers now to support the NAF financially and technically in the inclusion of Syrians as a target group in its cash transfer scheme.

At the same time, CfW programmes have several advantages in a direct comparison because of their potential triple dividend: Cash transfer schemes do not contribute to the building of infrastructure or the upgrading of skills, self-esteem or motivation among beneficiaries. And even if CfW programmes make no major contribution to the building of infrastructure, they can still make a difference such as e.g. the waste collection programmes in Jordan, which generate important awareness for cleaner streets and the recycling of waste. Cash transfers can also have positive effects on local economic development through multiplier and investment effects but they cannot compare with CfW programmes in the improvement of social cohesion because cash transfer schemes do not bring people together to one place and do not create a product that all population groups may in the end consider as a common good that different population groups have built together. Finally, cash transfer schemes perform less well on targeting: they tend to rely on proxy means-tests, which involve always large errors of inclusion and exclusion, while CfW programmes do much better because of the in-built self-targeting mechanism (only poor and vulnerable households apply because better-off households are not ready to do the hard work that CfW programmes offer). And of course, CfW is a more coherent strategy anyhow for countries that have a functioning CfW programme already. Here, donors should consider providing financial support to enable national governments cover additional target groups.

Probably, it will often be impossible to design CfW programmes in such a way that they have a true triple dividend but at least they should have two full dividends (and perhaps a little bit of the third). Sometimes, it might even be wise to focus on two aspects – wage employment and the creation of sustainable public goods or wage employment and training – but achieve as much as possible in both of them. The water reservoir projects in Jordan are possibly a very good example for the first option, while the CfW projects in agriculture are possibly a good example for the second one. However, the experience of Jordan shows that it is also sometimes possible to make achievements in all three dimensions: for example, the renovation of schools in Najmah projects or the upgrading of public parks in AVSI projects.

As a rule, we had the impression that small organisations in charge of few CfW projects were better able and more innovative in the task to design these projects such that they would make a real contribution to all three aspects: wage employment, sustainable infrastructure and training. What we do not know, of course, is if this advantage is bought by higher administration and overhead costs, meaning that we would not be surprised if large organisations implementing many similar CfW projects had lower costs because of economies of scale.

But in any case, we suggest all organisations involved in CfW activities in Jordan to reconsider how the third aspect of the dividend – i.e. the promotion of the skills, the self-esteem and the motivation of participants – can be further exploited (even if this renders the self-targeting mechanism of CfW projects less effective which is however less relevant when humanitarian turns into development aid). This is particularly important if gender is a major issue in the goals of CfW programmes because the promotion of women in economic and social life is particularly linked to this aspect.

In this context, it is important to stress that a trade-off exists of course for budgetary reasons between the number of employed workers and their mean duration of employment. Programmes with many workers and limited times of employment may be good for social cohesion and poverty reduction but cannot achieve the same as programmes with longer employment times in terms of skills development and investment effects. A compromise could be to issue normally only short-term contracts but extend them regularly for the most motivated workers.

However, neither model – shorter contracts for more people or longer contracts for less people – leads to investment effects. If a CfW programme aims for an investment effect, we discourage to implement the Jordanian model elsewhere as investments need longer-term reliable incomes to set realistic expectations. In this case, the skills components should be dramatically increased. In addition, credits must be made easily available.

At the same time, our impression is that CfW programmes should run for at least one year in the same location if they aim to achieve larger indirect effects on the community. Equally, on the individual level, the duration of the individual participation is important to achieve tangible direct effects: we recommend that the CfW programmes in Jordan should hire each participant for four to six months, except in cases where the longer participation in the programme could conflict with other social assistance schemes.

CfW programmes can be a useful tool in contexts with high unemployment or underemployment as they provide short-term jobs that ease financial stress, offer preoccupation and thus discourage public unrest. However, we do not recommend the use of CfW programmes if strong negative psychological effects for the participants may result, as may be the case if people solely rely on participation in CfW programmes and have difficulties to develop coping strategies after the end of the programmes.

7.2 Who should implement CfW programmes?

It is all but trivial if CfW programmes should be set up by foreign donors with the role of national governments being restricted to admitting the engagement of donors more or less automatically and easing the implementation of CfW in the local context. The advantage of the strategy for the national government is that it takes no responsibility: It does not have to contribute to the funding, it cannot be blamed for any possible mistake, failure or adverse effect, and it cannot be accused by citizens to care too much about immigrants rather than locals.

At the same time, national governments miss several opportunities by pursuing this course. If instead, they take the initiative themselves by setting up CfW schemes on their own, they could demonstrate that they (i) are able to master the game themselves, (ii) care about all inhabitants thereby legitimising their rule and (iii) are willing to co-ordinate and structure the field of social policies in a coherent, efficient and equilibrated way.

Donors on their hand have to decide if they want to claim responsibility for programmes informed by international best practice or support and thereby legitimise and stabilise national governments, which can claim legitimacy through successfully operating CfW programmes.

7.3 How should CfW programmes develop in Jordan itself?

In Jordan, CfW programmes should be transformed from an instrument of humanitarian aid to a development policy tool. The country is not anymore in an emergency situation where decisions and actions must be taken quickly. Instead, all planning should be driven by a more long-term and development perspective. This means that the importance of short-term employment and income effects decreases while the importance of long-term infrastructure, skills, empowerment, social cohesion, investment and gender effects rises. As a result, the importance of egalitarian and just targeting also decreases: CfW programmes do not have to employ any longer the most vulnerable workers but instead they should employ the workers that generate the most long-term sustainable effects from their participation in CfW schemes.

In the following, we distinguish what consequences these considerations have for (i) foreign donors and implementers of CfW programmes and (ii) municipalities and the central government of Jordan.

Foreign donors and implementers of CfW programmes

We recommend foreign donors and implementing agencies of CfW programmes to consider increasing the number of working days of participants to at least 6 months in order to leave more impact on beneficiaries and to create a more stable set-up for communities. However, in parallel, programmes' targeting and selection procedures might be further strengthened, since especially for longer-term employment the perception of unfair targeting may have negative effects on communities' social cohesion. Also, closer co-operation with local municipalities to

prepare for the maintenance and usage of the created infrastructure after the end of CfW programmes should be aimed for. Therefore, the trade-off between the efficiency of fully donor-run programmes and an early hand-over of programmes to local municipalities needs to be addressed.

We suggest also to focus on best-practice activities regarding skills by teaching skills that were found most useful by former participants (farming, house decoration, waste collection) and to continue supporting private contractors setting up labour-intensive work. Regarding the implementation of CfW programmes, we recommend for instance a better control of timely wage payments and fair selection procedures, including transparent communication of selection results. Further, we encourage that procurement is done locally wherever possible. In that regard, donor agencies should check whether regulations pushing for as low-priced procurement as possible can be waived or eased in those projects that aim for a positive effect on communities' social cohesion and local economic development. Also, local participatory processes can be enhanced by including local business people. If possible, teams should be mixed by nationality. It is desirable that implementers check whether teams can be mixed by gender as our findings show that women working in mixed teams strongly benefit. We also encourage interaction between nationalities and genders. Furthermore, we welcome the creation of employment opportunities that are located within the communities, especially for female participants. If possible, implementers should also inform male heads of family/husbands about working environment and activity.

Municipalities and other government agencies

For government actors and municipalities, we recommend to seek closer co-operation with donor agencies and CfW implementers to gradually take over the maintenance and usage of the infrastructure created after the end of CfW programmes. Further, we encourage to seek close co-operation with local private sector firms that are capable of implementing labour-intensive infrastructure projects in a transparent manner; contracts should be cancelled upon unfair or corrupt practices.

It is also important to invite participatory practices deciding about local infrastructure projects, including community members, representatives of all local groups, and local businesses. Further, the government of Jordan could consider implementing state-run public work programmes that create meaningful infrastructure while providing temporary employment to vulnerable Jordanians on a regular basis (as well as, funded by international donors, to refugees). These programmes could be inspired by the Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which entitles vulnerable parts of the population to 100 days of paid work per year. The programmes could be created with international agencies' support and benefit from their experiences made so far with CfW programmes in Jordan.

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Lists of interviewees

A – List of interviewed experts on the national level

- Abuobeid, Zein, Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 14 February 2019, Amman.
- Al Azab, Farah, Communications, Community Development and Monitoring Officer, Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure in Jordan, International Labour Organization, Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.
- Al-Awamreh, Mohammad, Deputy Programs Director, CARE International in Jordan, 28 June 2018 and 12 February 2019, Amman.
- AlDamen, Yasmin, Director of the Relations and Services Department, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 28 January 2019, Bonn.
- Aldhabbi, Assia, International Development Consultant, Amman, 26 June 2019, per e-mail
- Al-Madi, Dr. Badr, Assistant Professor, University of Jordan, 13 February 2019, Amman.
- Al-Majali, Lama, Programme Policy Officer / Nutrition Specialist, Jordan Country Office, World Food Programme (WFP), 24 June 2018, Amman.
- Al-Mubarak, Rawan, Director of Investment and International Cooperation, Ministry for Public Works and Housing, 20 February 2019, Amman.
- Al-Shakhshir, Tahani, President, Jordanian Women's Union, 18 March 2019, Amman.
- Al-Rawabdeh, Ahmad, GIZ Project Manager, Jordan Office, World Vision, 21 February 2019, Amman.
- Al-Rawashdeh, Samer, Agricultural Consultant, International Labour Organization, Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.
- Al Saket, Rand, Jordan Office, World Vision, 21 February 2019, Amman.
- AlShoubaki, Dr. Wa'ed, Assistant Professor, University of Jordan, 13 February 2019, Amman.
- Andraschko, Dr. Frank, Hara Foqa-Projekt, Deutsches Archäologisches Institut Amman und Institut für Archäologie der Universität Hamburg, 19 February 2019, Amman.
- Aqilan, Hanan, Project Lead Change Engagement / Capacity Building, iMMAP MENA Regional Office, King Abdullah II Street, Building 409 (Nimer Center), 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Arar, Rawan, PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of California San Diego, 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Baessler, Dr. Judith, Head of Programme „Psychological Support for Syrian and Iraqi Refugees and IDP“, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Baur, Michaela, Director of Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 20 June 2018, via Skype, as well as 10 February 2019, Amman.
- Bigio, Andrea, Food and Livelihoods Head of Department, Jordan Office, Action Against Hunger, 19 February 2019, Amman.
- Buffoni, Laura, Senior Livelihoods Officer, Country Office Jordan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 25 June 2018, Amman.

- Caris, Tobias, First Secretary, Head of Press and Cultural Department, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Amman, 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Chaix, Jessica, Field Support Specialist, Country Office Jordan, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 26 June 2018, Amman.
- Daradkeh, Hussam, Head of European Relations, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 27 June 2018 and 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Daru, Patrick, Country Coordinator "Jordan", Senior skills specialist, International Labour Organization, Jordan, 26 June 2018, Amman, as well as 29 January 2019, via Skype.
- de Groot, Jacqueline, Head of Programme, Jordan Country Office, World Food Programme (WFP), 24 June 2018, 24 June 2018, Amman.
- Dumaq, Nader, Jordan Office, Caritas Switzerland, 12 February 2019, Amman.
- El-Samarneh, Bashar, Project Manager, International Labour Organization, Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.
- El Wer, Reine, Business Development Advisor, National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (Najmah), 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Frank, Lukas, Project Manager, KfW Development Bank, Frankfurt/ Main, 26 June 2019, per e-mail
- Gaunt, Anna, Senior Livelihoods Officer, MENA Director's Office in Amman (DOiA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 11 April 2019, Amman.
- Ghuri-van Kruijsdijk, Maria, Team Leader, Protection of Water Dams Through Labour Intensive Activities (Cash for Work), Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018 and 12 February, Amman.
- Goneimat, Bashar, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, National Alliance Against Hunger and Malnutrition (Najmah), 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Griebenow, Carsta, Division S09 ("Implementation of humanitarian aid, humanitarian mine clearance, regional programmes, regional humanitarian aid"), Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, 08 May 2018, Berlin.
- Helyar, Will, Humanitarian Adviser, DFID Jordan, British Embassy, 12 February 2019, Amman.
- Herforth, Dr. Nico, Evaluator, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn, 10 December, Bonn.
- Hlaing, Htun, Chief Technical Advisor, Employment through Labour Intensive Infrastructure Programme, International Labour Organization, Jordan, 29 January 2019, via Skype, and 17 February 2019, Amman.
- Hollmann, Diana, Team leader, Employment-oriented MSME Promotion, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Jordan, 21 February 2019, Amman.
- Ismail, Muhammad, Programme Officer, Jordan Country Office, World Food Programme (WFP), 24 June 2018, 24 June 2018, Amman.
- Issa, Eman, Livelihood and Labour Lead, Jordan Compact Project Management Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 14 February 2019, Amman.
- Kafaween, Ahmed, Brigadier, Director of Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), Ministry of Interior, 14 February 2019, Amman.
- Katami, Maha, Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 14 February 2019, Amman.

- Kattaa, Maha, Regional Resilience and Crisis Response Specialist, International Labour Organization, Jordan, 17 February 2019, Amman.
- Kimathi, Victor, Area Manager, iMMAP MENA Regional Office, King Abdullah II Street, Building 409 (Nimer Center), 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Kocks, Dr. Alexander, Evaluator, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn, 10 December, Bonn.
- Kuzmits, Dr. Bernd, First Secretary, Deputy Head of Development Co-operation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Amman, 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Leiderer, Stephan, Head of Department “Governance, Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation”, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn, 21 June 2018, Bonn.
- Lechner, Johanna, Junior Advisor, Psychological Support for Syrian and Iraqi Refugees and IDP, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Lenner, Katharina, Prize Fellow, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath, 12 December 2018, via Skype.
- Lockhart, Dorsey, Researcher ‘Human Security’, West Asia – North Africa Institute, Royal Scientific Society, Amman, 25 June 2018, 25 February 2019 and 11 March 2019, Amman.
- Madi, Hakam, Programme Manager, Working with Refugees Programme, The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), 16 March 2019, Amman.
- Mauerer, Franz Xaver, Country Desk Officer for „Jordan and Arab League“, Division 310 (Near East and Arab League), Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 13 April 2018, via telephone.
- McGrath, Siobhán, WASH Programme Manager, Oxfam Jordan, 13 and 25 February 2019, Amman.
- Meier, Sarah Christin, Project Manager and UNOPS Key Account, Employment and Education Near East, KfW Development Bank, Frankfurt / Main, 26 June 2019, per e-mail
- Metz, Thorsten, Programme Director, Employment Promotion Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Jordan, 27 June 2018, Amman.
- Mhaidat, Hussain, Minister’s Advisor for Solid Waste Management, Director of Solid Waste Management Department, Director of Project Implementation Unit (PIU), Deputy Chairman of the Technical Committee to Follow up the Implementation of the NS for MSWM, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 12 February 2019, Amman.
- Morgenroth, Dr. Silvia, Head of Division 321 (‘Reducing the causes of flight, supporting refugees, employment initiative Middle East’, German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Berlin, 10 April 2018, Berlin.
- Morisse, Monique, Division S09 (‘Implementation of humanitarian aid, humanitarian mine clearance, regional programmes, regional humanitarian aid’), Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, 08 May 2018, Berlin.
- Mubarak, Ammarah, Emergency Coordinator, International Organization for Migration, 15 April 2019, Amman.
- Muhareb, Samar, CEO, ARDD Legal Aid, Arab Renaissance for Democracy & Development, 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Muhareb, Sozan, ARDD Legal Aid, Arab Renaissance for Democracy & Development, 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Musa, Insherah, Country Director, Jesuit Refugee Services, 18 February 2019, Amman.

- Mustafa, Abdulkarim, Programme Officer, Livelihoods and Employment, Mitigating the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Vulnerable Jordanian Host Communities, Jordan Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 19 February 2019, Amman.
- Neumann-Silkow, Frauke, Cluster Manager, Management of Water Resources Programme, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018, Amman.
- Petschulat, Tim, Resident Director, Office Jordan and Iraq, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 18 February 2019, Amman.
- Porter, Barbara, PhD, Director, American Center of Oriental Research, 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Qatamin, Hadeel, Media and Research Assistant, West Asia-North Africa Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 11 March 2019, Amman.
- Reintjes, Carolin, Desk Officer for Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid, HelpAge Germany, 24 June 2018, Amman.
- Ressel, Dr. Gerhard, Desk Officer for 'Employment promotion and labour market policies', Division 321 ('Reducing the causes of flight, supporting refugees, employment initiative Middle East'), German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Berlin, 10 April 2018, Berlin.
- Ranko, Dr. Annette, Resident Representative Jordan, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 21 February 2019, Amman.
- Rieken, Jakob, Forced Displacement Specialist, Middle East Division, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Frankfurt, 21 June 2018, Bonn.
- Roxin, Helge, Head of Evaluation Team, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEVal), Bonn, 21 June 2018, Bonn, as well as 14 January 2019, Bonn.
- Roy, Nicole, Project Advisor, Impact Monitoring – Livelihoods and Cash for Work, Waste Management Portfolio, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018 and 12 February 2019, Amman.
- Sabbagh, Amal, Former Secretary General, Jordanian National Commission for Women, 11 March 2019, Amman.
- Sadoun, Jasmin, Head of Administration, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 24 June 2018, Amman.
- Salem, Ghada, Economic Justice Policy Advisor, Oxfam Jordan, 13 and 25 February 2019, Amman.
- Sandler, David, Project Manager, Danish Refugee Council, Jordan Office, 13 February 2019, Amman.
- Santos-Jara y Pardon, Francisco, Team Leader 'Inclusive Growth', Humanitarian Development and Resilience Advisor, Jordan Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 19 February, Amman.
- Schaub, Christian, Director, KfW Office Jordan, 24 June 2018 and 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Schicklinski, Dr. Judith, Monitoring and Reporting Advisor, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 10 February 2019, Amman.
- Schimmel, Volker, Senior Regional CBI Coordinator, Office of the Director to the Middle East and North Africa Bureau in Amman, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 11 April 2019, Amman.
- Schmid, Jürgen, Country Desk Officer for Jordan, Division 211 ('Near East I, Turkey'), German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 25 January 2018, Bonn.
- Schmid, Mario, Development Advisor, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 10 February 2019, Amman.

- Schmidt, Dr. des. Katharina, Director, German Protestant Institute of Archeology (GPIA), Amman, 25 June 2018, Amman.
- Schumann, Prof. Dr. Dorit, Vice President for International Affairs, German Jordanian University, Madaba, 28 June 2018, Amman.
- Senzel, Ralf, Project Manager, Protection of Water Dams Through Labour Intensive Activities (Cash for Work), Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 30 May 2019, per e-mail.
- Sha'ban, Maram, Technical Advisor, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 10 February 2019, Amman.
- Sheyyab, Dr. Ali, Colonel, Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), Ministry of Interior, 14 February 2019, Amman.
- Shteivi, Prof. Dr. Musa, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 25 June 2018, Amman.
- Smalley, Katherine, Programme Officer, International Organization for Migration, 15 April 2019, Amman.
- Speer, Dr. Johanna, First Secretary, Head of Development Co-operation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Amman, 24 June 2018 and 11 February 2019, Amman.
- Tzannatos, Prof. Dr. Zafiris, Independent Analyst and Researcher, 23 June 2018, Amman.
- Ulmasova-Olive, Irina, Regional Head of Programmes, Eurasia and Middle East, Helpage International, 24 June 2018, Amman.
- van Diesen, Arthur, Regional Social Policy Adviser for MENA, MENA Regional Office in Jordan, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 26 June 2018, Amman.
- von Felbert, Leontine, Project Manager, Jordan Office, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 21 February 2019, Amman.
- von Fircks, Gabriele, Director DAAD Jordan, University of Jordan, 18 February 2019, Amman.
- Wälde, Dr. Helke, Senior Country Manager Middle East, KfW Development Bank, 16 January 2019, by telephone.
- Wedel, Ruben, Evaluator, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn, 10 December, Bonn.
- Wehinger, Franziska, Deputy Head of Country Office Jordan and Iraq, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 18 February 2019, Amman.
- Weltzien, Julie, Project Manager, Improvement of Green Infrastructure in Jordan, Country Office Jordan, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 27 June 2018, Amman, as well as 14 January 2019, Bonn.
- Woods, Elizabeth, Project Director of 'Urban Refugee Support', Jesuit Refugee Services, 18 February 2019, Amman.
- Yacoub, Hamdan, Head of Syrian Refugees Unit, Ministry of Labour, 12 February 2019, Amman.
- Yaghi, Rayan, Livelihoods Project Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council, 13 February 2019, Amman.
- Zoch-Özel, Bettina, Sector Economist, Social Protection, KfW Development Bank, Frankfurt / Main, 06 August 2019, per e-mail.

B – List of interviewed experts on the local level

Al-Azraq

Representative of Governorate, Al-Azraq District, 05 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Technical Advisor, Action Against Hunger, Al-Azraq Office, 03 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Food Security and Livelihood Programme Manager, Action Against Hunger, Al-Azraq Office, 03 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Head of local charity organisation, 3 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Head of community centre, 3 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Head of the development co-operation department in the municipality, 5 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Principal of a school, 25 March 2019, Al-Azraq.

Deyr 'Allā

President of Deyr 'Allā Local Council, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Head of local municipality, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Export Researcher, Plant Protection, Regional Center Deyr 'Allā, National Agricultural Research Center, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Field Advisor, Deyr 'Allā, Programme Irada, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Vice president of local municipality, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Treasurer of local municipality, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Director of the Agricultural Directorate of the Jordan Valley, 24 February 2019, Deyr 'Allā.

Senior Researcher in Plant Physiology and Post-Harvest, Regional Center Deyr 'Allā, National Agricultural Research Center, 25 February, Deyr 'Allā.

Faqū'a

Director of the Agricultural Directorate, 19 March 2019, Faqū'a.

Kafr Şawm

Head of local municipality, 13 March 2019, Kafr Şawm.

Head of local women's organization, 13 March 2019, Kafr Şawm.

Head of local agricultural cooperative, 10 March 2019, Kafr Şawm.

Principal of a school, 21 March 2019, Kafr Şawm.

Kafr Asad

Member of the Local Council of Kafr Asad, 27 February 2019, Kafr Asad.

Project Officer, Waste to (positive) energy, GIZ Jordan, 14 March 2019, Kafr Asad.

Member of the Reform Committee of the Local Council of Kafr Asad, 27 February, Kafr Asad.

President of the Local Council of Kafr Asad, 27 February 2019, Kafr Asad.

Principal of a school, 26 February 2019, Kafr Asad.

Head of the association for rehabilitation for handicapped and retarded (sic!) persons, 17 March 2019, Kafr Asad.

Al-Mafraq

Principal of a school, 26 March 2019, Al-Mafraq.

Tal al-Rummān

Head of the women's cooperative, 28 February 2019, Tal al-Rummān .

Member of the women's cooperative, 28 February 2019, Tal al-Rummān .

Umm al-Jimāl

President of the Jordanian Association for orphans and widows care, Al-Mafraq Governorate, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Head of a local community-based organization, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Representative of local charity, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Local Project Manager, Oxfam, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

Local Project Assistant, Oxfam, 6 March 2019, Umm al-Jimāl.

C – Other sources of interview information

CfW donor coordination group meeting, 13 February 2019, Amman.

CfW donor coordination group meeting, 17 April 2019, Amman.

Focus group discussion with six Syrian refugees (four persons from Damascus, one from Dar'a and one from Homs; all have come to Jordan between 2011 and 2014), 20 February 2019, Amman.

Focus group discussion with seven refugees from countries other than Syria or Palestine (three persons from Sudan, two from Somalia, one each from Iraq and from Ghana; all have arrived in Jordan between 2012 and 2016), 20 February 2019, Amman.

Participatory community discussion on the design of a possible GIZ project, 19 and 21 February 2019, Jabal Al-Nasr, Amman.

Participatory community discussion in public school recently renovated by an Al-Najmah project, 20 February 2019, Marka, Amman.

D – Overview of all field interviews

Inter- view num- ber *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Num- ber of inter- viewees*
1	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
2	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participants	Syrian	males	2
3	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
4	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
5	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	local experts	Jordanians	males	2
6	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	local experts	Jordanians	1 male, 1 female	2
7	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
8	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
9	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
10	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
11	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
12	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
13	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
14	24.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
15	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
16	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
17	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
18	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
19	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
20	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
21	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
22	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
23	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
24	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
25	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
26	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
27	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
28	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
29	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
30	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
31	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local experts	Jordanians	males	2
32	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
43	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
44	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keepers	Jordanians	2 males, 1 female	3
45	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
46	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
47	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	1 male local expert and 1 female other non participants (both Jordanians)			2
48	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
49	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keepers	Jordanians	males	2
50	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keepers	Jordanians	males	2
51	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
52	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
53	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
54	18.03.2019	Hawfa (Kafr Asad)	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
55	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
56	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
57	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
58	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
59	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
60	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
61	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
62	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
63	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
64	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	local expert	Jordanian	female	2
65	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
66	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
67	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
68	28.02.2019	Tal Arumman	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
69	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of inter-viewees*
70	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
71	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
72	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participants	Egyptians	males	2
73	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	1 female CfW participant and 1 male other non-participant (both Syrians)			2
74	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
75	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Syrian	male	1
76	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
77	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
78	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local experts	Jordanians	1 female and 1 male	2
79	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
80	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
81	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
82	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
83	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
84	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
85	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
86	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
87	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
88	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	local expert	Jordanian	male	1
89	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	1 CfW participant and 1 other non-participant	Syrians	males	2
90	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
91	05.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
92	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
93	03.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
94	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
95	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
96	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
97	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participants	Jordanians	females	2
98	07.03.2019	Za'atari	shop keeper	Syrian	male	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of inter-viewees*
99	07.03.2019	Za'atari	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
100	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 Syrian CfW participant and Jordanian other non-participant		females	2
101	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
102	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	local experts	Jordanians	2 females and 1 male	3
103	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
104	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
105	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 CfW participant and 1 other non-participant	Jordanians	males	2
106	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
107	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participants	Jordanians	males	4
108	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
109	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
110	07.03.2019	Za'atari	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
111	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	Local Expert	Jordanian	male	1
112	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
113	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
114	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
115	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
116	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 CfW participant and 2 other non-participant	Jordanians	males	3
117	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participants	Jordanians	females	3
118	06.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
119	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
120	27.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	1 CfW participant and 1 other non-participant	Jordanians	males	2
121	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
122	10.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
123	13.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of inter-viewees*
124	13.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
125	14.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	local experts	Jordanians	1 female and 1 male	2
126	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
127	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
128	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
129	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
130	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	shop keepers	Jordanians	females	2
131	12.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
132	13.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
133	13.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
134	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
135	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	1 female Syrian other non-participant and 1 male Jordanian shop-keeper			2
136	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
137	13.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
138	13.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
139	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
140	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
141	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
142	13.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
143	12.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
144	12.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
146	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
147	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participants	Syrians	1 female and 1 male	2
148	21.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
149	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	CfW participant	Syrian	female	1
150	10.03.2019	Kafr Şawm	local expert	Jordanian	male	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of interviewees*
151	10.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
152	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
153	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
154	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
155	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	2
156	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	3 Jordanian shop keepers, 1 Syrian CfW participant		males	4
157	07.03.2019	Umm el-Jimal	local expert	Jordanian	female	1
158	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
159	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
160	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	2
161	12.03.2019	Kafr Sawm	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
162	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
163	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
164	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
165	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
166	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
167	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
168	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
169	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
170	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
171	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
172	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
173	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
174	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
175	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
176	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	Local expert	Jordanian	female	1
177	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
179	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
180	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
181	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of inter-viewees*
182	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1
183	18.03.2019	Irbid Highway	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
184	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
185	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
186	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
187	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keepers	1 Syrian, 1 Jordanian	male	2
188	26.03.2019	Al-Mafraq	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
189	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
190	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
191	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
192	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
193	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
194	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Syrian	Male	1
195	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
196	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
197	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
198	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
199	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
200	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	Female	1
201	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanians	Males	1
202	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
203	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanians	2 Females	1
204	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	CfW participant	Jordanian	Male	1
205	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
206	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
207	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	2 to 3 females	1
208	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
209	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
210	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Jordanian	male	1
211	19.03.2019	Faqū'a	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1

Inter-view number *	Date	Location	Interviewee	Nationality	Gender	Number of inter-viewees*
212	20.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Syrian	female	1
213	24.03.2019	Faqū'a	other non-participant	Jordanian	Female	1
214	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
215	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
216	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Egyptian	Male	1
217	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
218	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
219	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
220	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Egyptian	Male	1
221	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	other non-participant	Jordanian	female	1
222	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Syrian	male	1
223	25.03.2019	Al-Azraq	shop keeper	Egyptian	male	1
224	24.03.2019	Al-Qaşr	shop keeper	Jordanian	Male	1
225	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
226	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanians	male	1
227	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
228	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
229	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Syrian	Male	1
230	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	other non-participant	Jordanian	Male	1
231	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
232	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Syrian	female	1
233	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	female	1
234	27.02.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
235	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
236	14.03.2019	Kafr Asad	shop keeper	Jordanian	male	1
237	26.02.2019	Kafr Asad	Local expert	Jordanian	male	1
270	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Syrian	male	1
271	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	other non-participant	Jordanian	male	1
272	25.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	other non-participant	Syrian	male	1
273	26.02.2019	Deyr 'Allā	CfW participant	Jordanian	female	1

Annexes

Annex 1: Interview guidelines

Guideline for interviews with CfW participants and non-participants (eligible and non-eligible people)	
Introduction	
* Hello. (small talk about the weather; the family) * I am X. * We are independent researchers working for a German institute. * This is Y, doing the translation. That is Z taking notes. * We are doing a study on the development of your community. Most interesting for us is your personal opinion on the economic situation and the social relations between people in this community. * [Would you be available for a conversation with us? We can also come back later.] * We do not write down names. And all information will be treated confidentially. * And, of course, you may always say if you do not want to answer one or another question. * Duration: 30-40 min	
Demographic information (to be checked or asked during the interview)	
• Sex • Nationality • Who is the head of household in your family? • Place of living (Neighbourhood/City) • How long have you been living in this community? • What is your current employment? • Educational Background • How old are you?	
First part	
<i>Sense of belonging</i> [1] How long have you been living in this community? [2] If not from here, where are you from? (How did you end up here?) [3] Where do you live? Can you describe us your neighbourhood and how is life there? (many shops? Do you like it there? Do you know your neighbours?) [4] Do you take part in community events/events organized by the municipality? [5] Do you have the feeling to be a member/ part of the local community? [6] Is there anything you don't like about your community? [7] Are there separate groups within the community of your town / village? [e.g. are some people of the same group living in the same area of the village] [8] Only Syrians: What is done to make you feel welcome in the community? [9] Have you observed any major changes in the community since... • 2011/2012? (ask Jordanians) • you live here? (ask Syrians)	

Wages / LED

- [10] **What are your main income sources?** [*wages / LED*]
- Please tell us about your main income sources in the last two years.
- [11] (*If CfW Participant*): How do you spend your income?
- Did you invest more or less than before? [*wages / LED*]
 - In which assets? [*wages / LED*]
 - **What do you buy? Where do you buy it?**
- [12] What has changed over the last five years? [*wages / LED*]

Horizontal trust

- [13] **Did your work help you to feel as part of the community?** [*sense of belonging*]
- [14] **Are you working/ have you worked with Syrians/Jordanians?**
- [15] Have you got Jordanian/ Syrian friends? Where and how did you meet them?
- And what about your children? [*horizontal trust*]
 - Do they get along well with the other children in school? (We have heard that in XY Syrian and Jordanian children are in different shifts?)
- [16] Have you already been invited by Syrians/Jordanians?
- [17] *Only Jordanians*: Is a lot being done for making Syrians feel welcome in the community?
- [18] As a part of the community, do you have the same opportunities like all other men and women? [*sense of belonging, but in particular role of women*]
- [19] Have your relations to Syrians/ Jordanians recently become closer?
Can you give us an example?

Second part*Sense of belonging*

- Please have a look at the following cards [*Sense of belonging*]
- CfW programme [adapted to the local name of CfW, e.g. “work program”]
 - Cleaner streets
 - Community events
 - Access to educational services
 - Access to training
 - Improved sanitation
 - Improved Transportation
 - Green spaces
 - Better school
 - *Other: please mention*
- [20] Did any of these factors make you feel as a part of this community?
- Please rank the cards you have selected [*Sense of belonging*]
- [21] Which of these factors have changed your opinion about Jordanians/Syrians in your community?
- Please rank the cards you have selected [*Horizontal trust*]

[22] Do you participate in CfW programmes? <i>Participants:</i> • What were the main reasons why you applied for CfW? (If answer is income: Anything else?) <i>[possible distortion of self-targeting bec of skills development]</i> • Are other people jealous of your participation in the CfW program? <i>Non-participants:</i> • Do you know what these programmes are? (if no, skip rest of the interview) • If yes, do you know people who participate? • If yes: Are people participating in CfW projects better off? [23] What is your opinion about these programmes? [24] What could be improved? (e.g. in terms of participation, length of employment etc.)
<i>Horizontal trust</i> <i>Only Non-participants:</i> [25] In CfW-programmes Syrians and Jordanians are working together, does this make you feel closer to each other? [26] Did CfW programmes affect your relations with Syrians/ Jordanians? <i>[horizontal trust]</i> • If yes, for what reasons? <i>[horizontal trust]</i> <u>(potential answers: existence, participation)</u>
<i>Participation in project design</i> [27] Do you feel that the created infrastructure fits/ suits your needs? <i>[LED]</i> • If yes, how? <i>[participation / targeting/LED]</i> • If not, for what reasons? <i>[participation / targeting/LED]</i> • What kind of infrastructure would you have preferred? <i>[participation / LED]</i> [28] Did CfW increase your feeling of being a member of the community? <i>[participation / targeting/sense of belonging]</i> • How? <i>[participation / targeting/sense of belonging]</i> • If not, for what reasons? <i>[participation / targeting/sense of belonging]</i> • How would CfW programmes need to change so that you would feel more as a member of the community? <i>[participation / targeting/sense of belonging]</i> • Was CfW/ this change particularly important for you as a woman? • Male participants: Would you let your wife also work in this program? (If yes: And in general?) [29] Has there been any consultation process you are aware of before CfW programmes were introduced in your community? <i>[participation / sense of belonging/ vertical trust]</i>
Debriefing * This was our last question. * Thank you so much for your time * We will write a scientific report with all interviews conducted that we will present in Amman (and / or other communities) in April. In this report, we seek to give answers about the effects of CfW programmes, in order to improve them in the future and to increase the benefits for this community. * Do you have any questions for us?

Guideline for interviews with shop keepers

(Shop Owners, Taxi Drivers, Hairdressers, Bakers, Butchers, Street Vendors...)

Introduction

- * Hello. (small talk about the shop)
- * I am X.
- * We are independent researchers working for a German institute (name no institution or ministry!);
- * This is Y, doing the translation. That is Z taking notes.
- * We are interested in the development of your community over the last few years. Most interesting for us is your opinion on the economic situation (and the social relations) between people in the community
- * Would you be available for a conversation with us? We can also come back later.
- * And, of course, you may always say if you do not want to answer one or another question. You can also interrupt the interview at any time.
- * We would like to take some notes if you agree...
- * But we do not write down names. And all information will be treated confidentially.
- * Are there any questions you would like to ask or know about us or the project?

First part (not mentioning CfW programmes)

- [1] How long have you been in this business/have you been working as (e.g. taxi driver, hairdresser...)?
- [2] Did you notice any changes in your business within the last 5 years?
 - If yes, can you tell us what has changed?
 - What do you think are the reasons for this change?

Local consumption/ change of demand

- [3] (*If applicable*) Which products do you sell most? (for business owners, bakers, butchers)
 - Which of these products are produced within this community? (Where do you get your supplies from? (Baker: eg wheat; Butcher: meat etc. // *Women cooperatives; goods produced by women?*)
- [4] Did people buy different products 5 years ago? What are the reasons?
- [5] (*If applicable*) What is the most demanded service? (for taxi drivers, hair dressers)
 - Has this changed over the last 5 years?
 - What are the reasons?

Additional income

- [6] Do you own the business?
- [7] (*If yes*): Did your business profits change during the last 5 years?
 - Why do you think it changed? (higher revenue, less costs?)
- [8] (*If yes*): Did your costs of running the business change?
 - Why do you think they changed?

Multiplier effect

- [9] How do you spend the additional profits?
- [10] Did you invest the additional profit?
 - If yes, in what did you invest?
 - If no, do you think about expanding your business?
 - Did you employ more persons? (If yes, whom? (gender?))
- [11] How many people depend on the income from your business activity?

Crowding-out effect/ creation of assets

- [12] Do people now have better access to your shop? (in case of creation of roads through CfW)
- [13] Did other shops (same business form as interviewee) open or close in the neighbourhood in the last 5 years?
- Do you know why?
 - Where in town are business activities strongest? (Was this different 5 years ago?)

Second part (mentioning CfW programmes)*Awareness of CfW existence*

- [14] Have you heard of the CfW programmes?
- [15] What is your opinion on them?

Change of demand

- [16] Do you know people who participate in the CfW-programmes?
- How do you think they spend their money?
- [17] Are some of the participants customers of your shop/business?
- Do they buy more goods/ask for more services at your shop, than some years ago?
 - What kind of products do they buy?
 - Do they buy locally produced goods?

Outlook

- [18] What do you think is going to happen when the CfW-programmes end?
- Do you think that would have an effect on your business?
 - Do you think people would buy less?
 - Would you sell different products?

Other business people

- [19] Do you know other businesses and persons that benefited from the effects of the CfW-programmes?
- In what way did they benefit?
- [20] Have you heard from any businesses that have opened due to income earned through CfW?

Debriefing

- * This was our last question.
- * Thank you very much for your time.
- * We will write a scientific report with all interviews conducted that we will present in Amman in April.
- * Do you have any questions for us?

Guideline for interviews with representatives of organisations involved in the implementation of CfW or similar programmes (donor agencies, government organisation, NGOs)	
Information required before the interview starts	
	• Number and location of CfW programmes • Duration • Role of interviewed organisation (implementer, donor...)
Statistical information on interviewee	
	• Name of interviewee • Affiliation (name of her/his organisation: university, research centre, international organisation, NGO, government agency, ministry...) • Function within the organisation • Area of activity • Interest and willingness to talk about the subject (our impression during interview)
Introduction	
	* Hello. * We are researchers from the German Development Institute (describe a bit the tasks and role of DIE) * We are in Jordan to conduct research on the effects of CfW programmes.
Activities of the organisation (implementing CfW or similar programmes)	
<i>Programme design</i>	
	[1] For how many programmes are you responsible? • Where are they located? [2] Since when do they exist? [3] For how many (working) days do people participate in the programmes on average? • Is this the official length? [4] How many men and women have participated? • Do you have different conditions of participation for men and women? (regarding length of participation, provision of child care, etc.)
<i>Effects of the programmes (in general)</i>	
	[5] What are the programmes to achieve? (What are their intended effects?) [6] To what extent have these effects been achieved? • Do you see differences in the achievements for female and male participants? [7] What would you see as your main challenges in achieving the intended effects? [8] Have there been unintended effects? [9] Do you think that the programmes have also indirect effects, i.e. effects that go beyond the creation of employment and assets? [10] Do you think that people who do not participate in the programmes themselves benefit from them as well? • To what degree? • In which way? [11] Do you think that some groups of people benefit more from the programmes than others? • Are any groups disadvantaged by the programmes?

Effects on LED

- [12] Would you be aware of any economic impacts that the programmes have on the community?
- And the effect of infrastructure?
 - And the effect on income?
- [13] How important is the economic effect of local procurement?

Effects on social cohesion

- [14] Are Jordanian and Syrian participants working together?
- [15] What do you know about their interactions?
- Have they started forming friendships?
- If programme take place in communities where people are living:*
- [16] Does the existence of the programmes make people feel better included in their communities?
- [17] Do you think that particularly participants who have been working for a longer time in the programmes feel better included in their communities?

Participation of communities

- [18] How does the decision making on the type of activity and location of the programmes look like?
- Are there specific criteria that you follow in the project design process?
 - Who is involved in the decision process?
 - How?
 - How are the local municipalities involved?
 - How is the government of Jordan involved?
- [19] Do you think that the existence of the programmes or the way decisions on programme design are taken has an effect on the trust of Jordanians and Syrians in the authorities?
- [20] Have you heard of any criticism about the decisions on the type of activity and location of the programmes?
- If yes: what were the major issues?
 - If yes: who was particularly critical?
- [21] Do you think that the existence of the programmes or the way decisions on programme design are taken has an effect on the trust between the people living in the different communities?
- If yes: in which way?
 - If yes: has the trust between Syrians and Jordanians been changed?
- [22] Do you think that the existence of the programmes or the way decisions on programme design are taken has an effect on the sense of belonging of people to their respective community?

Targeting

- [23] In which way do you select applicants for participation in your programmes?
- Do participants have to undergo a vulnerability assessment?
- [24] Have you heard of any complaints regarding the fairness and transparency of the process of participant selection?
- [25] Do you think that the process of participant selection has an effect on the sense of belonging of participants to their respective community, ...
- [26] ... to their trust in the authorities or ...
- [27] ... to the trust between members of different groups?
- [28] Have you heard about any tensions in the community that have been caused by negative feelings about the process of participant selection?
- [29] Do you think that the process of participant selection has an effect on the sense of belonging of non-participants to their respective community, ...
- [30] ... to their trust in the authorities or ...
- [31] ... to the trust between members of different groups?

Reforms

- [32] Are you planning to change the programme design?
- [33] How could the existing programmes be improved?

Debriefing

- * This was our last question.
- * Are there points we have not covered and that you would like to mention?
- * Do you have any suggestions about what other people we should also talk with?
- * Thank you very much for your time.

Guideline for interviews with other experts (academics, government officials, NGO representatives)
Information required before the interview starts
• Function and position of interviewee • Role of interviewee • Her/his context, background
Statistical information on interviewee
• Name of interviewee • Affiliation (name of her/his organisation: university, research centre, international organisation, NGO, government agency, ministry...) • Function within the organisation • Area of activity • Interest and willingness to talk about the subject (our impression during interview) • Personal commitment (our impression during interview)
Introduction
* Hello. * We are researchers from the German Development Institute (describe a bit the tasks and role of DIE) * We are in Jordan to analyse the effects of CfW programmes.
First part (open questions)
[1] How much do you think CfW programmes affect the local communities, in which they are active? [2] In which way?
Second part (social cohesion)
* We are analysing social cohesion from the angle of three dimensions: 1. Sense of belonging, which we understand in the context of our research as the degree to which Syrians for example are accepted and feel accepted within the community, to what extent they feel that they are part of the host community and vice versa, etc. 2. Horizontal trust, which we understand as to which degree different groups trust each other. For example, we would look at a Jordanian family whether they would let their kids play with Syrians. 3. Vertical trust, which we understand as the degree to which Syrians and Jordanians trust the institutions.
<i>Sense of belonging to the community</i> [3] How much interaction is happening between Syrians and the local host communities? [4] Do Jordanian host communities welcome Syrians in a different way now in comparison to five years ago? [5] Have you observed that the attitudes of Syrians of their host communities has changed? [6] Have you observed that the participation of Jordanians in CfW programmes has changed their attitudes towards their respective local community? • If any of these yes: Can you say for what reasons? • What is the impact of CfW? [7] What is being done in Jordan to strengthen the sense of belonging within local communities? [8] Which of these measures has the largest possible impact?

[9] What do you think is more important for the effect of CfW programmes on the sense of belonging to local communities: (1) the fact that CfW programmes exist at all, (2) the fact that Syrians and Jordanians work together in the same activities or (3) the creation of public assets that are helpful and nice for the members of local communities? [10] Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future development of sense of belonging within Jordanian local communities? • Why?
<i>Horizontal trust</i> [11] To what degree do Syrians and Jordanians trust each other? [12] Did CfW programmes have an impact on the relationship? • In which way? Do CfW programmes impact on horizontal trust mainly just because they exist and provide opportunities for different groups – or because Syrians and Jordanians work together and get to know people from the respective other group? • What about people who do not participate in the programmes themselves? Has their trust in other groups been affected as well? [13] What about people who <i>cannot</i> participate in the programmes – such as e.g. Yemenites, Palestinians without Jordanian ID card, Iraqis or Somalis? Have they been impacted by the programmes as well? • If so: in which way? [14] What about migrant workers, e.g. from Egypt? Have they been impacted as well? • If so: in which way?
<i>Vertical trust</i> [15] To what degree do Syrians respectively Jordanians trust local government authorities? [16] Do you think that CfW programmes have had an impact on their respective opinions about the local authorities? • In which way? Do CfW programmes impact on vertical trust mainly just because they exist and provide opportunities for different groups – or because they create useful and enjoyable public goods? [17] What about the opinion of other groups who cannot participate in CfW-programmes, such as e.g. Yemenites, Palestinians without Jordanian ID card, Iraqis or Somalis? Have they been impacted as well? • If so: in which way? [18] What about migrant workers, e.g. from Egypt? Has their opinion been affected as well? • If so: in which way?
Third part (LED)
* If we are talking about LED, we are mainly interested in the possible effects that CfW programmes can have on the respective local community as a whole. This includes both, changes in average income and the overall quality of life.
<i>Quality of life</i> [19] Did the creation & maintenance of public goods due to CfW increase the quality of living in the respective local communities?

Multiplier effect

[20] To what degree do local communities benefit in economic terms from CfW programmes?

[21] Do you have the impression that people who do not participate in CfW programmes also benefit from them?

- Would you say that there is evidence for a multiplier effect (second and third round effects on income and consumption)?
- Would you say that there is evidence for an investment effect (CfW programmes triggering and enabling private investment in the respective local community)?
- Would you say that there is evidence for an employment effect (CfW programmes raising average per-capita income in such a way that entrepreneurs employ additional people)?
- Do you know how CfW participants spend their additional income? Do they increase their investment expenditure, start investments or repay debts?
- Do participants spend their additional income locally?

Summarising question

[22] Overall, would you say that Jordanian communities with and without CfW programme activities have developed in different way?

[23] Did Jordanian communities with CfW programme activities change with regards to LED or social cohesion?

Debriefing

- * This was our last question.
- * Are there points that we have not covered and that you would like to mention?
- * Do you have any suggestions about what other people we should also talk with?
- * We will present our results in April in Amman. Would you like to attend this presentation?
- * Thank you very much for your time.

Annex 2: Numbers of interviews conducted by DIE by locality, function, gender and nationality

	Jordani-ans	Syrians	Egyp-tians	Total		Females				Males			
						Jordani-ans	Syrians	Total		Jordani-ans	Syrians	Egyp-tians	Total
All interviewees													
Deyr ‘Allā	16	8	0	24		4	3	7		12	5	0	17
Kafr Asad	44	15	0	59		11	4	15		33	11	0	44
Tal al-Rummān	6	0	0	6		3	0	3		3	0	0	3
Al-Azraq	20	11	4	35		9	1	10		11	10	4	25
Umm al-Jimāl	31	13	0	44		10	7	17		21	6	0	27
Kafr Şawm	42	13	0	55		17	9	26		25	4	0	29
Irbid Highway	6	4	0	10		2	0	2		4	4	0	8
Faqū’a	24	5	1	30		6	2	8		18	3	1	22
Al-Mafraq	15	3	0	18		4	0	4		11	3	0	14
Total	204	72	5	281		66	26	92		138	46	5	189
CfW participants													
Deyr ‘Allā	5	5	0	10		3	2	5		2	3	0	5
Kafr Asad	6	9	0	15		3	2	5		3	7	0	10
Tal al-Rummān	1	0	0	1		0	0	0		1	0	0	1
Al-Azraq	5	6	0	11		3	1	4		2	5	0	7
Umm al-Jimāl	6	7	0	13		1	5	6		5	2	0	7
Kafr Şawm	7	5	0	12		6	4	10		1	1	0	2
Irbid Highway	5	4	0	9		2	0	2		3	4	0	7
Faqū’a	3	3	0	6		1	0	1		2	3	0	5
Al-Mafraq	0	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
Total	38	39	0	77		19	14	33		19	25	0	44
Shop keepers													
Deyr ‘Allā	4	0	0	4		0	0	0		4	0	0	4
Kafr Asad	21	1	0	22		3	1	4		18	0	0	18
Tal al-Rummān	4	0	0	4		2	0	2		2	0	0	2
Al-Azraq	7	3	2	12		1	0	1		6	3	2	11
Umm al-Jimāl	6	2	0	8		0	0	0		6	2	0	8
Kafr Şawm	16	1	0	17		2	0	2		14	1	0	15
Irbid Highway	0	0	0	0		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
Faqū’a	15	0	1	16		2	0	2		13	0	1	14
Al-Mafraq	12	2	0	14		3	0	3		9	2	0	11
Total	85	9	3	97		13	1	14		72	8	3	83

Other non-participants												
Deyr ‘Allā	1	3	0	4	0	1	1	1	2	0	3	
Kafr Asad	7	5	0	12	4	1	5	3	4	0	7	
Tal al-Rummān	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Al-Azraq	2	2	2	6	2	0	2	0	2	2	4	
Umm al-Jimāl	14	4	0	18	6	2	8	8	2	0	10	
Kafr Şawm	16	7	0	23	9	5	14	7	2	0	9	
Irbid Highway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Faqū’a	5	2	0	7	3	2	5	2	0	0	2	
Al-Mafraq	2	1	0	3	0	0	0	2	1	0	3	
Total	47	24	2	73	24	11	35	23	13	2	38	
Local experts												
Deyr ‘Allā	6	0	0	6	1	0	1	5	0	0	5	
Kafr Asad	10	0	0	10	1	0	1	9	0	0	9	
Tal al-Rummān	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	
Al-Azraq	6	0	0	6	3	0	3	3	0	0	3	
Umm al-Jimāl	5	0	0	5	3	0	3	2	0	0	2	
Kafr Şawm	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	
Irbid Highway	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	
Faqū’a	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	
Al-Mafraq	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0		0	
Total	34	0	0	34	10	0	10	24	0	0	24	

Annex 3: Number of cash for work programmes in Jordan outside camps by donor, implementing agency, responsible ministry, sector and governorate

Donor	BMZ			BMZ	NORAD	WFP	Other	Total
Implementing agency	GIZ with local partners			KfW with ILO	ILO	Najma		
Programme	Green In- fra-struc- ture (GI)	Waste to Positive Energy (WtPE)	Water (C4WW)	Employment Intensive Investment (EIIP)		Food for Assets (FFA)		
Total	24	15	33	295	26	7	2	402
Governorate								
Irbid	4	7	4	233	0	5	0	253
Al-Mafraq	5	4	1	47	0	0	0	57
Al-Zarqā'	3	1	2	0	2	0	1	9
Jerash	2	0	1	4	4	0	1	12
'Ajlūn	1	0	0	7	3	0	0	11
Al-Balqā'	3	1	1	0	5	1	0	11
Amman	2	0	0	4	0	1	0	7
Mādabā	0	1	11	0	2	0	0	14
Al-Karak	1	1	13	0	4	0	0	19
At-Tawfīla	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	6
Ma'ān								
Al-'Aqaba	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sector								
Road works	0	0	0	186	0	0	0	186
Waste collection	1	14	1	8	0	1	2	27
Water & sanitation	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Green infrastructure	19	0	1	1	0	0	0	21
Municipalities	0	0	0	30	0	0	0	30
School & health centre maintenance	0	0	0	14	0	5	0	19
Soil erosion	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	5
Nursery	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	3
Hydroponic	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Forestry	0	0	4	8	8	0	0	20
Farming	0	0	5	45	6	0	0	56
Irrigation	0	1	7	0	8	0	0	16
Other agriculture	2	0	4	1	2	0	0	9
N/a	2	0	3	0	1	1	0	7

Donor	BMZ			BMZ	NORAD	WFP	Other	Total
Implementing agency	GIZ with local partners			KfW with ILO	ILO	Najma		
Programme	Green Infra- structure (GI)	Waste to Positive Energy (WtPE)	Water (C4WW)	Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP)		Food for Assets (FFA)		
Responsible ministry								
Public Works & Housing	0	0	0	209	0	0	0	209
Agriculture	0	0	13	55	0	0	0	68
Municipal Affairs	0	13	2	31	0	0	0	46
Environ-ment	20	1	0	0	0	0	0	21
Water and irrigation	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Jordan Valley Au- thority	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
N/a	4	1	12	0	26	7	2	52
Implementing agency								
Municipality	2	8	0	31	0	0	1	42
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	1	1	24	0	0	0	0	26
Royal Society for the Conversation of Na- ture (RSCN)	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Najma (group of NGOs led by JOHUD)	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Tech- nique et au Dévelop- pement (ACTED)	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
National Agricultural Research Council (NARC)	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Action Against Hun- ger (AAH)	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	4
World Vision International (WVI)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
VNG International*	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Oxfam	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
AVSI	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
N/a	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3

Source: own results

Note: number of programmes but size of programmes can differ substantially...

*VNG is the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten)

Annex 4: Results of the first round of the GIZ post-employment survey conducted among all participants of the GIZ Green Infrastructure (GI) Programme during 2019

	all		Jordanian females		Syrian females		Jordanian males		Syrian males	
Total	984		121		131		392		339	
By partner institution										
AVSI	93	9%	28	23%	16	12%	31	8%	18	5%
DRC	39	4%	3	2%	0	0%	30	8%	6	2%
NARC	248	25%	33	27%	30	23%	92	23%	91	27%
RSCN	523	53%	46	38%	72	55%	211	54%	192	57%
Sahab Municipality	51	5%	6	5%	5	4%	18	5%	22	6%
VNG	30	3%	5	4%	7	5%	10	3%	8	2%
By site										
‘Ajlūn	228	23%	40	33%	47	36%	85	22%	55	16%
Al-Baqa‘ah	65	7%	12	10%	12	9%	21	5%	20	6%
Al-Mafraq	23	2%	3	2%	2	2%	8	2%	10	3%
Bal‘amā	17	2%	3	2%	4	3%	5	1%	5	1%
Al-Quwayrah	93	9%	28	23%	16	12%	31	8%	18	5%
Ḍānā	119	12%	0	0%	13	10%	60	15%	45	13%
Deyr ‘Allā	50	5%	8	7%	5	4%	19	5%	17	5%
Fayfā	73	7%	5	4%	12	9%	21	5%	35	10%
Mūjib	103	10%	1	1%	0	0%	45	11%	57	17%
Marū	50	5%	4	3%	5	4%	21	5%	20	6%
Khaldiyyah	60	6%	6	5%	6	5%	23	6%	24	7%
Saḥāb	51	5%	6	5%	5	4%	18	5%	22	6%
Umm al-Jimāl	13	1%	2	2%	3	2%	5	1%	3	1%
Wādī al-Gharaba	39	4%	3	2%	0	0%	30	8%	6	2%
By marital status										
Single	344	35%	42	35%	14	11%	235	60%	52	15%
Married	596	61%	66	55%	95	73%	152	39%	281	83%
Divorced	26	3%	10	8%	9	7%	3	1%	4	1%
Separated	5	1%	1	1%	4	3%	0	0%	0	0%
Widowed	13	1%	2	2%	8	6%	2	1%	0	0%
By highest level of education										
Less than pre-secondary finished	213	22%	18	15%	47	36%	50	13%	98	29%
Pre-secondary finished	415	42%	22	18%	45	34%	181	46%	163	48%
Secondary finished	142	14%	34	28%	14	11%	75	19%	19	6%
Bachelor	64	7%	19	16%	3	2%	27	7%	15	4%
Vocational finished	112	11%	21	17%	16	12%	47	12%	28	8%
Other	38	4%	7	6%	5	4%	12	3%	14	4%

	all		Jordanian females		Syrian females		Jordanian males		Syrian males	
By sufficiency of CfW wage										
Had debts before CfW contract	625	64%	73	60%	89	68%	248	63%	213	63%
CfW wage covered daily needs	730	74%	97	80%	108	82%	296	76%	229	68%
By the three most important uses of the CfW wage										
House rent	446	45%	30	25%	92	70%	94	24%	228	67%
Bills	319	32%	40	33%	65	50%	105	27%	109	32%
Food	305	31%	41	34%	29	22%	115	29%	119	35%
Transportation	167	17%	24	20%	30	23%	63	16%	49	14%
Health	217	22%	26	21%	41	31%	61	16%	89	26%
Education	75	8%	16	13%	7	5%	32	8%	20	6%
Leisure	46	5%	7	6%	1	1%	36	9%	2	1%
Purchasing items	197	20%	45	37%	15	11%	105	27%	31	9%
Debt repay	336	34%	63	52%	51	39%	132	34%	88	26%
Other	65	7%	5	4%	11	8%	34	9%	15	4%
By possibility to save										
Could not save at all	684	70%	75	62%	98	75%	255	65%	253	75%
Saved for education	89	9%	16	13%	13	10%	34	9%	26	8%
Saved for personal items	139	14%	30	25%	15	11%	61	16%	32	9%
Saved for health	126	13%	16	13%	23	18%	50	13%	37	11%
Saved for small business	29	3%	6	5%	1	1%	16	4%	6	2%
Saved for other	36	4%	9	7%	4	3%	8	2%	15	4%
By main things learnt during CfW employment										
Commitment	343	35%	52	43%	54	41%	115	29%	122	36%
Team work	539	55%	79	65%	89	68%	187	48%	181	53%
Friendship	399	41%	60	50%	60	46%	148	38%	129	38%
Patience	242	25%	30	25%	32	24%	99	25%	81	24%
Time Management	177	18%	27	22%	27	21%	75	19%	48	14%
New Technical Skills	235	24%	44	36%	30	23%	98	25%	61	18%
Environmental Awareness	20	2%	1	1%	4	3%	8	2%	7	2%
Other	56	6%	5	4%	3	2%	28	7%	20	6%
Nothing	54	5%	3	2%	9	7%	25	6%	17	5%
By occupational status before CfW started										
Unemployed	603	61%	80	66%	101	77%	246	63%	172	51%
Formal employment	98	10%	5	4%	1	1%	43	11%	49	14%
Informal employment	32	3%	3	2%	3	2%	9	2%	17	5%
Within own expertise	99	10%	11	9%	5	4%	43	11%	40	12%
Outside own expertise	37	4%	2	2%	2	2%	20	5%	12	4%
Other CfW project	20	2%	1	1%	2	2%	5	1%	12	4%
Other	38	4%	6	5%	3	2%	10	3%	19	6%

	all	Jordanian females	Syrian females	Jordanian males	Syrian males
By envisaged occupation after CfW ends					
Another job	55 6%	3 2%	4 3%	30 8%	18 5%
Another income	68 7%	10 8%	2 2%	31 8%	25 7%
Stay in Jordan	912 93%	117 97%	126 96%	361 92%	305 90%
Other CfW project	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
Formal employment	709 72%	75 62%	110 84%	242 62%	279 82%
Training programme	316 32%	42 35%	23 18%	175 45%	75 22%
Informal employment	132 13%	14 12%	12 9%	66 17%	40 12%
Migration	40 4%	5 4%	2 2%	16 4%	17 5%
Does not know	9 1%	0 0%	0 0%	4 1%	5 1%
Other	86 9%	15 12%	18 14%	29 7%	23 7%
By degree of satisfaction					
Would recommend CfW programme to a friend	910 92%	118 98%	125 95%	364 93%	300 88%
Unsatisfied with payment	224 23%	29 24%	11 8%	93 24%	90 27%
Unsatisfied with employer	39 4%	5 4%	1 1%	21 5%	12 4%
Unsatisfied with supervisor	62 6%	14 12%	3 2%	20 5%	24 7%
Unsatisfied with work place	71 7%	21 17%	9 7%	15 4%	26 8%
Unsatisfied with working hours	122 12%	18 15%	18 14%	41 10%	45 13%
Unsatisfied with work equipment	98 10%	9 7%	4 3%	46 12%	39 12%
Unsatisfied with safety	61 6%	6 5%	2 2%	23 6%	29 9%
Unsatisfied with meals	303 31%	39 32%	39 30%	114 29%	110 32%
Unsatisfied with transportation	147 15%	19 16%	24 18%	45 11%	57 17%
Unsatisfied with training	79 8%	13 11%	5 4%	35 9%	26 8%
Unsatisfied with feed-back mechanisms	97 10%	19 16%	8 6%	37 9%	31 9%
By suggestions for improvement					
Increase employment term	8 1%	1 1%	2 2%	3 1%	2 1%
Increase salary	5 1%	1 1%	1 1%	0 0%	3 1%
Decrease working hours	16 2%	2 2%	2 2%	7 2%	5 1%
Improve meals	19 2%	3 2%	5 4%	7 2%	4 1%
Extend training	2 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 1%
Establish literacy centres for workers	2 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 1%	0 0%
Improve treatment by supervisors	1 0%	1 1%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
Improve transportation	9 1%	5 4%	0 0%	1 0%	3 1%
Improve feed-back mechanisms	7 1%	2 2%	0 0%	1 0%	4 1%
Set attendance policy	4 0%	1 1%	0 0%	3 1%	0 0%
Improve work place	3 0%	0 0%	0 0%	3 1%	0 0%
Source: own compilation of data retrieved from GIZ (2019)					

Bivariate correlations between selected variables (t-test)											
	Ability to save				Main lessons learned						
	Could not save at all	Saved for education	Saved for health	Saved for small business	Commitment	Teamworking	Friendship	Patience	Time Management	Technical skills	Environmental awareness
Gender											
Female	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.08
Nationality											
Jordanian	0.04	-0.12	0.11	0.00	-0.02	-0.05	-0.06	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.09
Site											
Ajloun	0.17	-0.06	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.02	-0.05	0.04	-0.12
Khaldia	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.11
Deir Allah	-0.02	-0.03	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.01	0.05	0.17	0.02	-0.04	0.12
Mujib	-0.09	0.11	-0.04	-0.11	-0.07	-0.18	-0.20*	-0.15	-0.06	-0.10	-0.03
Mru	-0.06	0.04	0.09	-0.02	-0.02	0.10	0.14	0.06	0.04	0.11	0.19
Fafa	0.22*	0.19	-0.11	-0.11	-0.06	-0.17	-0.16	-0.21*	-0.16	-0.13	-0.16
Baqaa	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.01	0.13	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.18
Quayra	-0.06	0.09	-0.06	-0.04	0.01	0.14	0.06	0.21*	0.16	0.04	0.13
Dana	-0.09	-0.38**	0.15	0.20*	0.03	-0.08	-0.07	-0.16	-0.09	-0.10	-0.19
Balama	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.10	0.09	-0.01	0.01	0.06	0.00
Sahab	-0.06	0.13	-0.09	-0.09	-0.02	0.00	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.06	-0.09
Wadi Gharba	-0.05	0.07	-0.02	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	0.03	0.07	-0.02	0.00	0.07
Um Ajmal	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.04	-0.02
Mafraq	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.12	-0.02
Marital status											
single	0.05	-0.12	0.11	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.12	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.05
married	-0.04	0.10	-0.08	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	0.04
divorced	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.04	0.00
separated	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.06	-0.03	0.03	-0.03	0.03
widowed	0.04	0.04	-0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.02
Highest level of education											
Less than Pre-Secondary	-0.05	0.05	-0.08	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.10	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.05
Pre-Secondary	0.05	0.10	-0.02	-0.12	0.00	-0.08	-0.05	-0.12	-0.05	-0.10	-0.12
Secondary	0.06	-0.06	-0.03	0.14	-0.09	-0.06	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	0.03	-0.04
Bachelor	-0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.05
Vocational	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	-0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.05
Occupation before CfW											
Unemployed	-0.01	-0.07	-0.02	0.00	0.13	0.06	-0.04	0.05	0.01	-0.03	0.09
Formally employed	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.12	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.02
Informally employed	-0.06	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.00
In other CfW programme	-0.05	-0.07	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.11	-0.01	0.00	0.03
Employed within expertise	0.00	0.06	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.12	-0.01	-0.04
Employed outside expertise	-0.08	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04

Bivariate correlations between selected variables (t-test)									
	Plans after CfW				Three main uses of CfW salary				
	Search longer-term employment	Training	Work in informal sector	Migrate	Rent	Bills	Health	Education	Debt repay
Gender									
Female	0.02	-0.08	-0.05	-0.04	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.06
Nationality									
Jordanian	-0.24*	0.23*	0.07	0.00	0.04	-0.44***	0.00	-0.13	0.24*
Site									
Ajloun	-0.01	0.09	0.12	0.01	-0.07	0.01	0.23*	-0.02	-0.05
Khaldia	0.06	0.00	-0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.14	0.03	0.05	-0.12
Deir Allah	-0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.09	-0.02	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.12
Mujib	-0.12	-0.08	0.01	-0.05	-0.24*	-0.06	-0.06	-0.13	0.07
Mru	-0.03	0.09	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.12	0.02
Fafa	0.18	-0.19	-0.11	-0.06	0.15	-0.24*	-0.13	-0.10	-0.07
Baqaa	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.11	-0.02	0.14	-0.09
Quayra	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.11	0.06	0.03	-0.08	0.01	0.19
Dana	-0.03	-0.10	-0.10	-0.08	0.00	-0.06	-0.04	-0.08	-0.12
Balama	0.07	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.07	-0.06	0.02	0.03
Sahab	0.03	-0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.11	-0.03	-0.09	-0.02	-0.06
Wadi Gharba	-0.04	0.19	0.07	-0.02	0.06	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05	0.12
Um Ajmal	0.05	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.05	0.08
Mafrq	-0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.05	0.02
Marital status									
single	-0.22*	0.16	0.11	-0.02	0.05	-0.31**	0.02	-0.08	0.30**
married	0.22*	-0.14	-0.09	0.04	-0.02	0.28*	-0.05	0.06	-0.31**
divorced	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.11
separated	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.05	0.04	0.07	-0.04
widowed	0.03	-0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.13	0.09	0.00	0.02	-0.06
Highest level of education									
Less than Pre-Secondary	0.20*	-0.15	-0.10	0.00	-0.10	0.24*	-0.02	0.06	-0.25*
Pre-Secondary	0.05	-0.14	-0.03	-0.05	0.10	-0.04	-0.16	-0.05	-0.06
Secondary	0.04	-0.06	0.00	-0.04	-0.17	0.09	0.05	0.01	-0.05
Bachelor	-0.07	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.05	-0.08	0.05	0.04	0.13
Vocational	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.06	0.05	-0.04	0.07
Occupation before CfW									
Unemployed	-0.07	-0.04	-0.06	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.03
Formally employed	0.07	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	-0.07	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.01
Informally employed	-0.03	0.11	0.03	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.03	-0.07	0.01
In other CfW programme	-0.01	0.09	0.05	0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.04	0.01	-0.02
Employed within expertise	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.25*	-0.01	0.10	-0.02	0.00	-0.01
Employed outside expertise	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.15	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.02

